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The retirement of the baby boomers will initiate a dramatic aging 
of the U.S. population. The baby boom, the large generation born be-
tween 1946 and 1964, is currently of working age. But the entire gen-
eration turns 65, the traditional work-retirement divide, between 2010 
and 2030. As the generations that follow are of roughly similar size, a 
roughly stable labor force will have to support an enormous expansion 
of the elderly population. 
Most	elderly	people	in	the	United	States,	defined	as	the	population	
age 65 and over, currently enjoy a reasonably secure and adequate in-
come. This income comes largely from two main sources—Social Se-
curity and employer-sponsored retirement plans. The impending demo-
graphic transition, and the rapid decline of employer support for tradi-
tional	defined-benefit	pensions,	threatens	the	nation’s	ability	to	provide	
reasonably secure and adequate old-age incomes going forward. 
Reform,	however,	has	been	difficult.	Policymakers,	and	people	in	
general, tend to ignore problems lying far in the future, and Social Se-
curity	has	enough	money	to	pay	full	benefits	until	2041.	Most	people	
also thought that the growth of 401(k) plans, and similar individual ac-
count retirement savings plans, would be able to replace the decline in 




also grew over the ability of 401(k)s to replace traditional employer-
sponsored pensions. A widening ideological divide and resistance to 
tax	increases,	benefit	cuts,	and	government	regulation	have	meanwhile	
resulted in political deadlock. Interestingly, policymakers of all stripes 
have embraced the use of investments in equities as an important com-
ponent of their proposals to reform Social Security, but there is no con-
sensus on how this should be done.1 
The purpose of this book is to explore the use of equities to help 
solve	the	Social	Security	financing	problem.	Equities	offer	a	promising	
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way forward due to the high expected returns on stocks and the diver-
sification	of	the	program’s	funding	sources	beyond	the	payroll	tax.	But	
the	use	of	equities	would	also	introduce	a	host	of	new	and	difficult	chal-
lenges and could dramatically change the structure of Social Security 
in the United States. 
To identify the challenges and implications for the structure of the 
nation’s retirement income system, this book explores the experience 
of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. These three nations ini-
tially had retirement income systems quite similar to the U.S. system, in 
that they relied on both government and employer plans to provide the 
bulk of old-age income. These countries also face similar demographic 
and economic challenges. In response, they each introduced equities 
into their Social Security programs. 
The reforms adopted by these nations largely mirror the three pro-
posals that came out of the 1994–1996 Social Security Advisory Coun-
cil—proposals	that	define	the	primary	approaches	for	including	equities	
in the U.S. Social Security program. The United Kingdom introduced 
equities through a system of “carve-out” individual accounts, whereby 
Social Security revenues are not increased but a portion can be diverted 
to individual accounts, where they can be invested in equities. Canada 
adopted the “trust fund investment” approach, which prefunds future 
Social Security obligations by building up assets in a trust fund and in-
vesting a portion of those assets in equities. Australia adopted a reform 
similar to the “add-on individual accounts” proposal, although the anal-
ogy is somewhat weaker than in the other two cases, where the govern-
ment mandates contributions to individual accounts that can be invested 
in equities. The experience of these three nations sheds light on the risks 
and complications associated with the use of equities in the U.S. Social 
Security program and how the introduction of equity investment in So-
cial Security could reshape the nation’s retirement income system. 
Additional information on the challenges created by equity invest-
ment also emerges from an analysis of the history of employer-spon-
sored	 defined-benefit	 plans.	 These	 plans	were	 once	 the	 backbone	 of	
the employer-based retirement income system in the United States and 
these three other nations. They are now in the process of being replaced 
by 401(k)-type individual account retirement savings plans. Factors 
contributing to this shift are the risk and uncertainty that equity invest-
ment in pension funds create for employers. Identifying the pitfalls that 
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have plagued the private sector provides insights on the ability of public 
plans to introduce equity investment.
Any change to the nation’s Social Security system must be evalu-
ated within the context of the other sources of income available to older 
people. In the United States, the shift to 401(k) plans means that indi-
viduals are exposed to market risk during the accumulation phase and 
interest rate risk at retirement in their supplementary retirement plans. 
This exposure increases the desirability of introducing equities into the 
public plan in a way that minimizes the risk faced by the individual. 
WHAT EqUITIES CAN AND CANNOT DO
It is important to clarify that introducing equities into the Social 
Security	program,	by	itself,	will	not	significantly	reduce	the	burden	on	
future generations of providing for a greatly expanded elderly popu-
lation. The primary way to reduce that burden is to increase national 
saving. Without an increase in national saving, the accumulation of eq-
uities in the Social Security trust fund, and decumulation of Treasury 
bonds, would only produce an offsetting reduction in equities held by 
the general public, and an increase in the public’s holdings of Treasury 
bonds. More saving, on the other hand, means more investment, in-
creased productivity growth, and a bigger economic pie down the road. 
This bigger pie would ease the burden on future workers, leaving them 
more national output after they meet the claims of the elderly. To in-
crease national saving, however, the current generation would have to 
reduce current consumption to increase contributions to the retirement 
income system or other saving vehicles. 
The proposals to reform Social Security that involve equity invest-
ment would accumulate these assets either in the Social Security trust 
fund or in individual accounts. Economists worry, however, that both 
approaches might be less than fully effective as a mechanism for build-
ing national savings. Many economists claim that the accumulation of 
Treasury bonds in the Social Security trust fund, following the reform 
of the program in the early 1980s, led to an expansion of government 
spending that offset the buildup of trust fund reserves and its positive 
effect on national saving. Shifting trust fund investments from Treasury 
4   Munnell and Sass
bonds to stocks would help address this problem, but concerns remain 
about using the government as a custodian of national savings. Econo-
mists are also concerned about the effectiveness of individual accounts 
as a mechanism for increasing national savings. If workers see their 
retirement wealth as more immediate and real as a result of this transi-
tion, they could be tempted to increase consumption and reduce other 
forms of saving. 
While investment in equities, by itself, does not ease the burden on 
future	generations,	it	could	have	two	important	advantages.	The	first	is	
an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing (Bohn 1997; Diamond 
1997).	In	general,	efficient	risk	sharing	requires	individuals	to	bear	more	
risk when young and less when old. This is because it is easier for the 
young to work more if they suffer a capital loss. They can also average 
returns over time and take advantage of the fact that declines in stock 
prices are typically associated with higher returns in the next period. As 
the old are in the process of liquidating their equity holdings, they can-
not take full advantage of this property. It is also reasonable to assume 
that the young are less risk averse than the old and hence more inclined 
to carry stock market risk.
However, the young generally hold no risky, high-yielding as-
sets, and their implicit asset—Social Security—is invested in Treasury 
bonds. Introducing equities into the Social Security program, either 
through the trust fund or individual accounts, would shift the portfolio 
of assets held by the young to include less low-risk, low-return bonds 
and	more	 high-risk,	 high-return	 stocks.		 If	 the	 financial	 assets	 in	 the	
economy remain unchanged, the portfolios of the old would hold more 
bonds and less stock. Introducing equities into the Social Security pro-
gram thus shifts risk from the old to the young, which improves the age 
distribution of risk and could make all generations better off (Arrow 
and Lind 1970). 
The second argument in favor of equity investment is more politi-
cal than economic—that it could make Social Security less expensive 
and	diminish	pressure	to	cut	benefits	or	increase	taxes.	Even	without	an	
increase in national saving, introducing equities with their higher ex-
pected	returns	into	Social	Security	should	increase	the	flow	of	income	
going to the expanding elderly population. It would give the elderly a 
larger share of the economic pie and a smaller share to the young. But, 
rather than accomplishing this transfer through higher payroll taxes, 
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the burden of supporting the expanded elderly population would be 
met through a reduction in the capital income of young investors, who 
would hold more bonds and fewer equities than they otherwise would. 
By	making	Social	Security	benefits	less	expensive,	including	equity	in-
vestments would thus reduce political risk to the program. 
EvALUATINg EqUITy RISKS IN RETIREMENT PLANS
A central issue in the debate over the introduction of equities is the 
thorny question of how to treat the risk in such investments when evalu-
ating	 the	finances	of	 retirement	 income	systems.	Some	experts	argue	
that holding equities should reduce the projected contributions required 
to	fund	a	defined-benefit	plan,	such	as	Social	Security,	or	increase	the	
projected income generated in individual retirement accounts. After all, 
stocks	yield	7	percent	 after	 inflation	 and	bonds	only	3	percent.	Oth-
ers claim this is nonsense. The higher expected return on equities re-
flects	their	greater	risk.	Any	serious	financial	evaluation	of	retirement	
arrangements, they say, must “risk-adjust” these returns. After account-
ing for risk, the amount of contributions needed to fund future pen-
sion obligations (or the amount of income an individual account could 
generate) is the same regardless of whether the assets are invested in 
equities or bonds. 
There is no clear consensus within the government on how to evalu-
ate the use of equities in Social Security reform proposals. The Social 
Security	actuaries	take	the	first	approach	and	credit	equities	with	their	
expected	rate	of	return.	The	Congressional	Budget	Office	(CBO),	a	key	
government gatekeeper, ignores the higher expected return and credits 
equities as yielding the long-term Treasury rate. The CBO, in effect, 
views the cost of the additional risk in stocks as precisely offsetting 
their additional return. 
The government also confronted this issue when Congress intro-
duced equities into the funding of the Railroad Retirement System in 
2001.	Congress	 raised	 benefits,	 reduced	 contributions,	 and	 sought	 to	
square the circle by authorizing investments in equities and other non-
traditional	assets.	But	the	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	(OMB),	
another key government scoring agency, ignored the higher expected 
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return on equities and used the long-term Treasury rate to project fu-
ture trust fund balances. Like the CBO, the OMB viewed the additional 
risk in stocks as precisely offsetting the additional return.2 The agency 
clearly sought to avoid a situation where the government could appear 
to raise money simply by issuing debt and buying stock with the pro-
ceeds. 
Adjusting for risk makes an enormous difference when assess-
ing Social Security reform proposals that rely on equity investments. 
Projections using the riskless rate produce no reduction in the funding 
shortfall	in	trust	fund	investment	proposals	and	dramatic	benefit	reduc-
tions in carve-out individual account proposals.3 
What then is the best way to evaluate the use of equities in retire-
ment plans? It depends on the objective. 
If the goal is to compare different proposals with the current system 
for policy purposes, then the bond return is the appropriate choice. The 
only way to get an “apples-to-apples” comparison is to look at streams 
of income with similar risk characteristics, and bonds rather than equi-
ties	have	the	characteristics	most	similar	to	benefits	under	the	current	
system. 
If the goal is to assess the likely outcome under a reformed system, 
the evaluation is more complex. The natural instinct is to think that 
investing in equities will probably	lead	to	a	higher	benefit	in	individual	
account	proposals	(or	smaller	deficits	in	the	trust	fund	investment	pro-
posals) since equities have historically outperformed bonds. The extent 
to which individual participants (or future taxpayers) can capture these 
higher returns, however, depends on their ability to manage the risk. 
If participants (or taxpayers) have other resources or can pool risk or 
delay retirement, they could weather market downturns more easily. 
Or, if the risks are pooled across individuals and over generations by 
having the trust fund invest in equities, they can be managed more ef-
ficiently.	These	risk	management	considerations	have	a	direct	impact	on	
the ability of different reform proposals to capture the higher expected 
return on equities, after properly subtracting the cost of the risk in such 
investments.
The different approaches to introducing equities into the Social Se-
curity program, in other words, are far from equal. The distribution of 
risk and its implications, as well as more conventional costs and ben-
efits,	depend	crucially	on	whether	equities	enter	the	program	through	
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individual accounts or the Social Security trust fund. Transaction costs 
and governance challenges—many of which emerge in response to the 
risk in equity investment—also vary dramatically from one approach 
to another.
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE U.S. RETIREMENT SySTEM 
The majority of the elderly currently enjoy a relatively good eco-
nomic position. Their cash incomes are generally lower than what they 
earned prior to retirement, but they need less. They no longer pay Social 
Security payroll taxes and typically pay less income tax. Their children 
are typically out of the house and no longer a drain on their incomes. 
Nor do they have working expenses. The elderly typically own their 
homes free and clear and do not have to save for retirement. The free-
dom from having to work, and the ability to use one’s time to shop more 
effectively, produce goods and services previously purchased on the 
market,	and	generally	enjoy	life	as	one	sees	fit,	are	important	lifestyle	
advantages. All in all, the elderly generally enjoy a standard of living 
not much different from that of their preretirement years. 
The retirement income of the elderly comes from two main sourc-
es—Social Security and employer retirement plans. As Figure 1.1 
shows, Social Security alone supplies 37 percent of the income of the 
elderly, 52 percent if earnings from work are excluded. Employer-
sponsored retirement plans provide another 20 percent, over a quarter 
when earnings from work are excluded, and are especially important for 
middle-	and	upper-middle-income	households.	The	only	other	signifi-
cant sources of old-age income—investment income and earnings from 
work—are important only for those at the top of the income scale, and 
earnings from work, which tend to put recipients in the upper quintile, 
disappear as individuals age. 
However, Social Security and employer plans are ill-equipped to 
provide the same level of support going forward. Legislation enacted 
in 1983, which raised the “normal retirement age” from 65 to 67 be-
tween 2000 and 2022, has already resulted in cuts in the level of pre-
retirement earnings that Social Security will replace, and rising health 
care costs will dramatically eat into future Social Security payments.4 
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Major changes in the nature of employer plans raise critical questions 
as to their ability to replace the same share of earnings in the future as 
they currently do, let alone make up for the decline in Social Security. 
Americans thus face the prospect of a sharp drop in their standard of 
living in retirement, with the fall-off getting steeper with each succeed-
ing cohort. 
The Future of Social Security
Under Social Security, active workers pay into the program, and 
they	 or	 their	 families	 receive	 benefits	when	 they	 retire,	 become	 dis-
abled, or die. The system functions on a partially funded basis. Roughly 
75	percent	of	current	revenues	go	to	pay	current	benefits,	and	the	re-
mainder is used to build up the Social Security trust fund. Over the next 











SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 Current Popula-
tion Survey.
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75	years,	benefit	costs	will	rise	as	the	population	ages.	The	ratio	of	the	
elderly population (age 65 or over) to working age adults (ages 20–64) 
will rise from 20 percent today to about 35 percent by 2030 (Figure 
1.2). The child dependency ratio—the ratio of the population age 19 
or younger to working-age adults—will decline, offsetting some of the 
rising aged dependency burden. Because the elderly consume far more 
resources per capita than children, the offset is not one for one. 
The rise in the number of elderly relative to the working-age pop-
ulation	will	 increase	 the	 cost	 of	 Social	 Security	 benefits	well	 above	
payroll tax receipts (Figure 1.3). Without any change, future revenues 
combined with the assets in the trust fund will allow Social Security to 
pay	100	percent	of	benefits	until	2040.	Once	the	trust	fund	is	exhausted,	
revenues	will	cover	only	about	70	percent	of	scheduled	benefits.	The	
federal budget will be affected earlier, when Social Security begins to 
redeem its trust fund assets. Instead of being a steady purchaser of gov-
ernment bonds, Social Security will become an added burden on the 

















Figure 1.2  U.S. Population Age 65+ as a Percentage of Population 20–64, 
1950–2050
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration (2006).
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Each	year,	the	Office	of	the	Actuary	of	Social	Security	prepares	a	
high,	low,	and	intermediate	cost	projection	for	the	financial	position	of	
the program for the following 75 years, with the intermediate projection 
playing a central role in the political process. In 2006, the difference over 
the projection period between the present discounted value of promised 
benefits	and	the	present	discounted	value	of	projected	revenues,	using	
the intermediate cost estimate, was $4.9 trillion (Table 1.1). Since the 




payroll tax rate needs to be raised immediately by roughly 2 percent of 
covered earnings—1 percent each for employers and employees—for 
Social	Security	to	pay	the	current	package	of	benefits	to	everyone	who	
reaches retirement age through 2080.
Social	Security’s	 long-term	financing	problem	 is	 somewhat	more	
complicated. If balance were restored only over the next 75 years, the 
Figure 1.3  Projected U.S. Social Security Revenue and Benefit Rates as a 
Percent of Covered Payroll, 2004–2080






















Regardless of how the shortfall is measured, changes are needed 
to	bring	Social	Security’s	 inflows	and	outflows	back	 into	 line.	These	
changes	can	take	the	form	of	benefit	cuts,	tax	increases,	or	an	increase	
in the returns on assets. As discussed above, many policymakers want 
to	avoid	higher	taxes	or	lower	benefits	and	thus	have	turned	to	equities	
as part of the solution. 
Policymakers	are	reluctant	to	cut	benefits	because	Social	Security	is	
already	scheduled	to	replace	a	significantly	smaller	portion	of	preretire-
ment earnings than it does today. A person with average earnings retir-
ing	at	65	currently	receives	benefits	equal	to	$1,180	per	month	or	about	
42 percent of previous earnings. After the Medicare Part B premium is 
automatically	deducted	from	Social	Security	benefits,	the	replacement	
rate drops to 38.5 percent. Under current law, Social Security replace-
ment	rates—benefits	as	a	percent	of	preretirement	earnings—are	sched-
uled to decline at any given retirement age for three reasons. First, the 
increase in the normal retirement age from 65 to 67, currently in prog-
ress, is equivalent to an across-the-board cut. Second, Medicare Part B 
premiums are slated to increase sharply due to rising health care costs. 
Finally,	Social	Security	benefits	will	be	taxed	more	under	the	personal	
income	tax,	as	the	exemption	amounts	are	not	indexed	to	inflation.	As	
shown in Table 1.2, these three factors will reduce the net replacement 




As a percent of
Taxable payrolls GDP
2006–2080 4.9a 2.02 0.7
2006–Infinity 13.4 3.7 1.3
a The	$4.9	trillion	includes	$4.6	trillion,	the	difference	between	scheduled	benefits	and	
projected revenues, and $343 billion required to bring the trust fund to 100 percent of 
annual cost by the end of the period.
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration (2006).
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rate for the average earner who retires at age 65 from 38.5 percent today 
to 29.3 percent in 2030, or $800 in today’s terms. Restoring solvency 
through	cuts	in	benefits	would	reduce	this	level	of	support	still	further.	
The Future of Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans
Employer-sponsored retirement plans, the only other important 
source	of	 income	for	most	older	Americans,	seem	ill-equipped	 to	fill	
in the gap. Indeed, most observers question their ability to provide the 
same level of replacement income that they do today. The problem is not 
that a smaller share of the workforce participates in an employer plan. 
Participation rates have been remarkably steady over the past quarter 
century, at about half the private sector workforce, and they are likely to 
remain much the same going forward. Rather, the nature of these plans 
has	changed	so	dramatically	that	it	is	very	difficult	to	predict	the	income	
they will provide when the baby boom retires. 
As noted above, employer plans currently provide 20 percent of 
the cash income of individuals age 65 and over—27 percent if we ex-




get in retirement vary quite a bit, depending on how often they changed 
Table 1.2  U.S. Social Security Replacement Rates for Average Earner 
Retiring at Age 65, 2005 and 2030
Provision Replacement rate (%)
2005
Reported replacement rate 42.2
After Medicare Part B deduction 38.5
2030
Replacement rate after extension of normal 
retirement age
36.3
After deduction for Medicare Part B 32.0
After personal income taxation 29.3
SOURCE: Munnell (2003) and authors’ updates.
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jobs. Once a worker retires, these pensions generally remain the same 
until	the	worker	dies.	The	major	uncertainty	is	the	rate	of	inflation	be-
cause	benefits	are	generally	defined	as	a	fixed	dollar	amount	and	lose	
purchasing power as prices rise. The elderly nevertheless can rely on a 
reasonably secure stream of income for the remainder of their lives. 
Most	baby	boomers,	by	contrast,	 are	 covered	by	“defined-contri-
bution” plans (Figure 1.4). In these arrangements, workers and their 
employers	contribute	a	defined	portion	of	the	worker’s	wage	to	an	indi-
vidual savings account. At retirement, the worker gets the accumulated 
contributions and investment income as a lump sum. The retirement 
income these plans provide depends on a host of factors, including how 
much	workers	and	employers	contribute,	the	real	after-inflation	return	
on assets in the accounts, how workers draw down their balances (both 
before and after retirement), and how long they live. Given the experi-
ence	to	date,	defined	contribution	plans	are	unlikely	to	replace	a	greater	
share	of	preretirement	income	than	defined-benefit	plans.	This	income	
Figure 1.4  Coverage by Type of Plan, U.S. Private Sector Wage and 

















SOURCE: Buessing and Soto (2006).
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is	also	subject	to	significantly	greater	risks	and	uncertainties	than	a	tra-
ditional pension. As a result, employer-sponsored plans in the future 
are unlikely to be as secure and reliable a source of retirement income 
as they are today. The baby boom generation thus faces the prospect of 
a sharp decline in living standards at retirement and even serious hard-
ship as they age (see Box 1.1). 
The challenge is to restore solvency to the Social Security program, 
make employer-sponsored plans work as well as they can, and maintain 
the contribution of these programs to retirement income security.5 As 
noted	above,	many	proposals	 to	eliminate	Social	Security’s	financing	
shortfall involve the introduction of equities in one form or another. 
The following chapters review the creation of modern retirement in-
come systems, examine the current situation in the United States and 
the experience of reforms enacted in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and Canada, and draw lessons for the United States on how the intro-
duction of equity investments into the Social Security program could 
affect	individuals	and	influence	the	evolution	of	the	nation’s	retirement	
income system. 
Box 1.1  It’s Not Just the Baby Boom
The American population has been aging ever since the 
founding of the republic, the result primarily of declining fertil-
ity and rising life expectancy. Over the 200-year period between 
1880 and 2080, the shape of the U.S. age distribution will change 
from a pyramid to almost a rectangle as the relative number of 
older people rises and the relative number of children declines 
(see	the	adjoining	figure).	Note	that	neither	date	that	brackets	this	
200-year period has anything to do with the baby boom genera-
tion;	1880	predates	the	first	boomer	by	more	than	six	decades,	and	
by 2080 virtually all the boomers will have died. (The youngest 
boomers, born in 1964, would be 116 years old in 2080.) The pas-
sage of the baby boom affects the timing of population aging, but 
the phenomenon is the result of the long decline in the number of 
babies per woman and of the increase in life expectancy.
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Box 1.1  (continued)
SOURCE: Munnell (2004).
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ORgANIzATION OF THE vOLUME
Chapter 2 describes how retirement income systems emerged in all 
industrial nations in response to a common set of problems. These na-
tions now all face the challenge of rapid population aging, and three 
countries that had a mix of government and employer plans much like 
ours (the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada) have responded with 
reforms incorporating equity investment that are especially instructive 
for the United States. Most nations on the European continent, by con-
trast, opted for public or publicly directed solutions. The experience of 
other Anglo-Saxon nations is thus most relevant to policymakers in the 
United States. 
Chapter 3 describes the challenges facing the U.S. retirement in-
come system. After 1980, serious solvency problems emerged in both 
employer	defined-benefit	pension	plans	and	Social	Security.	Reforms	
addressing the solvency of employer plans have been relatively inef-
fective, largely due to their inability to address the risk in equity invest-
ments. A far more important change in employer plans has been the 
shift	 from	 defined-benefit	 to	 defined-contribution	 formats—a	 change	
that exacerbated the risks in private retirement income programs, re-
duced the ability to effectively manage such programs, and raised new 
questions about retirement income adequacy. 
A major reform of the Social Security program, in 1983, cut ben-
efits,	increased	contributions,	and	restored	solvency	over	the	program’s	
75-year planning horizon. The funding shortfall reemerged, however, 
as the passage of time brought more years on the other side of the fund-
ing “cliff” within the program’s 75-year planning horizon. 
The	1994–1996	Social	Security	Advisory	Council	attempted	to	fix	
the problem. The council members resisted—for different reasons—re-
storing	balance	simply	by	raising	taxes	or	cutting	benefits.	They	all	re-
sorted to a new source of revenue—namely, the higher expected return 
on equity investment—but failed to reach a consensus around a single 
plan. Instead, the council produced three separate proposals: 1) “carve 
out” individual accounts invested in equities, funded by redirecting a 
significant	 portion	 of	 current	 payroll	 taxes	 and	 sharply	 reducing	 the	
guaranteed	social	 insurance	benefit;	2)	“add-on”	 individual	accounts,	
invested	in	equities,	that	would	top	up	the	reduced	benefits	that	could	be	
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financed	by	the	payroll	tax;	and	3)	a	portion	of	trust	fund	assets	invested	
in equities. No action has since been taken, and these three options re-
main on the table. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have all 
introduced equities into their Social Security programs, each along the 
lines of one of these three approaches. 
Chapter 4 reviews the experience of the United Kingdom, which re-
formed its retirement income system and introduced equities along the 
lines of the carve-out approach. To achieve solvency, the government 
sharply	cut	traditional	social	insurance	benefits.	To	raise	retirement	in-
comes back toward levels initially envisioned for the public program, it 
allowed workers to carve out a portion of their payroll tax to contribute 
to an individual account that invests in equities. In exchange, workers 
give	up	a	portion	of	their	diminished	Social	Security	benefits.	
The British experience clearly illustrates a series of shortcomings to 
such an approach. Individual accounts, which were primarily offered in 
the	financial	marketplace	rather	than	through	an	employer-	or	govern-
ment-run program, encountered high administrative costs that market 
forces have not been able to reduce. Major scandals also illustrate seri-
ous	difficulties	in	protecting	unsophisticated	workers	from	misleading	
selling practices. Meanwhile, the government’s guaranteed social secu-
rity	benefits	have	fallen	below	the	traditional	income	floor	guaranteed	
by the public welfare system—20 percent of national average earnings. 
In	response,	the	government	expanded	the	means-tested	benefits	for	the	
elderly. To mitigate the disincentive to work or save created by these 
means-tested	benefits,	Britain	introduced	a	tapered	withdrawal	rate	for	
the	 elderly—reducing	means-tested	 benefits	 by	 40	 pence	 per	 pound,	
rather than pound for pound. As a result, half the elderly are now eli-
gible	for	welfare	benefits	and	three-quarters	are	projected	to	be	eligible	
by the middle of the century. 
Proponents of the carve-out approach generally claim that they 
want to reduce dependence on the state and increase reliance on indi-
vidual	initiative	and	private	financial	markets.	The	British	experience	
suggests that the outcome of the carve-out approach is likely to be a ma-
jor	expansion	in	means-tested	benefits,	just	the	opposite	of	the	desired	
increase in self-reliance. 
Chapter 5 reviews the experience of Australia, which reformed its 
system and introduced equities along the lines of the add-on approach. 
The analogy is not perfect, but the introduction of individual accounts 
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was accompanied by a big increase in contributions. Australia added 
mandatory contributions to individual retirement savings accounts, 
which could invest in equities, atop its preexisting public pension pro-
gram. In Australia, these mandatory contributions are generally collect-
ed and invested collectively, which reduces administrative costs and 
relieves workers of many of the decisions they have to make in the UK 
system. The other component of Australia’s retirement income system 
is its means-tested Age Pension. The Age Pension is far more generous 
than the UK means-tested program; it guarantees an income of about a 
third of national average earnings, reduced by 40 cents for each dollar 
of other income above a minimal amount. Nearly all elderly Australians 
qualify	for	a	full	or	partial	benefit.	In	a	system	dependent	on	individual	
accounts invested in equities, the Age Pension means test performs a 
valuable risk-management service. It assures a reasonably comfort-
able income to those who outlive their individual account assets, invest 
poorly, or are in unlucky cohorts when it comes to investment returns. 
The Age Pension, however, also creates a powerful disincentive to work 
or save that should become a serious problem as assets build up in the 
nation’s mandatory savings program. 
Chapter 6 reviews the experience of Canada, which reformed its 
system and introduced equities along the lines of the trust fund ap-
proach. It accelerated scheduled tax increases to prefund future ben-
efits	(which	the	United	States	had	done	in	1983)	and	invested	the	ac-
cumulated assets in equities (whereas the United States stayed with 
government	bonds).	The	 trust	 fund	approach	has	significant	financial	
advantages over the use of individual accounts, especially if the policy 
objective	 is	 to	 achieve	 some	 specified	 level	 of	 retirement	 income.	 It	
is much better at handling the risks inherent in equity investment and 
avoids the work and saving disincentives seen in the Australian system. 
The trust fund approach also has much lower administrative and gover-
nance costs. The power it potentially puts in the hands of government, 
however, raises serious political issues. In response, Canada developed 
an elaborate governance design to minimize political involvement in 
the management of trust fund assets. Although the program has only 
been in place a few years, the Canadian experience suggests that the 
problem is manageable. It also appears considerably less daunting than 
the task of governing equity investments in a myriad of Social Security 
individual accounts. 
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Chapter 7 reviews the lessons drawn from the foreign experience. 
It suggests that the trust fund approach, adopted by Canada, may be the 
most promising way to introduce equities into the U.S. Social Security 
program. Although the program is relatively new, trust fund investment 
in	equities	seems	like	the	most	efficient	way	to	manage	the	risks	and	
administrative challenges inherent in equity investment while deliver-
ing a targeted level of retirement income. The Canadians have also de-
veloped a governance system that illustrates the ability of government 
to	keep	investment	management	essentially	free	of	political	influence.	
The Canadian approach seems to be well regarded both in Canada and 
internationally. Holding equities in add-on individual accounts, the ap-
proach	adopted	by	Australia,	also	bears	consideration.	It	adds	signifi-
cant resources to the system and increases national saving. Holding eq-
uities in individual accounts carved out of the Social Security program, 
the approach adopted by the United Kingdom, is clearly problematic. 
The British experiment shows how this approach precipitated the con-
version of the UK retirement income system into a combination of large 
and risky individual accounts atop a minimal means-tested welfare pro-
gram, with most of the nation’s elderly at some point in their lives de-
pendent	on	means-tested	welfare	benefits.	
Notes
 1.  Not all proposals to restore solvency to the Social Security program involve 
equity investment. See Diamond and Orszag (2004) and Smetters (1997). 
		2.		 The	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	(OMB)	provides	a	full	discussion	of	the	
need to risk-adjust expected returns: “Equities and private bonds earn a higher 
return on average than the Treasury rate, but that return is subject to greater 
uncertainty. Sound budget principles require that estimates of future trust fund 
balances	reflect	both	the	average	return	and	cost	of	risk	associated	with	the	un-
certainty of that return. . . . Economic theory suggests, however, that the differ-
ence between the expected return of a risky liquid asset and the Treasury rate is 
equal to the cost of the asset’s additional risk as priced in the market. Following 
through on this insight, the best way to project the rate of return on the fund’s 
balances is to use the Treasury rate” (OMB 2003). 
   Most economists seem to agree on the need to risk-adjust returns when 
evaluating Social Security reform proposals. Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes 
(2002) note that “our view is that the risk-adjusted NPV [net present value] mea-
sure is most helpful for ranking alternative” proposals. More recently, Diamond 
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and Orszag (2004) use risk-adjusted returns to evaluate proposals that include 
individual accounts. Others, however, continue to embrace the “best-guess” ac-
tuarial approach (Biggs 2002).
  3. Option pricing techniques can also be used to calculate the risk-reward trade-
offs. See Bodie (2001).
  4. The normal retirement age will rise from 65, for those reaching age 62 prior to 
the year 2000, to age 67 for those who reach 62 in 2022 or after. 




The Creation of Modern 
Retirement Income Systems
The elderly in modern industrial economies get the bulk of their 
income from two main sources—government old-age pensions and 
government subsidized and regulated employer-based plans. This is 
strikingly new. Prior to 1900, retirement itself was rare. Only as the 
twentieth century progressed did public and employer pensions come 
to support the elderly population in industrial economies. And only in 
the past generation did they come to eclipse all other sources of income 
and allow the elderly to maintain a reasonable approximation of their 
preretirement standard of living. 
Retirement income systems in industrialized countries evolved in 
two very different ways after the Second World War. The nations on 
the European continent, with private industry devastated by the war 
and with stronger traditions of publicly provided welfare, opted for 
systems of generous government-provided pensions.1 These programs 
came to replace 60 percent or more of a worker’s preretirement earn-
ings. In the United States and other “Anglo-Saxon” nations, such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, employers were spared the 
worst ravages of war and conservative political parties had a far more 
restrictive view of the role of the state. These countries maintained a 
mixed public-employer system. This chapter describes the evolution of 
these retirement income systems, focusing primarily on developments 
in Anglo-Saxon nations similar to the United States, to gain a better 
understanding of the rationale and structure of such systems and the 
challenges they face going forward. 
INDUSTRIALIzATION AND THE PROBLEM OF  
OLD-AgE INCOMES
In preindustrial economies, the elderly generally continued to work 
for as long as they could. They took on less taxing jobs as their strength 
22   Munnell and Sass
or acuity declined, and stopped working only when no longer able. A 
1570 census of the poor in Norwich, England, thus described three 
widows, ages 74, 79, and 82, as “almost past work” but still earning a 
small income from spinning. In colonial America, estates left by elderly 
decedents often included tools used in less strenuous trades, such as 
tailoring, shoemaking, and weaving. Three of four elderly Americans 
still worked well into the nineteenth century (Achenbaum 1978; Pelling 
1991; Sass 1997; Thane 2000). 
The elderly in preindustrial economies also often owned property 
that provided an income. Family farms and handicraft businesses were 
natural vehicles for accumulating wealth as part of a worker’s normal 
routine.	Through	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	improving	fam-
ily farms was actually the largest component of U.S. capital formation, 
and many elderly farmers were able to retire from active labor by sell-
ing or leasing these assets (Sass 1997; Thane 2000; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1960). The minority of the elderly who could no longer work 
and had little or no property would often rely on their children for eco-
nomic support. 
What transformed the economics of aging in the nineteenth century 
were industrialization and the closely related process of urbanization. 
Industrialization involved the transfer of production from the household 
to larger and more rationally organized enterprises. Urbanization con-
centrated the population in the large labor and product markets, which 
was necessary for the emergence of mass-production mass-distribution 
enterprises	and	firms	that	supplied	an	increasingly	broad	array	of	spe-
cialized goods and services. The outcome was an enormously produc-
tive economy. Per capita incomes in today’s industrialized nations are 
approximately 15 to 20 times higher than they were in 1820, when the 
process could be said to have begun (Maddison 1995). As industrializa-
tion came to dominate economic production, from the end of the nine-
teenth and into the twentieth century, it undermined the ability of the 
elderly to support themselves through work or ownership of income-
producing assets. Urbanization also undermined traditional sources of 
communal assistance. 
Workers in industrial economies gain their livelihoods primarily by 
working for large employers, earning wage and salary incomes, which 
they use to purchase market-supplied goods and services. But, as work-
ers age, their ability to generate earnings grows increasingly uncertain. 
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Industrial enterprises are fairly intolerant of an aging worker’s declin-
ing	capabilities.	They	need	to	cover	the	fixed	costs	of	plant,	equipment,	
and	supervision	just	to	break	even.	To	maximize	profits,	they	need	to	
operate at a rationally determined pace of production. Even if a work-
er’s labor remained valuable to such employers at age 50 or 60, it rarely 
would remain so at age 70 or 80 (Margo 1991). 
Workers in industrial economies also did not naturally acquire as-
sets that could provide an old-age income. They had no ownership in-
terest in their workplace, as they had in family farms and handicraft 
businesses. The process of gaining a livelihood was now sharply di-
vorced from the process of acquiring income-producing property. To 
build up such assets, industrial workers had to consciously set aside a 
portion of their earnings and use those funds to purchase income-pro-
ducing property. This saving and investing process required a good deal 
of	 foresight,	 discipline,	 and	 skill.	 It	 also	 required	 a	 significant	 aver-
sion	to	risk.	As	late	as	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century,	nearly	
two-thirds of all Americans who reached age 10, and thus had survived 
childhood diseases, could expect to die before reaching age 70. Given 
the	difficulty	in	acquiring	income-producing	assets	and	the	low	likeli-
hood of becoming too old to work, it is not surprising that less than half 
of the Massachusetts elderly in 1910 had any income from savings that 
could offset a decline or cessation of earnings (Sass 1997; Seager 1910; 
Squirer 1912). As wage and salary earnings tended to vanish as workers 
aged, industrialization had created a crisis in old-age incomes. 
THE EMERgENCE OF NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME 
SySTEMS: ca. 1850–1940
The response in every industrial nation was the creation of retire-
ment income programs by large employers and national governments—
the two institutions that became dramatically more important in modern 
industrial economies. The earliest programs were pension plans set up 
by	large	employers:	first	governments,	then	railroads	and	public	utilities,	
and then large manufacturers and service-providing enterprises. Germa-
ny	created	the	first	national	old-age	income	program	in	1889,	and	by	the	
end of the 1930s, essentially all industrial nations had such a program. 
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The Emergence of Employer Pensions 
The nineteenth century saw the emergence of a handful of very large 
employers, such as governments, railroads, utilities, universities, and 
business corporations, that sought to develop employment relationships 
with their workers and made the promise of an old-age pension a valu-
able instrument of personnel management.2	The	first	such	relationship	
involved the development of career civil servants and managers.3 The 
large, dispersed organizations that emerged in the nineteenth century 
delegated	significant	authority	 to	 this	special	class	of	workers.	These	
workers	had	to	invest	in	organization-specific	skills	and	relationships,	
make decisions and execute responsibilities in the best interest of the 
organization, and do so with limited oversight over their entire working 
lives. The British civil service pension plan of 1859 became the model 
for developing such a career managerial workforce in both government 
and private settings.4 
Pensions also proved valuable in developing employment relation-
ships with blue-collar workers. Railroad, urban transit, and manufac-
turing	firms	employed	large	numbers	of	blue-collar	workers	to	operate	
their capital-intensive, high-throughput operations. In a bid to attract 
better workers, win their loyalty, and fend off unions, these employ-
ers already paid above-market wages. Beyond a certain point, provid-
ing “industrial insurance” helped achieve these objectives better than 
paying	ever	higher	wages.	 In	exchange	for	 the	financial	stability	 this	
insurance provided, employers expected loyalty and diligent service. 
Unions and workmen’s friendly societies also offered such protection, 
so these employer plans fended off competing claims to their workers’ 
allegiance. Employers could also expect this compensation package 
to attract workers with a greater sense of responsibility and foresight 
(Ackerloff 1982; Ippolito 1998; Sass 1997). 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the opposite problem 
became	the	concern	of	many	large	employers.	Their	offices,	machine	
shops, and locomotives were increasingly staffed by older workers 
whose productive abilities had clearly declined. So, beginning in the 
1890s in Britain and at the turn of the century in the United States, large 
employers	began	to	introduce	mandatory	retirement	at	a	specified	age.	
To	remove	these	workers	without	damaging	the	firm’s	relationship	with	
the rest of the workforce and the public at large, they retired these work-
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ers on pension. Because employers wanted no employee interference in 
this mandatory retirement policy, they did not require employee contri-
butions. As companies with preexisting pension plans saw the number 
of older employees steadily rise, many introduced compulsory retire-
ment and likewise assumed the full cost of the plan (Graebner 1980; 
Lazear 1979; Sass 1997). 
By the end of the 1930s, employer plans had become standard in 
governments and mature big businesses throughout the industrial world; 
nevertheless, they covered only up to 15 percent of the workforce in 
industrialized nations such as the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Australia, and Canada. Many of those covered would also leave their 
employers prior to retirement, voluntarily or not, and fail to qualify for 
an old-age pension. Employer plans were thus a personnel policy tool, 
not the solution to the old-age income problem (Commonwealth Trea-
sury 2001; Coward 1995; Hannah 1986; Sass 1997). 
The Emergence of government Pensions 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a steadily rising popu-
lation of elderly poor created increasing pressure for national old-age 
income programs. National governments responded in one of two ways. 
Most early initiatives were means-tested programs that took on a por-
tion of the welfare burden from overstressed local communities. Many 
even used local governments to administer the program. The second ap-
proach, social insurance, mirrored the blue-collar industrial insurance 
programs set up by large employers. Social insurance programs initially 
targeted the industrial sector and excluded agrarian, self-employed, and 
white-collar workers. They also protected workers and their families 
against the loss of those earnings due to death, sickness, disability, un-
employment, or age, and typically mandated employee and/or employer 
contributions that were proportional to earnings. 
National	means-tested	pensions	for	the	elderly	were	first	introduced	
by small nations with modest industrial sectors: Denmark in 1891, New 
Zealand in 1898, and the British colony of Victoria (Australia) in 1900 
(Table 2.1). Then France introduced means-tested programs in 1907, 
as	did	the	United	Kingdom	in	1908.	All	paid	meager	benefits	and	had	
stringent income and residency tests.5 Early means-tested plans also re-
quired “good character,” which generally meant no record of serious 
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crime, drunkenness, or other moral failing, no recent application for 
pauper relief, and 20 or more years of residence. 
The	German	plan	of	1889,	 the	first	national	old-age	 income	pro-
gram, adopted the social insurance approach. Like the employer blue-
collar plans, the German old-age pension was part of a larger initiative 
that protected industrial workers against a loss of earnings due to illness 
(in 1883), accidents (in 1884), and then old-age and disability (in 1889). 
These social insurance programs required weekly contributions that 
were proportional to earnings and split between workers and employ-
ers. The programs also relied on contributions from general government 
revenues. At age 70, workers were entitled to a pension proportional to 
their average wage times the number of years in the plan. Even with a 
full career’s contributions, however, this pension replaced only a small 
portion of preretirement earnings. 
The German experiment was not soon repeated. Social insurance 
was a new and expensive public program. Unlike traditional means-
tested	assistance,	it	paid	benefits	to	those	who	had	sufficient	resources	
on their own. It also required a level of compulsion and bureaucratic 
management that exceeded the capacity of most nineteenth-century 
Table 2.1  The Creation of National Old-Age Pension Programs in 




Nations creating social 
insurance programs
1880s Germany
1890s Denmark, New Zealand
1900s France, Australia, 
United Kingdom, 
Irish Free State, Iceland
 
1910s Newfoundland, Uruguay France, Luxembourg, Romania, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain
1920s Norway, Greenland, Canada, 
South Africa 
Greece, Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, Yugoslavia, Belgium, 
Chile, Czechoslovakia, United 
Kingdom, Austria, Hungary
1930s  Poland, United States
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Board (1937).
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states (Massachusetts Commission on Old-Age Pensions 1909; Seager 
1910). 
After 1910, social insurance became the dominant approach to the 
old-age income problem. Three out of four national programs enacted 
after that date adopted the social insurance model. They mandated con-
tributions in the form of a tax on earnings, provided pensions as a mat-
ter	of	right	from	a	specified	age,	and	based	benefits	on	the	worker’s	con-
tribution record. These programs were far from universal. White-collar, 
agrarian, and self-employed workers were typically excluded. By 1933, 
however, 20 nations relied on social insurance as their primary old-age 
income program. Only 12 used means-tested programs.
The United States was late to develop a public old-age pension pro-
gram. This is explained partly by the sheer size of the nation, encom-
passing both the industrialized North and the agrarian South and West, 
and partly by the limited authority of the national government. Politi-
cally weak immigrants and their children, moreover, accounted for two-
thirds of the blue-collar industrial workforce. The most politically im-
portant	group	in	the	nation—native-born	Northerners—also	benefited	
from a generous pension program for Union Army veterans through the 
early years of the twentieth century (Sass 1997). 
The	 United	 States	 finally	 created	 its	 Social	 Security	 program	 in	
1935, in the midst of the Great Depression. The severe economic down-
turn, combined with a surge in the supply of older workers, dramatically 
worsened the employment and income problems of the elderly. A criti-
cal	need	for	financial	support	thus	emerged	at	a	political	moment	espe-
cially conducive to major institutional innovation. Some experts also 
contend that the desire to remove older workers from the labor force 
was another motivating factor. The program enacted in 1935 addressed 
the immediate crisis with a means-tested program called Old-Age As-
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THE ARRIvAL OF “RETIREMENT” 
In the period after the Second World War, the economics of the 
elderly changed dramatically. Essentially all industrial nations now pro-
vided old-age pensions, typically at age 65 for men and often earlier 
for women, which guaranteed a minimal old-age income without the 
need to work. Government had thus assumed the “industrial insurance” 
function seen in blue-collar employer plans, essentially providing basic 
retirement	benefits	on	a	universal	basis.	Public	and	employer	plans	also	
actively encouraged older workers to withdraw from the labor force. 
Many employers had a mandatory retirement policy. Most public plans 
had	an	earnings	 test	 that	denied	benefits	 to	anyone	who	earned	more	
than a trivial sum.6 Public and private programs also encouraged re-
tirement	by	not	increasing	benefits	beyond	the	normal	retirement	age.	
This effectively cut a worker’s compensation for remaining employed 
to the worker’s wage less the foregone pension. The combination of a 
basic old-age income and these incentives to retire reinforced the ongo-
ing decline in the percentage of the elderly who remained in the labor 
force (Figure 2.1). As longevity was also rising rapidly, retirement soon 
emerged	as	an	expected,	extended,	and	well-defined	stage	of	life.	
The elderly nevertheless remained a distinctly poor population. In 
Britain, old-age incomes in 1950 averaged only about 40 percent of the 
average male wage. In the United States, over one-third of the elderly 
in 1959 were poor. The three decades following the Second World War, 
however,	were	a	period	of	unprecedented	economic	growth.	The	finan-
cial standing of the elderly thus stood in increasingly sharp contrast to 
the rising prosperity of most working-age adults. A consensus gradually 
emerged that the elderly should share in this prosperity and that income 
should be spread more evenly across the lifespan—that active workers 
should be able to maintain a reasonable approximation of their prere-
tirement standard of living when they in turn grow old.7 The question 
was how. 
Nations on the European continent opted for a government-directed 
solution. The Depression and Second World War had destroyed much 
of the savings of individual workers, the net worth of private employ-
ers, and the value of assets held in employer pension funds or by annu-
ity providers. Only government pay-as-you-go transfers, or similar ar-
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rangements mandated and regulated by the government, could quickly 
increase the incomes of the elderly. These continental nations had com-
paratively strong traditions of publicly provided welfare and negotiated 
labor-market institutions, deriving variously from autocratic, Catholic 
social welfare, or social democratic political traditions. Many coun-
tries also institutionalized national wage bargaining after the war, with 
the outcomes legally enforceable. These negotiations became the plat-
form for establishing quasi-public mandatory social insurance arrange-
ments that would cover essentially all workers (Esping-Anderson 1990; 
Whiteside 2002). 
These continental programs—termed “Bismarckian” because ben-
efits	were	closely	tied	to	earnings	and	contributions,	as	in	Chancellor	
Bismarck’s 1889 German program—were substantially expanded in 
the second decade following the end of the Second World War. Pen-
sions provided by the state and/or quasi-mandated negotiated arrange-
ments came to replace 60 percent or more of preretirement earnings. 
This amount was generally enough to maintain preretirement living 
Figure 2.1  Percent of People Age 65+ in the Labor Force in the United 
States and United Kingdom, 1880–2005
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standards with little or no supplementation. (The importance of these 
programs even today is shown in Figure 2.3 towards the end of this 
chapter.) Only workers with low incomes or patchy employment his-
tories would need supplementary public support. Households who 
entered	retirement	owning	their	home	outright	or	with	some	financial	
assets could actually see their living standards rise. Except for highly 
paid	 corporate	 and	 government	 officials,	 this	 expansion	 of	 public	 or	
publicly supervised old-age pensions effectively eliminated the need 
for employer plans or individual retirement savings. 
The United States and other Anglo-Saxon nations such as the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, adopted a different approach to 
the old-age income problem. The conservative parties in these coun-
tries had a much more restrictive view of the proper role of the state. 
The United Kingdom and the United States, both early industrializers, 
also had a long tradition of employer plans. A common Anglo-Saxon 
corporate-financial	culture	and	extensive	cross-border	investments	also	
facilitated the early spread of employer pensions to large private en-
terprises in Australia and Canada. The Anglo-Saxon nations were also 
spared the worst ravages of the Second World War. So, compared to 
most nations on the European continent, they entered the postwar pe-
riod with far more resources in the private sector that could provide 
retirement incomes. Employer pension plans would thus remain a sig-
nificant	source	of	support	in	what	came	to	be	known	as	“Anglo-Saxon”	
as opposed to Bismarckian retirement income systems. The remainder 
of the book focuses on the expansion of these Anglo-Saxon systems 
and their response to the challenges that emerged toward the end of the 
twentieth century. 
THE ANgLO-SAxON APPROACH TO RETIREMENT  
INCOME SySTEMS: 1945–1965
The immediate postwar years did see pitched political battles in An-
glo-Saxon nations over the economic role of the state. Politicians on 
the left generally advocated a larger government role, including larger 
social insurance pensions. Politicians on the right generally sought a 
contraction, often seeking to replace social insurance with self-reliance, 
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employer plans, and a means-tested safety net. The actual postwar set-
tlements varied quite a bit. Britain, at one pole, nationalized coal, steel, 
and other basic industries and created the National Health Service. The 
United States, at the other, restored corporate management of the econ-
omy, restrained its unions, and limited new social welfare initiatives. 
There was far less variance in the area of government old-age pen-
sions. Anglo-Saxon nations generally continued their prewar programs 
with	 little	 or	 no	 increase	 in	 benefits,	 but	 they	 expanded	 coverage	 to	
include essentially all workers. In Britain, the 1946 Basic State Pension 
extended	its	1925	social	insurance	plan,	which	paid	a	flat	20	percent	of	
the average wage, to include white-collar as well as clerical and blue-
collar workers. In the United States, the critical 1950 Social Security 
Amendments retained prewar replacement rates—30 percent for the 
model average worker—while expanding coverage and easing require-
ments	for	the	receipt	of	full	benefits.	And	in	1952	Canada	converted	its	
1927	means-tested	benefit	into	a	universal	demogrant—a	flat	payment	
made to all elderly long-term residents (Ball 1947; Commonwealth 
Treasury 2001; Hannah 1986; Sass 1997; Whiteside 2002). 
Given the widespread acceptance of “retirement” and the low level 
of	government	benefits,	a	significant	expansion	of	employer	plans	was	
critical to the success of the Anglo-Saxon approach. Coverage rates also 
shot up dramatically in the postwar period. Most government workers 
were covered by pension plans even prior to World War II, and gov-
ernment	employment	expanded	significantly	in	the	postwar	period.	At	
most only 15 percent of the private sector workforce was covered by 
an employer plan at the end of the 1930s, but in the postwar period, 
coverage came to exceed 40 percent of private-sector workers in the 
United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Australia (see Figure 2.2 for 
the growth of coverage in the United States). 
This rapid rise in coverage after World War II can be traced to three 
factors.8	The	first	was	the	expansion	of	large	corporate	employers.	The	
long postwar boom was largely driven by the growth of giant mass-pro-
duction mass-distribution enterprises in both manufacturing (industries 
such as autos, steel, and consumer goods) and services (industries such 
as telecommunications, banking and insurance, transportation, and 
public utilities). As employer pensions had become an essential compo-
nent of corporate personnel systems, coverage expanded in line with the 
growth of big business (Chandler 1977, 1990).  
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The second factor leading to increased coverage was the growing 
importance of pensions as tax-advantaged compensation. In all Ang-
lo-Saxon nations, employer contributions and the investment income 
earned by a pension fund were tax exempt, and employees were taxed 
only	upon	the	receipt	of	benefits.	As	a	result,	employees	paid	signifi-
cantly less tax on compensation received in the form of deferred pen-
sion	benefits	than	in	the	form	of	cash	wages.9 This favorable tax treat-
ment had little effect on coverage before World War II because less 
than 10 percent of the adult population typically paid tax. But with the 
postwar growth of mass income taxation, pensions became an increas-
ingly attractive type of compensation, particularly for high-income pro-
fessionals, managers, and business owners. The foregone government 
revenues, or “tax expenditures,” made government a major funder of 
employer plans and encouraged their spread.10  
The	final	factor	affecting	the	growth	in	coverage	was	the	expansion	
of collectively bargained plans. Labor unions and worker “friendly soci-
Figure 2.2  U.S. Private-Sector Workers Covered by Employer Plans, 
1940–2004
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Skolnik (1976); U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
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eties” had long sought to provide their members with old-age pensions, 
but the largely voluntary nature of these organizations and their limited 
financial	resources	had	restricted	their	ability	to	do	so.	After	the	Sec-
ond World War, however, unions throughout the industrial world found 
themselves in a much stronger position, and they used this new-found 
strength	 to	expand	old-age	 income	benefits	within	 the	 larger	postwar	
political settlement. In continental Europe, they successfully pressed 
for expanded government pensions and mandatory employment-based 
plans that provided supplementary top-ups. In Anglo-Saxon nations, 
the unions negotiated generous employer plans, often with the help of 
the government. In the United States, the big industrial unions won gen-
erous pensions in 1949 and 1950 as part of a political settlement that in-
cluded long-term labor agreements, controls on labor militancy, and the 
passage of the 1950 Social Security Amendments. In the United King-
dom, unions in the 1950s won generous pensions in Britain’s national-
ized industries from a Conservative government intent on strengthen-
ing the role of employer plans and forestalling the expansion of public 
programs (Hannah 1986; Sass 1997; Whiteside 2002). 
THE ExPANSION OF ANgLO-SAxON RETIREMENT 
INCOME SySTEMS: 1965–1980
The Anglo-Saxon approach to the retirement income problem had 
clearly taken root by the mid-1960s, but the results were limited. Em-
ployer plans covered half the workforce at best. Many covered workers 
would	quit	or	lose	their	jobs	before	gaining	a	pension	benefit.	Others	
would	see	their	plans	go	bust	and	their	benefits	lose	much	or	all	of	their	
value. As public pensions provided meager, even welfare-level bene-
fits,	old-age	remained	a	stage	of	life	generally	characterized	by	a	sharp	
decline in living standards. Women, in particular, were poorly served. 
They	generally	accrued	little	or	no	employer	pension	benefits	on	their	
own,	and	benefits	earned	by	 their	husbands	 typically	came	to	an	end	
when the husbands died. 
In response to these shortcomings, Anglo-Saxon governments 
launched a series of initiatives to enlarge and strengthen their retirement 
income systems. This expansion largely came between 1965 and 1980 
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at	the	end	of	the	long	postwar	prosperity.	It	included	both	significant	in-
creases	in	government	benefits	and	initiatives	designed	to	make	employ-
er pensions so secure and broadly distributed that they functioned as an 
earnings-related second tier in the national retirement income system. 
The United States expanded its public programs for the elderly be-
tween 1965 and 1972. In 1965, Congress enacted Medicare (medical 
insurance for the elderly); in 1972, it sharply increased Social Security 
benefits	 to	a	42-percent	earnings	replacement	 rate	 for	 the	benchmark	
average earner. Canada in the late 1960s lowered the age of eligibil-
ity for the government’s old-age demogrant from 70 to 65 and intro-
duced an earnings-related social insurance pension program. For the 
benchmark	average	earner,	the	combined	benefit	would	replace	about	
43 percent of preretirement earnings—essentially the same as in the ex-
panded U.S. Social Security program. Australia in the 1970s increased 
its	means-tested	benefit	for	the	elderly	from	20	to	25	percent	of	average	
male earnings (equal to about a third of the average wage). It also lib-
eralized	access	to	the	point	where	half	of	the	elderly	qualified	for	a	full	
allowance	and	90	percent	for	at	least	a	partial	benefit.	Also	in	the	1970s,	
the	United	Kingdom	 increased	 its	 flat	 social	 insurance	 benefit	 to	 25	
percent of average earnings and introduced a separate earnings-related 
social insurance pension. When the earnings-related program matured 
in 1998, the two government pensions combined would replace a bit 
less than 45 percent of the wages of the benchmark average earner. 
In the United States and Canada, the government sought to strength-
en the employer component of the retirement income system by impos-
ing an extensive set of regulations on tax-favored plans. Government 
officials	had	taken	note	of	the	large	and	growing	size	of	its	pension	“tax	
expenditures.”11 Such a large apparent revenue loss could only be justi-
fied	by	 a	 comparable	 contribution	 to	public	welfare.	And	 this	would	
be accomplished only if employer plans allowed a large portion of the 
workforce to shift income from their years of employment to their years 
of	retirement.	In	exchange	for	government	tax	benefits,	 the	Canadian	
Pension	Benefits	Acts	of	1965–1967	(enacted	at	the	national	and	pro-
vincial level) and the U.S. Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of	1974	(ERISA)	established	new	vesting,	funding,	and	fiduciary	stan-
dards for employer plans. 
Government vesting requirements insisted that covered workers be 
given	a	“vested”	right	to	a	pension	within	a	specified	amount	of	time.	
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The regulations allowed different vesting schedules, but the most popu-
lar was full vesting after 10 years for workers age 45 or over in Canada 
and after 10 years in the United States. The vesting requirement meant 
that a much larger share of the workforce would get at least a small 
employer	pension	to	supplement	their	government	benefits.	As	expand-
ing coverage beyond large employers and unionized workers appeared 
unlikely, vesting seemed the most effective way to expand the contribu-




an ongoing, operating expense. If the employer went bust, so would the 
benefits	of	current	and	future	pensioners.	In	the	1920s	and	1930s,	how-
ever,	sponsors	came	to	recognize	 that	pension	benefits	were	properly	
treated as part of an active worker’s current compensation. Employers 
thus	recognized	the	accrual	of	pension	benefits	by	the	active	workforce,	
not	benefits	paid	out	to	retirees,	as	their	current	operating	pension	ex-
pense. Some employers recorded this expense in a book reserve, an 
accounting entry that recognized the obligation and allocated a portion 
of the sponsor’s net worth to offset the liability. Most governments, 
however, denied employers favorable tax treatment for book-reserve 
funding. Employers in these nations generally funded their plans exter-
nally. The largest employers set up separate pension funds; smaller em-
ployers generally used insurance companies, which developed a variety 
of deferred annuity products for employer plans.13
ERISA	and	 the	Pension	Benefits	Acts	also	 required	employers	 to	
fully fund their plans over a period of time. When most plans were cre-
ated, employers gave their existing workers pension credit for service in 
the past. This created substantial liabilities before the pension fund had 
any assets at all. The failure of the Studebaker plan in 1963 dramatically 
illustrated the vulnerability of this arrangement. ERISA thus required 
employers to fund such shortfalls within 30 years and the Canadian 
Pension	Benefits	Acts	 required	 funding	within	15	years.	ERISA	also	
made employers liable for any shortfall up to 30 percent of their net 
worth, effectively funding the plan up to that level with the equity of 
the	sponsor.	It	also	created	the	Pension	Benefit	Guaranty	Corporation	
(PBGC),	which	protected	benefits	up	to	a	specified	level	in	plans	that	
went bust, primarily by imposing levies on the continuing plans.14 
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The United States and Canada also imposed new requirements on 
plan	governance.	Trust	 law,	which	had	previously	governed	fiduciary	
conduct, assumed a community of interest between the grantor (the em-
ployer)	and	the	beneficiary	(the	worker)	and	imposed	fiduciary	require-
ments only on trustees. In pension plans, the misconduct was primarily 
done by the corporate and union grantors, not the trustees. To protect 
the interests of workers, Canada required at least one trustee to be inde-
pendent	of	the	sponsor.	ERISA	defined	a	variety	of	“prohibited	transac-
tions” and required everyone associated with a plan, from the trustees 
(typically	officers	of	the	sponsor)	to	their	consultants	and	agents,	to	act	
solely	in	the	interest	of	the	beneficiaries.	These	provisions	effectively	
outlawed investments designed to advance the interests of corporate 
and union sponsors (Coward 1995; Hannah 1986; Sass 1997).
The United Kingdom took a different tack to strengthening employer 
plans. The earnings-related public pension plan, added atop the univer-
sal	flat	basic	pension,	was	the	government’s	primary	lever.	Unlike	pub-
lic programs in nearly all other nations, the earnings-related plan was 
designed primarily as a residual plan, for those without employer cover-
age. Employers with plans that provided pensions that were comparable 
to	the	government’s	earnings-related	benefits,	including	to	workers	who	
left	prior	 to	qualifying	 for	a	 full	vested	employer	plan	benefit,	could	
“contract out” of the new program.  Since their plans took on this pen-
sion obligation, they received a “rebate” of the social insurance tax that 
funded	the	new	government	benefit.		The	government	then	encouraged	
employers to contract out by setting the rebate of social insurance taxes 
above	the	employer’s	estimated	cost	of	providing	the	benefit.15
Australia took a third approach to expanding employer plans. The 
Labor party had long advocated increasing public pensions and replac-
ing the country’s 1908 means-tested program with a social insurance 
pension	 plan.	But	 oil	 shocks,	 stagflation,	 and	 the	 general	weakening	
of the Australian economy had effectively blocked these options. So 
when Labor came to power in 1983, it pushed for the expansion of 
employer plans as an alternate source of old-age income. Substituting 
pension contributions for increased cash wages would also increase na-
tional saving and help the government achieve more immediate macro-
economic	policy	objectives:	reductions	in	consumer	demand,	inflation,	
interest	rates,	and	the	nation’s	widening	trade	deficit.	Together with the 
unions,	the	government	succeeded	in	including	pension	benefits	in	the	
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1986 standard labor contract negotiated at the national level by labor 
and management representatives (Bateman and Piggot 2001a; Com-
monwealth Treasury 2001).
Australia’s national bargaining system could not impose a nation-
wide	defined-benefit	pension	program,	as	 seen	 in	various	continental	
nations. Coverage nevertheless reached 72 percent of wage and salary 
workers by the end of the decade. The model contract included a uniform 
3 percent “award superannuation” contribution in lieu of a comparable 
increase	in	wages	across	all	industries	and	firms.	The	plans	to	emerge	
were	thus	defined	contribution	arrangements.16 To strengthen the new 
system as a broad-based source of old-age income, the government also 
enacted regulations that required full and immediate vesting of award 
superannuation contributions, equal labor-management representation 
on the boards overseeing the multiemployer “industry funds,” and the 
“prudent	man”	fiduciary	standard	to	govern	investment	management.17 
Retirement Income Systems at the End of the Age of Expansion 
The expanded retirement income systems that emerged by the end 
of the postwar boom—both the government-dominated “Bismarckian” 
systems and the mixed “Anglo-Saxon” systems—redressed a major 
shortcoming of the modern industrial economy. Industrialization has 
been an enormous economic achievement. Incomes rose dramatically 
as production moved out of the household into larger economic enter-
prises. Workers had typically enjoyed rising incomes over much of their 
working careers, but as they grew old, they lost their economic footing, 
becoming a distinctively poor and dependent population. Through the 
middle of the twentieth century, the elderly had largely relied for their 
livelihood on meager wages, contributions to the household budget 
from children who continued to live with them, support from children 
who took them into their own homes, or minimal public welfare or so-
cial	insurance	benefits.	
The expansion of national retirement income systems during the 
long postwar boom allowed the elderly to maintain a reasonable ap-
proximation	 of	 their	 preretirement	 living	 standard	 for	 the	 first	 time	
in history. After adjusting for a lower tax burden, reduced expenses, 
smaller household size, and greater opportunities for leisure and home 
production,	the	disposable	income	of	retirees	was	not	significantly	low-
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life, especially for older women. Anglo-Saxon systems also had greater 
disparities in the distribution of old-age income. Nevertheless, these 
systems provided a far more rational distribution of income across a 
worker’s lifespan.18
Thus, the picture around 1980 was as follows: in the United States 
and other Anglo-Saxon nations, expanded government pensions had 
pulled the bulk of the elderly out of poverty and generally assured a 
modest level of comfort, though not the standard of living most had 
enjoyed during their working years. Employer plans functioned as a 
broad-based	earnings-related	“second	tier,”	allowing	a	significant	por-
tion of the elderly to approximate their preretirement standard of living. 
Employer pensions were concentrated in the middle and upper end of 
the income distribution. Those at the bottom relied on government ben-
efits	for	nearly	all	of	their	old-age	income.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the source of retirement income in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada differed fundamen-
tally from that in the Bismarckian systems. In the three Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the capital market provided 40 percent or more of the income 
for older people. Of this 40 percent, roughly half came from funded 
employer plans and half came from the return on individually held as-
sets. The income of the elderly in Bismarckian systems—other than 
the Netherlands, which prefunds its quasi-public “second-tier” pro-
gram—came almost entirely from pay-as-you-go government transfers 
(see Figure 2.3). 
These expanded retirement income systems were clearly expensive. 
While costs varied from one nation to the next, Bismarckian programs 
toward the end of the twentieth century generally required annual con-
tributions equal to at least 20 percent of covered earnings. In the United 
States, contributions to the Social Security old-age income program 
were about half that amount, pension tax expenditures about a quarter 
of the Social Security contribution, and contributions to employer plans 
about 7 to 8 percent of covered payroll.19 
Soon after these new systems took root, it became clear that the 
cost of pay-as-you-go government plans would dramatically rise in the 
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future. Rapid population aging will place enormous pressure on public 
old-age pension programs in Anglo-Saxon and especially in Bismarck-
ian systems. Advance-funded employer plans, as a result, appeared in-
creasingly attractive. 
Structural economic shifts, however, seriously weakened employer 
plans in the years after 1980. Global competition and the increased un-
certainty created by the higher technical level of production undermined 
the market power of large corporate and union pension sponsors, which 
reduced their ability to underwrite and manage long-term retirement 
income programs. Globalization, higher education, higher technology, 
and the entry of married women into the paid workforce also under-
mined the career employment model in favor of shorter, intermediate-
duration relationships. This was especially so among the higher paid 
workers	that	employer	plans	target.	Employers	would	thus	find	far	less	
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justification	 for	 maintaining	 their	 traditional	 defined-benefit	 pension	
plans, which function as a reward for career employment. 
Since 1980, national retirement income systems have been highly 
schizophrenic. The elderly have enjoyed the ample incomes provided 
by the expansion of public and employer programs prior to 1980. At 
the same time, policymakers and younger cohorts have increasingly 
focused on the harsh implications of rapid population aging and the 
withdrawal of employer interest in supporting retirement income pro-
grams. The challenge all nations now face is how best to maintain the 
poverty reduction and income smoothing achievements of the current 
system while minimizing burdens on the active population. The next 
chapter will review reforms to the U.S. system to date. It will then intro-
duce the three main proposals for structurally reforming the program, 
all of which include investments in equities as part of the solution. 
The following chapters then review the experience of three Anglo-Sax-
on systems that have reformed their systems along the lines of these 
proposals. 
Notes
 1. These continental systems included both governmental and quasi-governmental 
programs. See Whiteside (2002).
  2.  For the growth of such organizations, see Chandler (1977, 1990). 
  3. Early pensions were also often provided to war veterans, but the provision of 
these pensions is most usefully viewed as a response to unique events rather than 
a solution to a persistent economic problem. 
  4. There were earlier plans for government employees, especially in the military. 
The	British	eighteenth-century	plan	for	customs	officials	is	generally	seen	as	the	
precursor to later civil servant plans. The 1859 plan, however, extended pensions 
throughout the civil service and provided a template widely imitated by other 
large employers, both public and private (Raphael 1964).
 5. Scaled to current U.S. earnings in 2003, the British program guaranteed the el-
derly	an	annual	income	between	$7,240	and	$11,950	(between	one-fifth	and	one-
third of average male earnings in 2003 of $36,200). Note, however, that a much 
larger percentage of incomes in the past were used to purchase necessities. Food, 
clothing, and shelter absorbed over 80 percent of a “middle income” family’s ex-
penditures	in	1918,	compared	to	less	than	half	in	1988	(Brown	1994).	Benefits	in	
the Australian program were similar to those in the United Kingdom but granted 
at age 65. The Danish program paid different amounts in different locations, 
reflecting	the	significant	geographic	variation	in	the	cost	of	living	and	in	the	wel-
fare allowances provided by local authorities. In Britain, this variation would be 
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reflected	in	the	provision	of	supplementary	benefits	for	the	elderly,	primarily	in	
the area of housing and local tax relief, by local government authorities (Seager 
1910; Thane 2000). 
	 6.	 These	earnings	tests	reflected	both	the	notion	that	public	old-age	pensions	were	
insurance	against	an	inability	to	work	or	find	employment	and	a	Depression-era	
impulse to reduce the supply of labor. 
 7. The rule-of-thumb estimate was that old-age income would need to replace be-
tween 65 and 80 percent of preretirement earnings. 
 8. During World War II, the government’s wage controls also provided some sup-
port for pensions. The War Labor Board, which had set legal limitations on cash 




 9. From the point of view of an employee, these provisions are equivalent to a 
tax deferral on both pension contributions and the investment earnings on those 
contributions. Assuming the employee remains in the same tax bracket, this is 
equivalent to an interest-free loan on the amount of the tax (Munnell 1982).
	10.	 In	 the	United	States,	Congress	 leveraged	 its	financial	stake	 in	employer	plans	






top of the list.
 12. In both the United States and Canada, vesting requirements have since been 
significantly	shortened.	In	addition	to	vesting,	ERISA	expanded	the	number	of	
employer	plan	beneficiaries—specifically	 to	 elderly	widows	who	were	poorly	
served by earnings-based retirement income systems—by making a joint-and-
survivor	annuity	the	default	annuity	form.	Unless	specifically	waived,	the	sur-
viving spouse (nearly always a widow) would receive half the worker’s pension, 
which	would	 be	 actuarially	 reduced	 to	 pay	 for	 this	 survivor	 benefit	 (Coward	
1995; Sass 1997). 
 13. Although these claims were recognized and increasingly funded by large corpo-
rate sponsors, active workers typically had a legally enforceable claim only to 
benefits	provided	by	an	insurance	company.	In	uninsured	plans,	corporate	law-
yers	 typically	 defined	 pension	 benefits	 as	 a	 “gratuity”	 that	 the	 employer	was	
under no legal obligation to provide. Prior to 1938, pension assets in the United 
States could be held in a revocable trust, allowing the sponsor to reclaim the 
assets at will. After the Second World War, the courts and then the legislatures 
made	pension	benefits	a	legally	enforceable	claim	(Coward	1995;	Sass	1997).	
 14. Under the U.S. 1942 Revenue Act, sponsors had to contribute an amount equal 
to	benefits	 accrued	 in	 the	 current	year	plus	 an	amount	needed	 to	prevent	 any	
current shortfall from widening. ERISA required such shortfalls to be amortized 
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over time. It also required shortfalls arising from sources such as an unexpected 
rise in longevity or a decline in asset returns to be funded within 15 years. In the 
United Kingdom, funding was largely left to the discretion of the sponsor’s con-
sulting actuary, a policy that proved generally effective in assuring the solvency 
of employer plans (Coward 1995; Sass 1997).  
 15. The United Kingdom introduced a public earnings-related pension program, 
with	 this	 contracting-out	 feature,	 in	1961.	This	Graduated	Retirement	Benefit	
plan was slight, ill-designed, and widely suspected of being a Tory political ploy 
rather	than	a	bona-fide	retirement	income	initiative.	The	State	Earnings	Related	
Pension Scheme (SERPS), introduced in 1978, was a far more ambitious pro-
gram. In both programs, employers did not have to take on the entire pension 
liability. The government retained the riskier portions of the obligation, such as 
inflation	proofing.	In	the	SERPS	program,	the	government	set	the	contribution	
rebate at about 0.5 percentage point above the estimated private cost of providing 
the	benefit	to	encourage	contracting	out.	The	cost	estimate	included	administra-
tive expenses, which increased costs above those of the government program, 
but	assumed	a	significant	use	of	equities	in	funding	the	benefit,	which	reduced	
costs	far	below	the	present	value	of	the	benefit	discounted	at	the	riskless	govern-
ment rate (Daykin 2001; Hannah 1986). 
	16.	 Essentially	all	U.S.	collectively	bargained	plans	had	a	defined-benefit	rather	than	
a	defined-contribution	format.	This	was	the	case	even	though	the	cost	of	these	
benefits	was	carefully	priced	at	 the	bargaining	 table	as	equivalent	 to	a	certain	
amount	per	hour.	In	these	U.S.	negotiated	plans,	costs	and	benefits	varied	dra-
matically and the employers bore the risk that their contributions and pension 
fund	income	would	be	insufficient	to	fund	the	promised	benefits.	A	nationwide	
agreement	to	contribute	a	fixed	percentage	of	earnings	to	pension	plans	that	cov-
ered a wide variety of employer or industry groups, even in the United States, 
would	likely	result	in	plans	with	a	defined-contribution	format	(Sass	1997).
 17. The prudent man standard is common in Anglo-Saxon trust law. In the formula-
tion	specified	in	ERISA,	“a	fiduciary	shall	discharge	his	duties	with	respect	to	a	
plan	solely	in	the	interest	of	the	participants	and	beneficiaries	and	.	.	.	with	the	
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that 
a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use 
in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims . . . ” (Bateman 
and Piggot 2001a; Commonwealth Treasury 2001).
 18. The United Kingdom is somewhat of an outlier, with the disposable income of 
the elderly clearly lower than that of working-age adults. But, even in the United 
Kingdom, the disposable income levels reported by Yamada (2000) are reason-
ably close. 
 19. In the United States, the contribution rate for Social Security old-age, survivors, 
and disability insurance is currently 12.4 percent of covered earnings, split even-
ly between employers and employees, realizing $511 billion in 2005; the pension 
tax	expenditure	for	2005,	as	reported	by	the	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	
(2005) (for employer plans, Keogh plans for small businesses, and individual 




The Retirement Income Challenge 
Facing the United States
The U.S. retirement income system, like the systems in other in-
dustrial nations, faces major demographic and economic challenges go-
ing forward. As discussed in the introduction, population aging over 
the next quarter century will raise the cost of promised Social Security 
benefits	far	above	projected	revenues.	Eliminating	the	shortfall	requires	
some	combination	of	higher	taxes,	lower	benefits,	and/or	the	introduc-
tion of equity investments with their higher returns, albeit with greater 
risk. Complicating the challenge of restoring balance to Social Security 




the program and bore key risks, such as the risk that investment re-
turns prove inadequate or that retirees live longer than expected. Today, 
employers	typically	offer	defined-contribution	plans—primarily	401(k)	
plans—where the employee makes the decisions and bears all the risk. 
While 401(k) plans are better for mobile employees in that they can 
take their accumulations with them as they move from job to job, the 
ultimate level of retirement income has become much more uncertain. 
Reform proposals for Social Security must therefore be considered in 
the context of the increased risk that workers now face in their 401(k) 
plans. 
This chapter describes the evolution of the U.S. public and employ-
er-sponsored retirement system since 1980 and the primary options put 
forward	as	potential	solutions	to	Social	Security’s	funding	deficit.	
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THE U.S. RETIREMENT SySTEM 
The United States has a retirement income system with relative-
ly	modest	public	pensions	and	significant	employer	plans.	Like	other	
Anglo-Saxon nations, the United States expanded both public and em-
ployer programs at the end of the long prosperity that followed the end 
of the Second World War. After Congress enacted Medicare in 1965 
and	increased	Social	Security	benefits	in	1972,	the	bulk	of	the	elderly	
were lifted out of poverty and assured a modestly comfortable standard 
of living. After the enactment of  ERISA in 1974, employer pensions 
became a reasonably secure and widespread source of old-age income, 
primarily for middle- and upper-income workers. Income from gov-
ernment and employer plans, along with rising home ownership, has 
allowed much of the elderly to maintain a reasonable approximation of 
preretirement living standards. 
The Role of Social Security in the U.S. Retirement Income System
Social Security has been the largest source of old-age income in the 
United	States	over	the	past	quarter	century.	Social	Security	benefits	are	
critically important for low-wage workers because they have virtually 
no other source of retirement income. Today, as in 1980, Social Security 
accounts for more than 80 percent of income in the lowest quintile of 
elderly households compared with only 19 percent in the highest. Even 
in the middle-income quintile, Social Security provides two-thirds of 
income (Figure 3.1).1 
The	Social	Security	benefit	 formula	has	 remained	essentially	un-
changed since the expansion of the program in the 1970s. (See Box 3.1 
for	a	description	of	how	Social	Security	benefits	are	calculated.)	The	
standard measure of the generosity of such programs is the replacement 
rate	of	a	hypothetical	average	earner.	The	replacement	rate	is	the	benefit	
as a percent of preretirement earnings. The hypothetical average earner 
is a worker who consistently earns the national average wage and retires 
at age 65.2 The Social Security Administration calculates replacement 
rates for hypothetical low, medium (average), and high earners—work-
ers who effectively earn 45 percent, 100 percent, and 160 percent of na-
tional average earnings over their working careers and retire at age 65. 
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Box 3.1  The Calculation of Social Security Benefits
The	primary	insurance	amount	(PIA)	is	the	benefit	a	worker	
would receive at the normal retirement age. The calculation of a 
worker’s PIA involves three steps: 
 1) Earnings prior to age 60 are restated in terms of current 
wages. This is done by indexing those earnings by wage 
growth up to age 60. Wages after age 60 are not indexed. 
 2) The highest 35 years of adjusted and unadjusted earnings 
are then averaged and divided by 12 to give average in-
dexed monthly earnings (AIME). 
 3) Finally, the PIA is produced by applying three different 
replacement rates to different portions of the worker’s 
AIME. The “bend points” dividing AIME into these three 
tranches are set percentages of national average earnings 
(NAE)	in	the	year	the	worker	reaches	age	60.	Specifically,	
a worker’s PIA replaces
•	 90 percent of AIME up to 22 percent of NAE in the 
year s/he turns 60,
•	 32 percent of AIME between 22 and 133 percent of 
NAE that year, and
•	 15 percent of any AIME in excess of 133 percent of 
NAE that year.
    For workers reaching age 60 in 2004, the PIA is the 
 sum of 
•	 90	percent	of	the	worker’s	first	$656	of	AIME,	plus
• 32 percent of AIME between $656 and $3,955, plus
• 15 percent of any AIME in excess of $3,955.
The worker’s PIA is continually recalculated as long as the 
individual remains employed. It is also indexed to prices from 
age 62. 
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It also calculates replacement rates for a hypothetical maximum earner, 
whose wages consistently equal the maximum amount covered by the 
program. These replacement rates for 2006 are given in Table 3.1. 
Retired workers do not need 100 percent of their preretirement 
earnings to maintain their preretirement standard of living. They no lon-
ger pay Social Security payroll tax, often pay less in income tax, have 
typically paid off their mortgage, no longer need to save for retirement, 
nor need to support their children. Estimates of the amount of income 
needed to maintain preretirement living standards typically range from 
65 to 85 percent of preretirement earnings. The hypothetical replace-
ment	 rates	 in	Table	 3.1	 indicate	 that	 Social	 Security	 satisfies	 a	 large	
portion of the retirement income needs of low-wage workers. Medium 
and high earners must clearly supplement their Social Security income, 
primarily	 through	employer	plan	benefits,	 to	maintain	 their	preretire-
ment standard of living. 
The replacement rates in Table 3.1 are hypothetical. They depend 
on several clearly unrealistic assumptions. Workers do not earn a con-
stant percentage of the national average wage over the course of their 
careers. Recently retired men, in fact, have averaged 6 years of zero 
earnings	from	age	22	to	the	year	they	claim	benefits.	Women	have	av-
eraged 13 years of zero earnings (U.S. Social Security Administration 
2004).	Most	workers	also	claim	benefits	well	before	age	65.	In	2003,	
59	percent	of	women	and	53	percent	of	men	claimed	benefits	at	age	62.	
And while the hypothetical rates are typically given for individuals, 
most people enter retirement as couples. 
Estimates of actual Social Security replacement rates are neverthe-
less quite close to what the policy model suggests, as shown in Table 
3.2.3 Retirement earlier than the Normal Retirement Age lowers actual 
Table 3.1  U.S. Social Security Replacement Rates for Hypothetical 
Workers, 2006
Earner Career average earnings
Replacement rate (%)
Age 62 Age 65
Low 45% of national avg. earnings 42 56
Medium 100% of national avg. earnings 31 41 
High 160% of national avg. earnings 26 35 
Maximum 22 29 
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration (2006). 
48   Munnell and Sass
replacement rates. On the other hand, the years out of the labor force 
reduces lifetime earnings and this reduction, given the program’s pro-
gressive	benefit	formula,	 raises	 replacement	rates.	 In	addition,	Social	
Security	gives	spouses	the	greater	of	their	own	earned	benefit	or	half	of	
their	spouse’s	benefit,	which	raises	the	replacement	rate	of	couples.	
For single individuals, the median Social Security replacement rate 
is 45 percent—quite close to the hypothetical rate. Men have lower 
replacement rates because they have above-average earnings and the 
program’s	 progressive	 benefit	 formula	 replaces	 a	 smaller	 percentage	
of above-average earnings; single women, conversely, have below-av-
erage earnings and higher replacement rates. For couples, the median 
Social Security replacement rate is 44 percent. Not surprisingly, earn-
ings replacement is sharply higher for couples where only one spouse 
works. As married women have gone to work, they often increase the 
household’s preretirement earnings without raising its Social Security 
benefits,	since	the	woman’s	own	earned	benefit	is	often	less	than	half	
her	husband’s	benefit.	The	result	has	been	a	41	percent	replacement	rate	
for couples where both spouses have earnings. 
 Social Security replacement rates for most household types thus ap-
pear quite close to the hypothetical 42 percent rate. This level of earn-
ings replacement is generally seen as providing a solid base upon which 
most retirees can add income from other sources for a relatively secure 
retirement. 
But this level of earnings replacement is scheduled to sharply de-
cline, as noted in Chapter 1. After the rise in the normal retirement 






Spouse has no earnings 58.0





SOURCE: Munnell and Soto (2005a). 
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age, the deduction of increased Medicare premiums, and the taxation 
of	benefits	under	the	personal	income	tax,	the	replacement	rate	for	the	
hypothetical medium earner will be substantially lower in, say, 2030 
than it is today. 
The Role of Employer Plans in the U.S. Retirement Income System
Employer retirement plans, especially after the enactment of ERISA 
in 1974, function as the nation’s primary supplement to Social Security 
for middle- and high-income workers. Most government workers and 
about half of the private sector workforce—essentially the better paid 




say 1.5 percent, so workers with 20 years would receive 30 percent of 
final	salary	for	as	long	as	they	live.4	The	employer	finances	these	ben-
efits	 by	making	 pretax	 contributions	 into	 a	 pension	 fund;	 employees	
typically do not contribute. 
For	the	steady	employee	who	remains	with	one	firm,	defined-bene-
fit	plans	provide	a	stream	of	monthly	benefits	that	replaces	a	significant	
portion of earnings at retirement. The major drawback is that mobile 
employees forfeit some or all future pension income when they move 
from job to job. Despite this limitation, employer pensions account for 
about	a	fifth	of	 the	income	of	the	elderly,	and	about	a	quarter	of	 that	
income other than earnings from work. Among households with em-
ployer	pension	income,	Social	Security	and	employer	plan	benefits	at	
retirement replace 70 percent of preretirement earnings for the median 
single individual and 63 percent for the median couple (Table 3.3). This 
level	of	earnings	replacement	is	sufficient	to	maintain	a	rough	approxi-
mation of preretirement living standards. 
Employers supported these plans because they helped manage their 
workforce.	As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 defined-benefit	 pension	 plans	
encourage	 long	 tenure	 and	 efficient	 retirement.5 To fund these plans, 
employers typically contributed between 7 and 8 percent of payroll. 
The	plan	trustees	(typically	officers	of	the	employer)	then	held	the	as-
sets and directed the investments, with the employer retaining the risk 
that	the	assets	in	the	plan	would	not	be	sufficient	to	pay	out	promised	
50   Munnell and Sass
benefits.	ERISA	required	 the	employer	 to	pay	down	shortfalls	within	
15 or 30 years, depending on the source. Should a plan terminate with 
insufficient	assets,	the	PBGC,	created	by	ERISA,	insured	benefits	up	to	
specified	limits.6 
THE REFORM OF THE U.S. RETIREMENT INCOME 
SySTEM SINCE 1980
Soon after the expansion of the nation’s retirement income system, 
it became clear that powerful demographic and economic forces were 
undermining	the	system’s	long-term	finances.	Serious	solvency	prob-




Table 3.3  Actual Replacement Rates in the United States for Median 
Couples and Singles, with and without Pension Income
Household type
Replacement rate (%)
Social Security + pension
Couples
  Without pension 43.0
  With pension 63.3
Single
  Without pension 46.2
  With pension 70.4
NOTE:	The	replacement	rates	in	this	table	define	retirement	income	as	Social	Security	
benefits,	employer	pensions,	 the	annuitized	value	of	employer	defined-contribution	
balances, and for those with pension coverage, the annuitized value of Individual 
Retirement Account (IRA) balances. IRA balances are included for those with pen-
sion coverage, as most IRA balances have been created as a result of rollovers from 
employer	plans.	The	replacement	rates	 in	 this	 table	define	preretirement	 income	as	
AIME	plus	earnings	above	the	cap	and	returns	on	financial	assets.
SOURCE: Munnell and Soto (2005b).
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Shoring Up the Solvency of Employer Defined-Benefit Plans
ERISA’s regulation of pension funding followed the “best practice” 
of the pension actuaries. In particular, it regulated solvency by asking 
whether	a	plan’s	assets	were	sufficient	to	pay	promised	future	benefits,	
given the expected return on those assets. But in the recessions of 1980–
1982,	large	funding	deficits	suddenly	emerged,	exposing	serious	inad-
equacies	in	this	approach.	The	primary	reason	why	these	large	deficits	
appeared so suddenly was because employer plans invest a substantial 
portion of their assets in equities. The expected return on equities is far 
greater than that on bonds, which makes a plan far more affordable, but 
equities are risky (see Box 3.2). Even if equities deliver their expected 
return in the long run, the value of a plan’s assets can suddenly fall. 
Often the fall in asset prices triggers a cut in expected returns, which 
sharply raises the present value of the plan’s distant pension obliga-
tions. In the actuarial funding approach, which ERISA had adopted, 
the	 sponsor	 functioned	 as	 the	 plan’s	 financial	 guarantor.	When	 “risk	
happened,” employers were required to increase their contributions and 
gradually bring the plan back into balance. But, rather than being able 
to backstop their plans, many large sponsors themselves went bankrupt 
in the recessions of the early 1980s.
The plan of a bankrupt sponsor is terminated, and any unfunded 
liabilities are transferred to the PBGC. Without the employer as the 
financial	guarantor,	only	low-risk	bonds	can	be	used	to	satisfy	the	li-
abilities of a terminated plan. The pensions are much lower than in an 
ongoing	plan,	as	benefits	are	based	on	earnings	at	the	time	of	the	ter-
mination, not at retirement or some later date. But, as bonds carry an 
interest rate well below the expected return on equities, each dollar of 
future	pension	benefits	requires	more	assets	to	make	the	plan	solvent.	
To protect workers (and the PBGC) in the event of a termination, Con-
gress reformed the rules of employer plan funding in 1987. It required 
sponsors to calculate the plan’s termination liability—the present value 
of	currently	accrued	benefits	discounted	to	the	present	using	the	interest	
rate on low-risk bonds as the discount rate. If the plan’s assets were less 
than 90 percent of its termination liability, the sponsor had to eliminate 
the	deficit	within	five	years.7 
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Box 3.2  Asset Returns and Risks
Stocks have historically delivered much higher returns than bonds. 
Over the period from 1926 to 2002, stocks returned 7.2 percent, after 
adjusting	for	inflation,	compared	with	2.4	percent	for	intermediate	gov-
ernment bonds (see table below). 
But returns are not the whole story. Stocks are much riskier, as seen 
in the standard deviations of returns reported in the table. Stocks can be 
expected to outperform bonds over the long term, but the performance 
of the stock market is very uncertain. For any given 10-year period over 
the past 75 years, investors have had a 25 percent chance of realizing 
lower returns from a portfolio of Standard and Poor’s stocks than from a 
portfolio of government bonds (MaCurdy and Shoven 2001). 
The higher expected return on stocks, in fact, is due to their greater 
risk. Investors are risk-averse and demand an “equity premium” to hold 
stocks instead of bonds. If stocks were not priced in a way that produced 
a higher expected return, investors would always choose bonds. (Some 
economists [e.g., Mehra and Prescott 1985] have concluded that the 
rate of return on stocks is greater than can be explained by their greater 
riskiness).
Financial instrument





Long-term corporate bonds 2.9 8.7
Intermediate government bonds 2.4 5.8
U.S. Treasury bills 1.8 3.2
Memo:
Inflation 3.0 4.4
Annual Returns on Financial Instruments in the United States, 
1926–2002
a Stocks refer to the returns on large company stocks. Over the same period, the 
return and standard deviation on small company stocks was somewhat higher: 
a 12.5 percent return with a standard deviation of 33.2 percent. 
SOURCE: Ibbotson Associates (2003). Based on copyrighted work by Ibbotson 
and	Sinquefield.	All	rights	reserved.	Used	with	permission.
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earnings into the worker’s individual account. These contributions are 
invested, usually at the direction of the employee, mostly in mutual 
funds consisting of stocks and bonds. Upon retirement, the worker gen-
erally receives the balance in the account as a lump sum. 
The	defining	characteristic	of	401(k)	plans	is	that	the	burden	of	pro-
viding for retirement is largely shifted to the worker. The employee 
Figure 3.2  Defined-Contribution Plans as a Share of Total Pension Plans 


















SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (2004, 2005).
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decides whether or not to participate, how much to contribute, how to 
invest the assets, and how to use the assets at retirement. In addition, 
workers can often access their 401(k) assets before retirement, adding 
another element of individual responsibility.
The shift to 401(k)s was led by a surge in new plan formation in the 
1980s,	a	virtual	halt	in	the	formation	of	new	defined-benefit	plans,	and	a	
spike in terminations during the late 1980s.8	Defined-benefit	plans	were	
rarely converted to a 401(k), particularly among large plans. The most 




plans to employees was the ability to gain control of their retirement 
planning. They could make tax-deductible contributions, have discre-
tion over the amount saved and the investment allocation, and see their 
accounts grow. Most plans allowed loans and withdrawals, and young 
mobile workers—the primary participants in the early expansion of 
the 401(k)—could take their 401(k) accumulations with them as they 
moved from job to job. 
From the employers’ perspective, 401(k) plans offered a form of 
pension that their workers clearly appreciated. Moreover, the employer 
no longer bears the risks involved in funding future retirement annui-
ties. The cost of a 401(k) plan was highly predictable, which became 
increasingly important during the 1980s as the economic environment 
became more competitive. The out-of-pocket cost of a 401(k) plan was 
also	lower	than	that	of	a	defined-benefit	plan—in	the	order	of	2	to	3	per-
cent of payroll. Advances in computer and communications technology 
also	greatly	simplified	the	cost	of	administering	the	individual	accounts	
in a 401(k) plan.




service employees, but they are ill-suited to industries where companies 
come and go and the workforce is mobile. Indeed they penalize what 
employers and workers in such industries increasingly valued—mobil-
ity	and	flexibility.	Several	studies	find	that	changes	in	industry	compo-
sition,	unionization,	and	firm	size	account	for	about	half	the	decline	in	
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defined-benefit	coverage	(see,	e.g.,	Andrews	1985;	Gustman	and	Stein-
meier 1992; and Ippolito 1995).
The	 increasingly	 complicated	 government	 regulation	 of	 defined-
benefit	 plans	 also	 caused	 new	 companies,	 and	 many	 existing	 small	
firms,	to	opt	for	401(k)s.	In	addition	to	ERISA,	a	large	and	complicated	
set of requirements in its own right, Congress in the 1980s repeatedly 
imposed new burdens, such as the new funding obligations and sharply 
increased PBGC premiums. These regulations made pensions, which 
are supported by federal income tax preferences, fairer and more secure, 
but	they	also	made	defined-benefit	plans	more	complex	and	costly.	The	
cumulative impact of the legislative changes has greatly increased the 
relative	costs	of	defined-benefit	plans,	especially	for	small	companies.9 
A	major	consequence	in	the	shift	from	defined-benefit	pensions	to	
401(k)s was that employers became far less involved in the retirement 
income system. They generally provide a matching contribution for 
workers who participate, typically 50 percent on contributions up to 6 
percent	of	earnings	(Profit	Sharing/401[k]	Council	of	America	2005).	
But they typically outsource plan administration and investment man-
agement	to	financial	services	firms,	bear	none	of	the	risks,	and	conduct	
no actuarial reviews of the retirement planning effort. Employers get 
some	personnel	benefits	from	offering	a	401(k),	attracting	a	more	thrifty	
and presumably more diligent workforce (Ippolito 1998), but employ-
ers are no longer the driving force behind these plans. The initiative in 
retirement planning has clearly shifted to their employees and to the 
government, with its interest in increasing retirement saving through 
the	offer	of	tax	benefits.	
Restoring Solvency to the Social Security Program
The	expansion	of	Social	Security	benefits	in	1972	came	just	eight	
years after the baby boom came to an end in 1964. Fertility rates fell 
from 3.6 children per woman in 1960 to 1.8 in 1975. It took time for 
policymakers to conclude that the fertility decline was permanent and 
would	create	a	major	financing	problem	for	Social	Security.	By	the	early	
1980s, however, the threat was clearly understood. The Social Security 
actuary	estimated	the	program’s	deficit	at	1.8	percent	of	taxable	payroll	
over the 75-year planning horizon. 
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In response, the National Commission on Social Security Reform 
was formed, headed by Alan Greenspan. The commission represented a 
broad cross section of political opinion, and its 1983 report presented a 
series of reforms, endorsed by either the whole commission or a major-
ity of its members that would restore solvency over the 75-year horizon. 
The key solvency reforms that Congress enacted into law included (Na-
tional Commission on Social Security Reform 1983): 
Increased funding 
• Accelerated the introduction of scheduled future tax increases. 
Social	Security	retirement	benefits	in	1982	were	funded	by	a	9.15	
percent tax on wages, split evenly between workers and employ-
ers. The tax was quickly raised to the current 10.6 percent. 
• Increased the payroll tax paid by the self-employed to equal the 
total employer-employee tax on wage-and-salary workers. 
•	 Extended	 coverage	 to	 nonprofit	 and	 new	 Federal	 government	
workers. 
Decreased benefits 
•	 Cut	 future	 benefits	 by	 increasing	 the	Normal	Retirement	Age.	
Congress increased the normal retirement age from 65 (for those 
reaching age 62 prior to the year 2000) to age 67 (for those who 
reach 62 in 2022 or after).
•	 Subjected	half	the	benefits	of	higher-income	beneficiaries	to	in-
come taxation, with the proceeds returned to the Social Security 
program. 
The design of the system has changed little since these reforms. 
Since 1983, the most important changes have perhaps been the decision 
to	subject	85	percent	of	the	benefits	of	higher	income	beneficiaries	to	
income taxation, up from 50 percent, and the elimination of the earn-
ings test, in 2000, for workers older than the normal retirement age. 
THE CHALLENgE gOINg FORWARD 
The reforms enacted since 1980 strengthened the solvency of both 
Social	Security	and	employer	defined-benefit	plans	for	a	time.	But,	by	
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the	early	years	of	 the	 twenty-first	century,	both	 faced	solvency	prob-
lems	quite	similar	 to	those	addressed	in	the	1980s.	Defined-contribu-
tion plans, now the dominant form of employer retirement programs, 
are	solvent	by	definition,	but	 their	ability	to	deliver	adequate	old-age	
incomes, especially given the scheduled decline in Social Security re-
placement rates, has emerged as a serious new problem. On the positive 
side, the system has changed in ways that encourage workers to extend 
their careers and shorten their retirements, which could have an impor-
tant	beneficial	effect	on	the	retirement	income	problem.	
The Uncertain Future of Employer Plans 
The	 reforms	 enacted	 to	 shore	 up	 employer	 defined-benefit	 plans	
did	 little	 to	 increase	 the	 flow	 of	 resources	 into	 the	 system	 from	 the	
mid-1980s through the end of the century. The funding ratios that the 
government used to measure solvency were strong. The stock market 
boomed, which drove up the value of pension fund assets. The returns 
on both stocks and bonds were high, which kept the present value of 
future obligations low. But Congress also strictly limited a sponsor’s 
ability to contribute to a “fully funded” pension plan. As a result, rela-
tively	little	new	money	flowed	into	the	system.
After the turn of the century, the economy slid into recession and 
the old solvency problems returned. Total underfunding in employer 
defined-benefit	plans	reached	an	estimated	$400	billion,	and	the	aver-
age funding ratio fell to 76 percent by year-end 2002. Under the new 
funding rules, this low level of funding triggered a sharp increase in 
required pension contributions. This demand for increased contribu-
tions	in	recessions,	precisely	when	employers	are	financially	stressed,	
makes	the	future	of	traditional	defined-benefit	plans	even	more	uncer-
tain (Bovbjerg 2003; WatsonWyatt 2005a).
The 401(k) plan has clearly emerged as the dominant employer plan 
design. Its performance as a vehicle for achieving retirement income 
security, however, has been disappointing. Simulations show that a 
worker in the middle of the earnings distribution in theory should end 
up with about $300,000 in his 401(k) account and/or IRA at retirement. 
(Most of the money in IRAs is rolled-over balances from 401(k) plans.) 
This amount would provide an adequate retirement income in addition 
to Social Security. The Federal Reserve’s 2001 Survey of Consumer Fi-
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nances, however, reports that the typical individual approaching retire-
ment had only $60,000 in such accounts (Figure 3.3). Of course, many 
in this group may not have spent a lifetime covered by 401(k) plans. But 
even younger cohorts, who have grown up with 401(k) plans, do not 
seem to be on track for an adequate retirement income. For example, 
the average 401(k)/IRA holdings for those 45 to 54 are only $49,000 
compared to a predicted $155,000. 
A critical factor explaining these low balances is that the entire 
burden has shifted from the employer to the employee. In these plans, 
workers must decide whether or not to join, how much to contribute, 
how to invest the assets, when to rebalance, what to do about company 
stock, whether to roll over accumulations when changing jobs, and how 
to withdraw the money at retirement. The evidence indicates that a sig-
nificant	 fraction	of	participants	makes	 serious	mistakes	 at	 every	 step	
along the way. Most importantly, a quarter of those eligible to partici-
Figure 3.3  401(k)/IRA Actual and Simulated Accumulations in the 
United States, by Age group, 2001
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pate choose not to do so, and many cash out when they change jobs. In 
addition, over half fail to diversify their investments, many overinvest 
in company stock, and almost no participants rebalance their portfolios 
as they age or in response to market returns. 
The	basic	problem	is	that	financial	decisions	are	difficult.	Most	par-
ticipants	lack	sufficient	financial	experience,	training,	or	time	to	figure	
out what to do. These plans could be greatly improved by making them 
easier and more automatic. Indeed, one-third of large 401(k) plans now 
have automatic enrollment provisions whereby employees are automat-
ically put into the plan and must explicitly opt out if they do not want to 
participate	(Profit	Sharing/401[k]	Council	of	America	2005).	Although	
this and other changes may improve balances in the future, to date they 
remain low.
An important consequence of the shift to 401(k)s that strengthens 
the retirement income system has been the elimination of early retire-
ment	 incentives	 found	 in	defined-benefit	pension	plans.	As	discussed	
above, employers built incentives into their pension plans to terminate 
employment relationships at some targeted age. Over the last quarter 
of the twentieth century, sponsors commonly offered sweetened early 
retirement pensions to induce retirements well before age 65, the nor-
mal	retirement	age	generally	specified	in	such	plans.	These	incentives	
helped push the average retirement age for men from age 66 in 1970 to 
age 63 in 1985 (see Figure 3.4). 
By contrast, 401(k) plans are age-neutral. The balance in a worker’s 
account does not change as a result of the worker reaching a particular 
age. Working longer will reduce the length of retirement, so a given 
balance would yield a higher monthly payout. It should also push up 
the worker’s balance due to added contributions and investment earn-
ings. These plans have no age-triggered adjustments and especially no 
sweeteners to induce a worker to retire early. A number of studies have 
shown that workers covered by a 401(k) retire about one year later than 
otherwise	similar	workers	covered	by	traditional	defined-benefit	plans	
(Friedberg and Webb 2005; Munnell, Triest, and Jivan 2004).
The emergence of the 401(k) coincided with the stabilization of the 
average retirement age for U.S. men in the mid-1980s, and its slight 
rise since then (Figure 3.4). The shift to 401(k)s should not be seen as 
responsible because it takes decades for such a change to affect work-
retirement decisions. The fact that the retirement income system has 
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become	significantly	more	“age-neutral,”	however,	should	become	in-
creasingly important going forward.10 To the extent that it raises the av-
erage retirement age, the shift to 401(k)s would increase the resources 
and reduce the burdens on the retirement income system. 
The nation’s employer retirement income plans have changed dra-
matically since 1980. The experience thus far illustrates serious dif-
ficulties	in	maintaining	the	solvency	of	employer	defined-benefit	plans	
and in relying on 401(k)s as a retirement income security vehicle. The 
elimination of early retirement incentives, however, should be an im-
portant improvement. These changes in employer plans provide a criti-
cal backdrop when considering alternative approaches to restoring sol-
vency to Social Security. 
Social Security’s Long-Term Funding Shortfall
The	1983	reforms	cut	benefits,	raised	contributions,	and	built	up	the	
Social Security Trust Fund. The 1983 Trustees Report in fact projected 
Figure 3.4  Average Retirement Age of Men in the United States, 
 1910–2004
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a 75-year surplus equal to 0.02 percent of taxable payrolls. Neverthe-
less,	 deficits	 appeared	 almost	 immediately	 after	 the	 1983	 legislation	






Why did the balance deteriorate? Table 3.4 shows the source of the 
swing in the Trustee’s accounts. Leading the list is the impact of chang-
ing the valuation period. That is, the 1983 Report looked at the system’s 
finances	over	the	period	1983–2058;	the	projection	period	for	the	2006	
report is 2006–2080. Each time the valuation period moves out one 
year, it picks up a year with a large negative balance. This is the reason 
why policymakers now insist on looking beyond the 75-year projection 
period when considering ways to restore solvency. 
Figure 3.5  U.S. Social Security’s 75-Year Deficit as a Percent of Taxable 
Payrolls, 1983–2005
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A Social Security Advisory Council, established by President Clin-
ton in 1994, thus had to revisit the problem. As was typical, the council 
represented a broad cross section of political opinion. The members 
reached a consensus on various principles and reforms—they opposed 
means-testing,	they	thought	that	each	generation’s	benefits	should	bear	
a reasonable relationship to its contributions, they favored an increase 
in	the	income	taxation	of	benefits,	and	they	also	suggested	bringing	new	
state and local government workers into the program. A small majority 
would also accelerate the rise in the Normal Retirement Age and then 
index	 it	 to	 longevity.	These	 initiatives,	 however,	were	 insufficient	 to	
eliminate the program’s long-term funding shortfall (U.S. 1994–1996 
Advisory Council on Social Security 1997). 
The council members found themselves beyond the standard ap-
proach	 to	 restoring	 solvency	 (i.e.,	 via	 tax	 increases	 and	 benefit	 cuts	
alone). The payroll tax was already the largest federal tax by far on low- 
and	middle-income	households,	and	benefits	would	be	quite	low	after	
the 1983 amendments were fully phased in. Further cuts would clearly 
put the standard of living of many older Americans at risk. 
Table 3.4  Reasons for Change in the Actuarial Deficit of Social Security 
in the United States, 1983–2006 
Item Change as a percent of payroll
Actuarial balance in 1983 +0.02
Changes in actuarial balance due to 
Valuation period −1.35





Total change in actuarial balancea −2.04
Actuarial balance in 2006 −2.02
a Total change in actuarial balance includes 0.02 percent that could not be attributed to 
listed categories.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on 1983–2006 U.S. Social Security Trustees’ 
Reports.
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Rather	than	relying	solely	on	higher	taxes	or	lower	benefits,	mem-
bers of the advisory council embraced—in one form or another—in-
vestment in equities, with their high expected returns, to help restore 
solvency to the nation’s Social Security program. They also saw equity 
investment	as	 the	only	way	 to	make	 the	Social	Security	benefits	 that	
younger workers would receive in retirement bear a reasonable relation-
ship to their contributions. But the council failed to coalesce around a 
single consensus approach. Instead it divided into three separate camps, 
each advancing a distinctly different proposal with a different approach 
to	equity	investment.	These	three	approaches	define	the	primary	options	
for reforming the basic design of the U.S. Social Security program.  
• Trust Fund Investment.	 The	 “Maintenance	 of	 Benefits”	 plan	
recommended	modest	changes	to	taxes	and	benefits	and	closed	
the remaining gap by investing a portion of trust fund assets in 
equities, which promised higher expected returns, and also by 
increasing contributions in the out years. 
• Add-On Accounts. The “Individual Accounts” plan proposed to 
achieve solvency by cutting Social Security’s guaranteed ben-
efits	to	fit	within	the	existing	payroll	tax.	In	response	to	the	sense	
that	benefits	would	then	be	inadequate,	the	plan	mandated	an	ad-
ditional contribution, equal to 1.6 percent of covered earnings, to 
new individual retirement savings accounts. The use of individ-
ual accounts opened the door for equity investments earmarked 
for old-age pensions but without involving the government in the 
financial	markets	and	corporate	governance.	
• Carve-Out Accounts. The “Personal Security Accounts” plan 
proposed to achieve solvency by cutting Social Security’s guar-
anteed	benefits	and	carving	contributions	to	“Personal	Security	
Accounts”—equal to 5 percent of covered earnings—out of the 
existing	payroll	tax.	Guaranteed	benefits	had	to	be	cut	not	just	to	
fit	within	the	resources	provided	by	the	current	payroll	tax,	as	in	
the Add-on Account approach, but even more to accommodate 
the	5	percent	carve	out.	To	maintain	benefit	adequacy,	the	plan	
relied on larger investment in equities, with their high expected 
returns. The reform advanced by President Bush is a descendent 
of this proposal. 
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Political considerations have largely determined the support given 
each proposal for incorporating equities into the Social Security pro-
gram. Liberals are comfortable with government programs and prefer 
trust fund investment, as it maintains Social Security’s currently sched-
uled	 level	 of	 guaranteed	 benefits.	Conservatives	 prefer	 carve-out	 ac-
counts, as it promises to minimize the scope of government and maxi-
mize individual self-reliance. Moderates seeking a middle ground will 
often opt for the add-on accounts approach, with the somewhat smaller 
guaranteed	 benefits,	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 limited	 amount	 of	 individual	
choice, and a politically palatable way (mandatory saving vs. higher 
taxes) to get more resources into the system. 
Practical	 considerations	 should	 also	 influence	 the	 desirability	 of	
the three alternative approaches to reforming Social Security. Most im-
portant is how the approach to equities shapes the retirement income 
system. Other considerations include the cost of administering these 
programs, the ability to oversee their operation and restrain the power 
of government, and the capacity for handling the risk in equity invest-
ment. Risk management is perhaps the most critical of these pragmatic 
considerations.	As	the	experience	of	employer	defined-benefit	pension	
plans clearly shows, the risk that comes with equity investment can 
radically upset a retirement income program. 
CONCLUSION
The U.S. retirement income system enters the new century in an 
unsettled state. Social Security, the primary source of income for the 
majority of older Americans, lacks the resources as of 2040 to pay the 
full	value	of	even	the	reduced	benefits	currently	promised.	This	solven-
cy problem has dominated retirement income policy debates for well 
over a decade, but rather than move the discussion toward consensus, 
the	debates	have	generated	increasingly	fierce	disagreements	over	the	
government’s proper size and role in the economy. 
A second problem—that of assuring adequate retirement incomes—
has also emerged on the horizon. As discussed in Chapter 1, the sched-
uled rise in the normal retirement age, plus higher projected Medicare 
premiums and income taxes, will dramatically cut the recipient’s net 
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Social	Security	benefits.	If	solvency	is	restored	through	a	plan	that	cuts	
benefits	and	increases	taxes	by	comparable	amounts,	 it	would	reduce	
Social Security replacement rates below their lowest level in the pro-
gram’s history. 
Employer plans are not prepared to take on more of the burden. 
The share of the workforce participating in a plan and the level of con-
tributions have been roughly constant for the past quarter century. But 
the	continuing	shift	from	defined-benefit	to	defined-contribution	plans	
has placed more of the risks and responsibilities on the shoulders of 
individual workers, and workers have not demonstrated great success 
in managing their accounts. Thus, employer plans are unlikely to make 
up the shortfall created by the scheduled decline in Social Security ben-
efits,	let	alone	any	further	reductions.	
The next three chapters examine reforms enacted in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Like the United States, these three na-
tions all have Anglo-Saxon retirement income systems, with relatively 
modest	public	pension	programs	and	a	significant	reliance	on	funded	
employer plans. Each, however, has incorporated equity investments 
into its social security program, each along the lines of one of the op-
tions	defined	by	the	1994–1996	Social	Security	Advisory	Council.	The	
experiences of these nations thus provide instructive examples of what 
might play out if we were to adopt one of these three ways forward. 
Notes
	 1.		 Elderly	 households	 are	 defined	 as	 households	 headed	 by	 someone	 age	 65	 or	
older. 
  2. Although this example uses 65 as the retirement age, the so-called normal re-
tirement	 age—the	age	when	 the	worker	 is	 eligible	 for	 full	 benefits—is	 in	 the	
process of moving from 65 to 67 by 2022. The increase began with individuals 
who reached age 62 in 2000, for whom the normal retirement age is 65 plus two 
months, and increases two months per year until it reaches age 66. Then, after a 
12-year hiatus, the normal retirement age begins to increase again by two months 
per year until it reaches age 67 for individuals who reach 62 in 2022 or later. 
 3. The Munnell and Soto (2005a) replacement rates presented in Table 3.2 are some-
what different from the hypothetical rates published by the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA) and presented in Table 3.1. Munnell and Soto give ben-
efits	as	a	percentage	of	AIME,	or	average	indexed	monthly	earnings.	The	SSA	
hypothetical	rates	give	benefits	as	a	percentage	of	hypothetical	earnings	prior	to	
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retirement. For the “medium earner” this is national average earnings when the 
worker	is	age	64.	The	SSA	specification	of	preretirement	earnings	is	somewhat	
higher	than	AIME.	If	the	SSA	defined	preretirement	earnings	as	AIME,	the	hypo-
thetical “medium” earner would have a 48 percent replacement rate. Conversely, 
adjusting Munnell and Soto’s 44 percent overall rate, for comparability with the 
SSA	figures,	would	produce	a	replacement	rate	somewhat	less	than	the	SSA’s	42	
percent. 
 4. Especially in collectively bargained plans, the annuity might be a dollar amount 
per month for each year of service, say $50, so workers with 20 years of service 
would receive $1,000 per month at age 65. 
	 5.	 Such	 plans	motivate	workers	 to	 remain	with	 the	 firm	 because	 benefits	 based	
on	final	earnings	increase	rapidly	as	job	tenures	lengthen.	They	also	encourage	
workers to retire at an age when productivity typically falls below their compen-
sation. Thus workers who stay past the plan’s designated retirement age forgo 
their	pension	while	they	work,	with	no	increase	in	future	benefits.	As	a	result,	
their net compensation is equal to the difference between their wage and their 
foregone pension. Considerable work has documented the impact of incentives 
to	retire	in	defined-benefit	plans:	Lazear	(1979,	1985);	Samwick	(1998);	Stock	
and Wise (1990a,b); Kotlikoff and Wise (1987, 1989); and Fields and Mitchell 
(1984).
 6. The PBGC monthly guarantee limit in 2005 is $3,801 at age 65 and declines to 
$1,710 at age 55. Employers pay for this insurance with premiums largely deter-
mined by the plan’s funding status.
  7. In addition to imposing this new funding requirement, Congress dramatically 
raised PBGC premiums—to $19 plus a “risk adjusted” premium equal to 0.8 
percent of the plan’s unfunded termination liability—and gave the PBGC a claim 
against 100 percent of the sponsor’s net worth. Many of these changes were en-
acted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. 
		8.	 Nonprofit	and	governmental	organizations	have	shifted	towards	403(b)	and	457	
plans,	which	are	very	similar	to	401(k)s.	Many	large	sponsors	of	defined-benefit	
plans in the late 1990s were shifting to new hybrid formats, such as the “cash 
balance	plan,”	that	replace	the	worker’s	pension	benefit	with	an	individual	de-
fined-contribution	 type	 account.	 In	 a	 cash	 balance	plan,	 employers	 contribute	
the full amount, equal to a set percentage of salary, and increase the balance by 
a	rate	of	return	they	set.	Like	a	traditional	defined-benefit	plan,	the	assets	of	the	
pension fund, the sponsor, and the PBGC all stand behind these balances. As 
the	 government	 clarifies	 the	 rules	 governing	 cash	 balance	 conversions,	many	
large	sponsors	are	expected	 to	adopt	 this	defined-contribution	format	for	 their	
“defined-benefit”	program,	or	to	switch	to	a	more	conventional	401(k)	(Munnell	
and Sundén 2004).    
		9.	 The	biggest	increase	in	both	absolute	and	relative	costs	of	defined-benefit	versus	
defined-contribution	plans	occurred	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 as	 plans	 adjusted	 to	 the	
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that increased re-
cord-keeping	requirements,	administrative	expenses,	and	benefit	costs	(Hustead	
1998). 
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 10.  Retirement incentives have also been reduced in the Social Security program. 
The	1983	amendments	introduced	actuarially	fair	increases	in	benefits	for	retire-
ment between the normal retirement age and age 70, to be fully phased in for 
workers	attaining	age	62	after	2004.	As	Social	Security	early	retirement	benefits	
were	already	actuarially	adjusted,	 the	 lifetime	benefits	of	a	worker	with	aver-
age	 life	expectancy	will	be	about	 the	 same	 regardless	of	whether	benefits	are	
claimed at age 62, 65, or 70 (aside from changes due to additional work). The 
1983 amendments also relaxed the Social Security earnings test, and legislation 
eliminated the earnings test entirely for those who reached the normal retirement 
age. For a fuller discussion of the evolution of the earnings test and the delayed 




Lessons from the United Kingdom
Privatization and a Safety Net
The United Kingdom has included equity investment in its Social 
Security program along the lines of the “carve-out” individual account 
approach. The goal of the reform was to restore solvency, reduce de-
pendence on the state, and increase reliance on individual initiative and 
private	financial	markets.	The	United	Kingdom	achieved	solvency	by	
cutting	 benefits.	 It	 then	 allowed	workers	 to	make	 up	 the	 shortfall	 in	
projected retirement income by redirecting a portion of their social in-
surance contributions to an individual account, which could be invested 
in equities. The recent withdrawal of many employers from offering 
traditional	defined-benefit	pensions,	which	could	also	substitute	for	a	
portion of the government pension program, has made an individual ac-
count the primary choice for workers electing the carve-out option. 
Britain’s individual account program, however, has been hampered 
by high administrative costs and governance challenges that market 
forces	have	thus	far	been	unable	to	bring	under	control.	Benefits	provid-
ed by the Basic State Pension have meanwhile fallen below 15 percent 
of national average earnings and are projected to hit 7 percent midcen-
tury.	Because	welfare	benefits	are	pegged	at	20	percent	of	national	av-
erage earnings, and because Britain introduced a “tapered” withdrawal 
rate	for	old-age	means-tested	benefits,	reducing	benefits	by	only	a	per-
centage of income earned, half the elderly are now eligible for welfare 
benefits.	By	mid-century	this	figure	is	projected	to	be	three-quarters	of	
the	elderly,	with	a	greater	proportion	on	means-tested	benefits	at	some	
point in their lives. Thus, the carve-out approach in Britain is expected 
to change the public retirement system from social insurance to one 
increasingly	based	on	means-tested	welfare	benefits.	
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THE UK RETIREMENT SySTEM IN 1980
Through the early postwar decades, the United Kingdom had a stan-
dard	two-tier	Anglo-Saxon	retirement	income	system.	The	first	tier	was	
the Basic State Pension, a social insurance program funded by a payroll 
tax, which had evolved out of the nation’s 1908 means-tested welfare 
program for the elderly. The Basic State Pension provided full-career 
workers a “basic pension,” which was kept at about 20 percent of na-
tional	average	earnings	through	the	first	three	postwar	decades	(Figure	
4.1). The second tier was the collection of tax-advantaged employer 
plans, which provided earnings replacement for workers who remained 
with their employers to retirement. Half the wage and salary workforce, 
and two-thirds of the men, were covered by such a plan at the end of the 
1970s. But, as indicated by the elderly’s heavy dependence on the gov-
ernment’s	meager	old-age	benefits,	only	a	small	number	of	retirees	at	
the time had an adequate income from an employer plan (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.1  UK’s Basic State Pension as a Percent of National Average 
Earnings, 1950–2005
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Figure 4.2  Sources of Retirement Income in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, 1979
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Like the United States, the United Kingdom expanded its retirement 
income system in the 1970s in response to two distinct problems—the 
persistence of old-age poverty and the sharp drop in income that most 
workers experienced when they retired from the labor force. Parliament 
addressed the problem of old-age poverty in 1975 by expanding the 
Basic	State	Pension.	 It	 pushed	 benefits	 to	 25	 percent	 of	 the	 national	
wage. It also gave the disabled and those who remained at home to care 
for young children or other family members (primarily married wom-
en)	credit	toward	benefits.	These	reforms	made	the	Basic	State	Pension	
less of an employment-based social insurance program and more of a 
demogrant—a uniform payment made to a group of residents—which 
improved its success in keeping the elderly out of poverty. 
Parliament addressed the problem of income maintenance by 
strengthening the earnings-related second tier of the nation’s retirement 
income	system.	In	1973,	it	imposed	a	five-year	vesting	requirement	on	
employer plans.1 Many more workers could thus expect to retire with 
at least some earnings-related retirement income. Parliament’s major 
income-maintenance initiative, however, was the creation of the State 
Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). Enacted in 1975 and going 
into effect in 1978, the new SERPS program was scheduled to replace 
25 percent of earnings between the level of the Basic State Pension 
(then 25 percent of average earnings) and 7.5 times that amount (then a 
bit below twice average earnings). 
The addition of this earnings-related old-age pension changed the 
structure of the British social insurance program, making it more like 
the U.S. Social Security program. Once SERPS matured, in 20 years, 
the “average earner” would get a combined Basic State Pension /SERPS 
pension replacing nearly 44 percent of preretirement earnings: 25 per-
cent from the Basic State Pension and nearly 19 percent (25 percent of 
earnings above the Basic State Pension) from SERPS. The U.S. Social 
Security program has a similar structure. For a worker with average 
earnings,	 Social	 Security	 replaces	 90	 percent	 of	 the	 first	 22	 percent	
of the worker’s average indexed earnings and 32 percent of earnings 
above that amount (Table 4.1). This yields a replacement rate of 45 
percent of average indexed earnings. Such two-tier pension packages 
provide	higher	benefits	to	high	earners,	who	contribute	more,	and	lower	
benefits	to	low	earners,	who	contribute	less,	but	they	replace	more	of	
the low earner’s wage to assure a minimum old-age income.2 
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The fundamental difference between the expanded British and U.S. 
Social Security programs was the ability of British employers to “con-
tract	out”	of	SERPS.	Employers	that	offered	comparable	benefits—to	
both leavers and stayers—were in fact encouraged to “contract out.” 
The government provided that encouragement by giving employers that 
contract out a “rebate” of the payroll tax that funded SERPS. This rebate 
was	set	somewhat	above	the	estimated	cost	of	the	benefit.3 SERPS was 
thus a residual program, designed for those not covered by an employer 
plan.	It	also	served	as	a	benchmark	that	defined	the	minimum	earnings-
related	benefit	for	workers	covered	by	employer	plans.	At	the	end	of	the	
1970s, 53 percent of workers eligible for SERPS were contracted out, 
leaving just 47 percent contributing to the government program (Davis 
1997; Whitehouse 1998). 
The ability to contract out meant that employer plans in the United 
Kingdom would play a larger role than they do in the United States. 




Aside from this ability for employers to contract out, the United 
States and the United Kingdom had similar retirement income systems 
at the end of the 1970s. The expanded UK public pension program was 
designed to replace about 44 percent of the “average worker’s” earn-
ings, essentially the same as Social Security. Both countries also had 
broad	participation	in	tax-advantaged	employer	defined-benefit	pension	
plans, and these plans then provided about 16 percent of the income 
of the elderly (Figure 4.3). Both countries also had adopted vesting 
Table 4.1  The Structure of U.S. and UK Social Security Systems after  
the 1978 Reforms
Hypothetical social security replacement rate (%) for the average worker
                       U.S. systema UK System
90%	portion	of	the	benefit	formula 20 Basic State Pension 25
32%	portion	of	the	benefit	formula 25 SERPS 19
Total replacement 45 Total replacement 44
a The	U.S.	replacement	rates	presented	in	this	table	are	Social	Security	benefits	as	a	per-
cent	of	average	indexed	earnings,	using	the	benefit	formula	presented	in	Table	3.1.	
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
74   Munnell and Sass
requirements	designed	 to	provide	 retirement	 income	benefits	 to	a	 far	
greater share of the workforce. 
The two nations responded quite differently to challenges that 
emerged at the end of the twentieth century. Britain was quick to adopt 
the carve-out response. More than any other industrial nation, it cut 
government pensions and shifted much of the responsibility of provid-
ing	 the	 diminished	 level	 of	 public	 benefits	 to	 the	 private	 sector.4 Its 
experience thus illustrates possible implications of such policies for the 
United States. 
Figure 4.3  Projections of UK Public Pension Benefits as a Percent of 
Average Earnings, 1979–2060
NOTE: S2P is the State Second Pension, a replacement for SERPS introduced in 2002 
that	 provides	 higher	 benefits	 for	 low-wage	workers	 and	 SERPS-level	 benefits	 for	
workers with middle and high earnings. 
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THE REFORM OF THE BRITISH RETIREMENT INCOME 
SySTEM: CONTRACTION AND PRIvATIzATION
The government-led expansion of the British retirement income 
system proved short lived. In 1979, only one year after the new SERPS 
program went into effect, the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher 
came	to	power	and	remained	in	office	for	the	next	18	years.	Thatcher	
was elected on a platform that promised to privatize and deregulate the 
economy, cut social spending, reduce the power of unions, and lower the 
overall tax burden. The National Insurance Contribution payroll tax that 
funded government old-age pensions, as well as other social programs, 
took about 15 percent of covered earnings. It was a major component 
of overall taxation, especially for low and middle earners. Reputable 
studies also began projecting a rapid aging of the population, a sharp in-
crease in pension expenditures, and payroll tax rates rising to 35 percent 
of covered earnings after 2010 (Whitehouse 1998). Controlling public 
expenditures on old-age pensions thus became a major policy objective. 
As private plans were funded in advance and had a strong voluntary 
component, they promised a smoother and less costly transition to an 
older	society.	The	fiscal	implications	of	societal	aging	and	the	perceived	
advantages	of	private	plans	thus	intensified	the	Conservative	impulse	to	
pare down social insurance and privatize the retirement income system 
(UK Department for Work and Pensions 2000). 
The campaign began in 1980, when the Conservatives indexed the 
Basic State Pension to prices rather than wages. As wages typically 
rise faster than prices, the change in indexing meant that the program 
would require an ever smaller share of earnings and national output as 
compared	to	the	pre-1980	policy.	It	also	set	Basic	State	Pension	benefits	
on a slow but steady path of replacing an ever-smaller share of prere-
tirement	earnings.	By	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-first	century,	benefits	
would fall from 25 to 15 percent of national average earnings. The Ba-
sic State Pension is projected to replace 10 percent of national average 
earnings by 2030, and just 7 percent by midcentury (UK Government 
Actuary 2003). 
The Conservatives turned to the earnings-related portion of the pub-
lic retirement income system in 1986 and 1995. They cut the SERPS 
pension from 25 percent of the average of a worker’s best 20 years 
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of covered earnings to 20 percent of average covered earnings over 
the worker’s full career, reduced the amount of earnings covered by 
the	program,	halved	the	survivor	benefit	from	100	to	50	percent	of	the	
deceased	 spouse’s	 benefit,	 increased	 the	 retirement	 age	 for	 women	
from 60 to 65, and introduced various technical procedures that further 
reduced	SERPS	pensions.	The	changes	would	cut	 the	benefits	 to	 just	
a quarter of their original 1978 level, with married women bearing a 
disproportionate share of the reduction (Blake 2000; Davis 1997; Han-
nah 1986; Nobles 2000; UK Department for Work and Pensions 2000; 
Whitehouse 1998). 
As the Conservatives reduced social insurance pensions, they shift-
ed more of the retirement income burden to private plans. They would 
require	vesting	after	two	years	of	service,	pension	fund	assets	sufficient	
to meet at least 90 percent of the plan’s current obligations, a stricter 
standard	of	fiduciary	conduct,	and	participation	in	an	“insurance”	pool	
that protected participants against fraud.5 In addition to these ERISA-
like rules, the Conservatives would also require employers to index 
both	vested	accruals	and	pension	benefits	to	inflation	of	up	to	5	percent	
per year (Blake 2000, 2002; Davis 1997; Hannah 1986; Nobles 2000; 
UK Department for Work and Pensions 2000; Whitehouse 1998). 
The privatization campaign was stymied, however, by the stagna-
tion in employer plan coverage. Coverage in fact had peaked in 1967 
and was slowly trending down (Davis 2003). As in the United States, 
production was shifting away from the traditional pension sponsors—
large hierarchic enterprises and unionized industries—toward smaller 
firms	and	employers	of	the	rapidly	growing	supply	of	women	and	mo-
bile	 knowledge	 workers.	 Defined-contribution	 plans	 were	 far	 better	
suited	than	defined-benefit	pension	plans	to	smaller	firms	and	workers	
with multiple-employer careers. To expand the reach of private plans—
and	to	create	a	more	fluid,	noncorporate,	non-union,	and	market-driven	
economy—the Conservatives promoted the growth of individual ac-
count retirement plans (Davis 1997; Nobles 2000). 
Beginning	in	1986,	the	government	allowed	firms	and	workers	to	
contract out of SERPS using “money purchase” plans, individual retire-
ment savings accounts that annuitized the balance at retirement.6 These 
money purchase plans could either be individual “personal pension” 
policies offered by insurers or employer-sponsored money purchase 
plans. To accelerate the adoption of personal pensions, the Conserva-
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tives between 1988 and 1993 offered a higher “rebate” of social insur-
ance contributions to workers who took out such plans—an additional 
2 percent of covered earnings atop the 5.8 percent rebate then given for 
workers that were contracted out through a traditional employer de-
fined-benefit	plan.	They	also	allowed	workers	 to	opt	out	of	 their	em-
ployer	defined-benefit	plan	and	direct	the	standard	payroll	tax	rebate,	
and this 2 percent bonus, to a personal pension. They even allowed 
workers	to	cash-out	the	value	of	their	defined-benefit	plan	accrual	and	
deposit the sum into a personal pension (Davis 1997; Daykin 2001). 
The government’s promotion of private pensions succeeded in 
boosting the number of workers that were contracted out of SERPS 
into some sort of prefunded private retirement plan (see Figure 4.4). 
The spread of individual retirement savings account plans was never-
Figure 4.4  Percent of All UK Workers Covered by Employer Plans or 
Personal Pensions, 1979–2002
NOTE: Coverage includes both public and private sector wage and salary workers. The 
coverage rates thus are not strictly comparable to those for the United States presented 
in Figure 2.2, which includes only private sector workers. 













78   Munnell and Sass
theless slower in Britain than in the United States. The additional 2 
percent rebate primarily led to a shift out of SERPS, more than out of 
employer	defined-benefit	plans	(Table	4.2).	SERPS,	as	a	result,	covered	
less than 40 percent of workers in second-tier earnings-related plans 




and over a third of all workers in private plans were in an individual ac-
count arrangement (Whitehouse 1998). The pace of structural economic 
change,	firm	creation,	and	new	plan	formation	nevertheless	proceeded	
at	a	slower	pace	in	Britain.	So	employer	defined-benefit	plans	remained	
the dominant private retirement income vehicle through the end of the 
twentieth century. 
In 1997, the Conservatives made a bold attempt to completely 
privatize the retirement income system. They proposed the replacement 
of both the Basic State Pension and SERPS by mandatory participation 
in a private plan—presumably an individual account for those not al-
ready contracted out—with a minimum contribution equal to 9 percent 
of earnings. The Conservatives argued that such a plan was the key to 
raising the old-age incomes of those at the bottom. They saw employer 
plans	 as	 a	 financial	 vehicle	 giving	middle-	 and	 upper-income	work-
ers access to the capital markets and high-yielding equity investments, 
which would allow the conversion of current earnings into ample old-
age pensions. A key hurdle impeding access to the capital markets by 
low-wage	workers	was	the	fixed	setup	and	marketing	costs	of	personal	
pension accounts, which took a large bite out of the contributions and 
investment returns of low and middle earners. One study estimated an 
Table 4.2  Coverage in the United Kingdom by Type of Plan for Those 
with Earnings-Related Pensions
Coverage (%)
Type of plan 1978–79 1987–88 1994–95 2001–02
Employer	defined-benefit	
plan
51 46 40 35
Money purchase plan 0 16 24 20
SERPS 49 38 36 45
SOURCE: UK Department for Work and Pensions (2003b).
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average reduction of 3.2 percentage points in annual returns for partici-
pation over a 10-year period and 1.7 percentage points for a 25-year 
period. Another found fees and high turnover rates often reduced the 
value of individual account balances of low-wage workers by 40 percent 
or more. By raising the guaranteed contribution to 9 percent of covered 
earnings, approximately twice the level of the payroll tax rebate, the 
overhead burden could be cut roughly in half. As a fail-safe against the 
risks inherent in such plans, the Conservatives would also guarantee an 
income	at	least	equal	to	the	Basic	State	Pension	on	the	“first-tier”	por-
tion of the mandatory contribution (Blake and Board 2000; Davis 1997; 
Murthi, Orszag, and Orszag 1999; Whitehouse 1998). 
The Conservative privatization campaign and proposal to eliminate 
public old-age pensions came to an end in the election of 1997. La-
bor made retirement income policy a major campaign issue, and the 
resulting debate contributed to the Conservatives’ worst defeat since 
1832.7 Labor did not, however, reverse the basic privatization approach. 
It declared its ambition that private plans would provide 60 percent of 
retirement	 income	by	 the	middle	of	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 and	 that	
the great majority of the elderly would get at least some support from 
private sources. But Labor developed alternate approaches for includ-
ing low and middle earners in private plans and for assuring a minimal 
retirement income (Whitehouse 1998). 
THE REFORM OF THE BRITISH RETIREMENT INCOME 
SySTEM: PRIvATIzATION WITH A SAFETy NET 
Labor recognized that the overhead costs of personal pensions were 
a	significant	problem	for	low	and	middle	earners,	with	their	low	level	of	
contributions and low account balances. So, in 2001, Labor introduced 
the “Stakeholder pension,” effectively a personal pension with fees lim-
ited to 1 percent of assets and with no charges for initiating or exiting an 
account.8 The government also required employers without their own 
plans to offer their workers a Stakeholder option. By imposing this re-
quirement, controlling fees, and sanctioning the design, the government 
hoped to accelerate the acceptance of Stakeholder pensions. This was 
especially important as the low-fee accounts required enormous econo-
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mies of scale to be commercially viable (UK Department for Work and 
Pensions 1998; 2002a). 
The	Stakeholder	design	limited	the	overhead	burden	by	fiat,	but	it	
remained	costly	 for	financial	services	firms	 to	market	and	administer	
such plans, especially for workers with low contributions and balances. 
Advising low and middle earners whether or not to contract out and 




sued Stakeholder business and take-up has been disappointing. In re-
sponse, the government in 2004 increased allowable fees to 1.5 percent 
of	assets	over	the	first	10	years	of	contributions.	Even	at	this	level,	ob-
servers question whether fees could cover costs in the low- to average-
earner market. A 1.5 percent fee also represents a major reduction in 
investment earnings, resulting in about a 30 percent reduction in assets 
at retirement if maintained across the entire accumulation period (Blake 
and Turner 2005; UK Pensions Commission 2005). 
Labor’s	most	significant	 reforms	addressed	 the	problem	of	assur-
ing the elderly a basic income—the issue that had initiated the rise of 
modern retirement income systems. Because of Britain’s meager social 
insurance program and the limited reach of private plans, one out of six 
elderly Britons in the 1990s collected national means-tested cash pay-
ments.9 With the contraction of social insurance, the issue of assuring 
the elderly a basic income required a serious policy response. 
The most obvious approach would be to restore the Basic State Pen-
sion to its traditional peg of about 20 percent of average earnings. Re-
storing	the	Basic	State	Pension,	however,	would	increase	benefits	to	all	
retirees, not just those in poverty. To keep a lid on public expenditures, 
Labor continued the policy of price-indexing the Basic State Pension, 
which	produces	a	steady	decline	in	benefits	relative	to	earnings.	
To augment public pensions for low and middle earners, Labor in-
creased	their	benefits	in	the	government’s	second-tier	earnings-related	
program. In 2002, Labor replaced SERPS with the State Second Pen-
sion.	This	new	program	broke	the	direct	relationship	between	benefits	
and earnings to increase pensions of those at the bottom. After the pro-
gram was fully phased in: 
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• Full career workers with earnings of about 45 percent of national 
average earnings would receive 40 percent of covered earnings. 
• Workers with less than 45 percent of national average earnings 
would receive the same amount as the 45 percent earner.
• Workers with earnings above 45 percent of national average 
earnings	would	receive	a	higher	benefit,	but	the	amount	of	prere-
tirement earnings replaced would decline as earnings rose until 
reaching the SERPS 20 percent replacement rate. 
Thus,	the	benefits	provided	by	the	State	Second	Pension	were	a	flat	
amount at the bottom of the income distribution, gently sloped in the 
middle, and proportional to earnings only at levels where most work-
ers contract out. The new system would thus function more like the 
welfare-derived Basic State Pension, assuring a minimal income, than 
the	market-derived	SERPS,	with	benefits	proportional	to	contributions.	
Labor also provided caregivers and the disabled credit toward a second-
tier pension, which represented another shift toward a welfare-based 
model. The combination of the Basic State Pension and the State Sec-
ond Pension still gave higher earners higher social insurance pensions, 
but	 benefits	would	not	 be	much	greater	 than	 those	 going	 to	workers	
with much lower earnings.10 
Even	for	low	earners,	however,	the	larger	benefits	provided	by	the	
State Second Pension will only partially offset the decline of the Basic 
State Pension. Public pensions are thus expected to replace a steadily 
declining share of preretirement earnings. One estimate has the com-
bined pension falling to 28 percent of national average earnings for the 
average earner as early as 2025 and to 21 percent—Britain’s traditional 
welfare-level allowance—for those earning half the national average 
earnings (Pensions Policy Institute 2003). Labor’s social insurance re-
forms thus targeted the government’s scarce resources on those at the 
bottom. It preserved the basic welfare-level pension for low earners 
without private coverage, and it left those in private plans with just the 
dwindling Basic State Pension (Pensions Policy Institute 2003). 
Labor’s most far-reaching reform was the addition of the “pension 
credit” to the nation’s means-tested welfare program for the elderly in 
2003. The nation’s welfare program had traditionally reduced means-
tested	benefits	pound	for	pound	once	the	recipient’s	total	income	crossed	
the targeted threshold amount, which was about 20 percent of national 
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average earnings in the postwar period. As the Basic State Pension falls 
below that target, an increasing proportion of the elderly would see in-
come earned through work, savings, or contributions to public or pri-
vate	 retirement	 plans	merely	 reduce	 their	means-tested	 benefits	 on	 a	
pound-for-pound basis.11	The	pension	 credit	 cut	 that	 confiscatory	 tax	
to a more manageable 40 percent. That is, after the application of the 
pension credit, a pound of income above the Basic State Pension lowers 
means-tested	benefits	by	40	pence.	This	tapered	withdrawal	of	means-
tested	benefits	reduced	the	sense	of	unfairness,	and	the	draconian	disin-
centive to work or save, that the traditional approach would impose on 
an increasing share of the elderly as the Basic State Pension declined 
(Clark 2001, 2002; Clark and Emmerson 2003). 
At	 the	same	 time,	 the	pension	credit	 taper	significantly	 increased	
the	share	of	the	elderly	that	qualifies	for	means-tested	payments.	Before	
the introduction of the program, retirees with a full Basic State Pension 
(about 15 percent of national average earnings in 2003) lost all means-
tested	 benefits	 if	 they	 had	 income	 from	other	 sources	 greater	 than	 5	
percent of national average earnings. With the pension credit, retirees 
with other income up to 13 percent of national average earnings—about 
half	 the	elderly—qualify	for	a	benefit.	When	the	Basic	State	Pension	
reaches 10 percent of national average earnings, retirees with other 
income up to 25 percent of national average earnings would qualify 
(Pensions Policy Institute 2003). Estimates of the eligible population 
by mid-century, with a Basic State Pension estimated at 7 percent of 
national average earnings, range from 65 to 80 percent of the elderly 
(Figure 4.5). The great majority of British households would thus be 
eligible	for	means-tested	benefits—if	not	at	the	time	of	retirement,	then	
later in life, as old-age incomes typically decline over time, especially 
relative to national average earnings (Clark and Emmerson 2002, 2003; 
Pensions Policy Institute 2003; UK Department for Work and Pensions 
2002b).12 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORMED BRITISH SySTEM
The British responded to the demographic and economic challenges 
that emerged after 1980 as aggressively as any advanced industrial na-
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tion. The British system at the beginning of the period looked much 
like that in the United States, with social insurance and employer de-
fined-benefit	plans	promising	reasonably	ample	incomes	to	much	of	the	
elderly population. By the end of the period, the roles of both social 
insurance	and	employer	defined-benefit	plans	had	been	greatly	dimin-
ished. If the current system remains in place, three out of four elderly 
Britons	will	rely	on	means-tested	benefits	by	the	middle	of	the	twenty-
first	century	and	individual	accounts	will	be	the	primary	source	of	pri-
vate retirement income. 
A key public policy objective throughout was to reduce the pressure 
on government budgets, and ease the transition to an older society, by 
privatizing much of the retirement income burden. This objective has 
largely been realized. In a world in which nearly all industrial nations 
face enormous public pension obligations, Britain is widely admired for 
containing government expenditures on the elderly to about 5 percent of 
GDP. Social insurance spending is projected to fall by midcentury, from 
a bit more than 4 percent of GDP today to a bit more than 3 percent, 
Figure 4.5  Projected Percentage of UK Pensioners Eligible for  
Pension Credit
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with the erosion of the Basic State Pension and the rising retirement 
age for women more than offsetting the effects of population aging (UK 
Pension Commission 2004). These cuts will help contain payroll tax 
rates, which fund the National Health Service as well as old-age pen-
sions. Meanwhile means-tested expenditures, paid out of general rev-
enues, are projected to rise from less than 0.5 to over 1 percent of GDP 
over this period (Clark 2001, 2002; Davis 2003; UK Department for 
Work and Pensions 2003a). 
Britain’s privatization initiative required employer plans to assume 
an increasing share of the retirement income burden. In this, however, 
Britain	 has	 been	 far	 less	 successful.	 Employer	 defined-benefit	 plans	
faced similar demographic and economic forces as they did in the United 
States, but their burdens were greater, because they typically contracted 
out the government’s second-tier pension and the government imposed 
increasingly	stringent	inflation-proofing	requirements	on	employer	plan	
accruals	and	benefit	payouts.	The	boom	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	light-
ened the burden, but the economic downturn at the turn of the century 
resulted	in	major	employer	plan	deficits.	By	year-end	2002,	assets	aver-
aged just 80 percent of liabilities in the plans of Britain’s 100 largest 
firms	(Davis	2003).	In	some	cases	the	deficit	exceeded	40	percent	of	the	
sponsor’s market value. As in the United States, new government fund-
ing rules required a sharp increase in pension contributions to quick-
ly fund termination liabilities—just when the sponsor’s business was 
struggling.	Employers	could	also	see	that	defined-benefit	plans	would	
remain a costly affair even after the recession ended. In response, em-
ployers	with	half	of	all	private-sector	defined-benefit	participants	have	
closed their plans to new entrants (Davis 2003). Government agencies 
and	enterprises	have	retained	their	defined-benefit	programs,	but	retire-
ment saving in the British private sector, as in the United States, will 
increasingly be organized around individual accounts.13 
Given the continued erosion of government pensions and the decline 
in	employer	defined-benefit	plans,	individual	accounts	have	emerged	as	
critically important in the British retirement income system. The chal-
lenge of retirement income planning is much the same in individual 
accounts	 and	 employer	 defined-benefit	 plans.	There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 ad-
equately fund the plan, invest the assets, manage the risks, generate the 
desired	 income	 stream,	 and	 seek	 out	 qualified	 vendors	 and	 advisors.	
Employers bring tremendous sophistication to the task. Workers bring 
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little or none, nor does the British experience suggest that workers be-
come	more	sophisticated	as	government	and	employer	benefits	decline,	
although	the	stakes	become	significantly	greater.	
The clearest indication of this lack of proper management is the 
low level of contributions to individual accounts. Contributions to em-
ployer	defined-benefit	plans,	largely	determined	by	actuarial	analysis,	
run about 16 percent of payroll. This is larger than contributions in the 
United States, as British plans generally contract out and take on the 
burden	of	paying	public	second-tier	pension	benefits	to	terminated	as	
well	 as	 active	workers	 and	 are	 required	 to	 provide	 significant	 levels	
of	inflation-proofing.	By	contrast,	the	average	contribution	to	defined-
contribution plans is half that amount—8.5 percent of earnings in em-
ployer plans and only 7.7 percent of earnings in the far more prevalent 
personal pensions (Davis 2003). Under some circumstances, this level 
of contribution could produce a reasonable balance at retirement. Brit-
ish private pensions, however, have very high overhead costs, which 
reduce the ultimate accumulation. Contribution rates, moreover, are 
not constant across a worker’s career. Government rebates of social 
insurance	contributions	for	workers	in	defined-contribution	plans	rise	
sharply with age. They start at 5 percent of covered earnings and rise to 
13 percent of covered earnings for workers age 52 and over. The large 
contributions made toward the end of a worker’s career, however, have 
relatively little impact on the account balance at retirement. This back-
loaded pattern of contributions, combined with higher overhead costs, is 
unlikely to produce an adequate retirement income (Blake 2002; Davis 
1997, 2003; UK Department of Work and Pension 2002; Whitehouse 
1998).
Older workers also have not been very effective in translating their 
account balances into retirement income streams. Until April 2006, the 
government required the annuitization of balances created by payroll 
tax rebates, with payments increasing at least 3 percent per annum as 
a	protection	against	expected	inflation.14	In	fulfilling	this	requirement,	
workers commonly failed to shop around for the best value. Even when 
other providers offered far more retirement income in exchange for 
their	balances,	retiring	workers	often	annuitized	with	the	firm	that	had	
managed the accumulation phase. Most workers also choose not to an-
nuitize	their	nonpayroll	tax	balances.	Such	decisions	create	a	significant	
risk	of	insufficient	income	down	the	road	(Davis	1997,	2003).	
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The lack of proper management is most dramatically illustrated in 
the “mis-selling” scandal that erupted in 1993. Workers had been given 
the right to contract out of SERPS or their employer plan using a per-
sonal pension in 1986. Encouraged by commission-driven insurance 
agents, millions of workers contracted out of SERPS and 500,000 out 
of	 employer	 defined-benefit	 plans.	 Some	 of	 the	 former,	 and	most	 of	
the	 latter,	made	a	serious	financial	error.	Workers	 in	 their	mid-40s	or	
over were generally better off in SERPS, let alone in far more generous 
employer	defined-benefit	plans.15 Opting out of an employer plan typi-
cally meant the loss of the employer’s pension contribution, ancillary 
disability	and	 life	 insurance	benefits,	 and	 the	plan’s	 risk	pooling	and	
administrative economies.16	Workers	 dissatisfied	with	 their	 particular	
provider, or unable to continue contributing at the initial agreed-upon 
rate, would also discover that most plans had very low cash values in 
the early years of the program, as a large portion of their contributions 
went to pay commissions and set-up fees (Blake 2000, 2002; Davis 
1997, 2000; Murthi, Orszag, and Orszag 1999). 
The scandal resulted in the insurance industry paying an estimated 
11 billion British pounds (GBP) as compensation to mis-sold workers 
(Davis	2000).	 It	also	produced	tougher	controls	on	both	 the	financial	
services industry and individual decision making. Personal pension 
providers must now disclose commissions and surrender values over 
the	first	five	years	of	the	contract.	To	transfer	accruals	in	employer	de-
fined-benefit	plans	to	a	personal	pension,	workers	now	need	a	written	
explanation, prepared by a trained expert and checked by the insurer, 
demonstrating	 the	 gain.	 These	 reforms	 responded	 to	 specific	 lapses	
but fail to address the larger management problem—the complexity of 
retirement income decision making, the inability of workers to make 
proper	decisions,	and	 the	asymmetric	nature	of	 the	financial	 services	
market—where customers lack the knowledge and information need-
ed to properly evaluate offers prepared by sophisticated vendors. This 
larger problem drives up costs, generates confusion and mistrust, cre-
ates	opportunities	for	gaming,	mis-selling,	and	error,	and	significantly	
reduces	the	overall	efficiency	of	the	retirement	income	system	(Blake	
2000, 2002; Davis 2000; Emmerson 2002; Whitehouse 1998). 
Overhead costs also remain a serious impediment. Britain’s indi-
vidual accounts have largely been organized as “retail” personal pen-
sions, rather than delivered “wholesale” through employers, as are U.S. 
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401(k) plans. The Conservatives had hoped that market competition 
and/or higher contributions would drive down fees and charges, but 
competition	 has	 not	 significantly	 lowered	 the	 price	 of	 personal	 pen-
sions. Labor had hoped to lower costs by introducing the Stakeholder 
pension,	with	its	strictly	capped	fees,	but	financial	services	firms	have	
not aggressively pursued Stakeholder business. Given the maximum 
fees and charges, they view the prospect of a mass-market take-up, large 
economies	of	scale,	and	long-run	profitability	as	too	chancy	to	justify	
entry. Marketing and administering individual accounts thus remains a 
costly endeavor, limiting their ability to generate retirement income for 
low and middle earners.
CONCLUSION
The success of Britain’s retirement income policy required that em-
ployer plans expand to offset the cuts in social insurance. Initiatives to 
enhance	the	contribution	of	employer	defined-benefit	plans—especially	
the	 imposition	of	 inflation-proofing	and	 tougher	 funding	 rules—have	
generally had the opposite effect. The use of individual accounts to ex-
pand the reach of employer plans—especially among low and middle 
earners—has met with limited success at best. And the shift from de-
fined-benefit	 to	 defined-contribution	 arrangements	 will	 likely	 reduce	
the overall contribution of private plans. 
Britain’s current safety net, if it remains in place, will guarantee the 
elderly an income of about 20 percent of national average earnings—
the traditional welfare stipend. The pension credit should lift most of 
the	elderly	above	this	minimal	income	floor.	But	because	of	the	contrac-
tion	of	public	and	private	pensions,	most	workers	will	see	a	significant	
decline in their standard of living in retirement. In 2050, three out of 
four	are	projected	to	qualify	for	means-tested	pension	credit	benefits.	
With the Basic State Pension at a projected 7 percent of national aver-
age earnings, 75 percent of the elderly would have incomes less than 
40 percent of national average earnings. A recent British study found 
that such a standard was “modest but adequate” (Parker 2002). While 
significantly	less	than	the	income	needed	to	maintain	preretirement	liv-
ing standards, it does afford “full opportunity to participate in contem-
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porary society and the basic options it offers.” In 2050, however, the 
great majority of the elderly would at best have incomes that provide 
this basic level of social participation (Clark and Emmerson 2002; Liu 
1999; Parker 2002; Pensions Policy Institute 2003; UK Department of 
Work and Pensions 2002b). 
This	 general	 dependence	 on	 means-tested	 benefits	 threatens	 to	
change the character of the retirement income system and thereby the 
lives of the elderly. It could diminish the dignity of recipients, create 
disincentives	to	work	or	save,	and	generate	conflicts	between	those	re-
ceiving	means-tested	benefits	and	those	paying	the	bill.	It	was	precisely	
this general dependence and these adverse effects that led Britain, like 
other industrial nations, to replace its means-tested program for the el-
derly with social insurance pensions. But Britain’s decision to sharply 
cut its social insurance programs and increase reliance on individual 
initiatives has returned the nation to a welfare-based solution to the old-
age income problem.17 
Notes
  1. The law went into effect in 1975; in 1985, Parliament required vesting after two 
years of service (Blake and Orszag 1997; UK Department for Work and Pensions 
2000).
 2. The hypothetical replacement rates reported by the Social Security Administra-
tion and presented in Table 3.1 are calculated on a somewhat different basis and 
produce a 42 percent replacement rate for the average earner. See Box 3.1 (p. 46) 
for	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	Social	Security	benefit	formula.	




rebate	 given	 to	 employer	 defined-benefit	 plans	 for	workers	 contracted	 out	 of	
SERPS is reset periodically and as a percentage of covered earnings has been: 7 
percent (1978–1983); 6.25 percent (1983–1988); 5.8 percent (1988–1993); 4.8 
percent (1993–1997); 4.6 percent (1997–2002); and 5.1 percent (2002–2007) 
(Daykin 2001). 
		4.	 The	carve-out	approach	1)	restores	solvency	by	cutting	benefits,	and	2)	allows	
workers to carve a contribution to a private retirement plan out of the payroll tax 
in	exchange	for	a	reduction	in	their	future	Social	Security	benefits.	In	the	United	
Kingdom, the ability to “contract out” of SERPS means that “carving out” a con-
tribution to a private retirement plan was an integral feature of the expanded UK 
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 6. On balances created by payroll tax rebates, at least three-quarters had to be an-
nuitized using unisex rates, with payments rising at least 3 percent per annum to 
accommodate	expected	inflation	and	with	spouses	getting	at	least	a	50	percent	
survivor	benefit.	
 7. A Conservative proposal to change the taxation of private plans—their response 
to	the	financing	crisis	created	by	the	privatization	of	pay-as-you-go	social	in-
surance—emerged as a key election issue. Privatization would eliminate both 
the social insurance revenue stream and the accrual of further social insurance 
obligations.	But	the	government	still	had	to	honor	pensions	and	benefits	accrued	
in the past. To pay these pensions, the Conservatives would bring the taxation of 
pensions forward. They would eliminate the deductibility of current contribu-
tions	and	make	future	benefits	tax-exempt.	While	this	did	not	cover	the	entire	
liability, the remaining burden became manageable. Labor, however, hammered 
away at this loss of deductibility and emphasized the political risk, inherent in 
such proposals, that future governments would reimpose a tax on retirement 
benefits. 
 8. Providers could also require no more than £20 to open a Stakeholder account. 
	 9.	 One-third	of	the	elderly	received	means-tested	benefits	from	either	the	local	or	
national government (Pensions Policy Institute 2003).
	10.	 The	government	expected	18	million	workers	to	benefit	from	the	new	program:	5	
million low earners at the 40 percent accrual rate, mainly part-time women work-
ers; 9 million middle earners; 2 million caregivers; and 2 million disabled (UK 
Department for Work and Pensions 1998, 2000). For details on the program, see 
Sass (2003).
 11. Income from accumulated savings is not the actual income generated, but 




 12. The two estimates differ largely because of differences in projections of annual 
real earnings growth (2 percent versus 1.5 percent) and whether the elderly are 
defined	as	the	population	age	65	and	older	or	age	60	and	older.	
 13. The Finance Act of 1986, enacted at a time of serious budgetary pressure, al-
lowed plans to be at most 5 percent overfunded. So rather than build up surpluses 
during the boom years of the 1980s and 1990s, sponsors took “funding holidays,” 
reducing contributions from 2.7 to 1.2 percent of GDP between 1980 and 1992, 
and	used	“excess”	assets	to	sweeten	early	retirement	benefits	(Blake	2002;	Davis	
1997, 2003). As in the United States, the new accounting rules required sponsors 
to	report	in	their	financial	statements	the	pension	plan	deficits	that	emerged	in	the	
new century.
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 14. Since April 2006, individuals that do not annuitize by age 75 must take an Alter-
native Secured Income, which allows for bequests, subjects savings to taxation, 
and restricts the amounts drawn down to assure a continuing income (HM Rev-
enue and Customs 2004). 
	15.	 In	employer	defined-benefit	plans,	accruals	at	the	end	of	a	worker’s	career	have	
the greatest impact on retirement income. SERPS rewards each year more equal-
ly. In personal pensions, contributions in the early years of a worker’s career 
have by far the greatest impact. Thus, young workers who contracted out of 
SERPS—and young workers were the majority of those who did so—made a 
reasonable	financial	decision.	
 16. Some workers opted out of an employer plan to increase their take-home pay. 
They contributed just the payroll tax rebate to their personal pension and pock-
eted	their	former	contribution	to	the	employer	plan.	Such	decisions	could	reflect	
tremendous liquidity constraints, a low value placed on their own future well-be-
ing,	or	simple	financial	ignorance.	
 17. A government Pensions Commission, created in 2002 and headed by Lord Alistair 
Turner, conducted an exhaustive review of the nation’s retirement income sys-
tem and in 2005 delivered a set of policy recommendations (Pensions Commis-
sion 2004, 2005). The Turner Commission proposed a thorough revamping of 
the British system, including an end of the carve-out approach. It would 1) pro-
vide	a	flat	public	pension,	set	at	about	30	percent	of	average	earnings,	and	deliv-
ered to all elderly citizens, regardless of employment and contribution history, 
to	fulfill	the	government’s	objective	of	assuring	a	minimal	old-age	income	with	
minimal means-testing; 2) raise the age of eligibility for public pensions to 67 
by 2040, to control costs and focus resources where they were needed most; and 
3) introduce a system of individual accounts, with contributions from workers 
(4 percent of covered earnings), employers (3 percent of covered earnings), 
and government (1 percent of covered earnings). The plan would use govern-
ment administration to reduce recordkeeping overhead and private asset man-
agement. Workers would be automatically enrolled in the plan but allowed to 
opt out. For the “average earner” who participates, the combined system would 
produce an estimated 45 percent replacement rate. As of the completion of this 





Mandating “Add-On” Individual Accounts
Australia introduced equity investments into its Social Security 
program along the lines of the “add-on” individual retirement account 
approach. The analogy is not perfect. The mandatory contributions to 
Australia’s individual accounts, which were introduced in the 1990s, 
are much larger than those in U.S. add-on proposals. Australia’s public 
retirement income program, moreover, has always been its means-tested 
Age Pension. Australia never had a social insurance pension plan. The 
Age Pension was expanded in the 1970s and now guarantees an income 
equal to about a third of average earnings—far more than the income 
guaranteed by the UK means-tested program but far less than the pen-
sion Social Security provides the “average earner.” The combination of 
the Age Pension and Australia’s substantial individual accounts should 
nevertheless deliver adequate retirement incomes to the nation’s elderly 
population. The Age Pension also performs valuable risk-management 
service to an elderly population reliant on individual accounts invested 
in equities. It assures an income to those who outlive their individual 
account assets, invest poorly, or are in unlucky cohorts when it comes 
to investment returns. 
Using the means-tested Age Pension to cushion the risk in equity 
investments,	however,	creates	 two	 types	of	costs.	The	first	 is	overin-
vestment in assets that dodge the means test, such as housing, consumer 
durables,	and	exotic	annuity	products	created	by	the	financial	services	
industry. Such assets have lower returns than many alternate invest-
ments but higher returns after netting out tax and Age Pension reduc-
tions. The second cost is an incentive to retire early, spend down indi-
vidual account assets, and increase reliance on the means-tested Age 
Pension. To the extent that workers retire early, cut back on saving, or 
spend down their assets prior to reaching old age, they increase the bur-
den on the system while reducing their retirement incomes.
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THE AUSTRALIAN AgE PENSION AT THE END OF  
THE 1980s 
Australia has by far the most experience of any industrial nation 
with a retirement income system made up of earnings-based individual 
accounts and means-tested public pensions. Both Australian programs 
are also far more substantial than those in the United Kingdom. Austra-
lia’s experience thus illustrates the importance of size in retirement in-
come planning and also provides insight on potential problems created 
by the interplay of individual accounts and a generous means-tested 
program. 
Australia’s public Age Pension program was introduced in 1908. 
Like most programs created at the time, it provided a welfare-level al-
lowance	to	elderly	individuals	who	satisfied	a	stringent	means	test.	Un-
like other nations with such programs, Australia never switched over to 
social insurance. The means-tested Age Pension remains to this day the 
nation’s	first-tier	retirement	income	program.	Australia	also	has	a	long	
tradition of employer-provided pensions. From the nineteenth century 
forward, workers in government and large corporations have been cov-
ered	by	defined-benefit	plans.	
Like other Anglo-Saxon nations, Australia expanded its retirement 
income system in the 1970s. It raised the Age Pension allowance from 
about 20 percent to about 25 percent of “male total average weekly 
earnings” (see Figure 5.1). It also extended coverage to a much larger 
portion of the elderly by adding a “taper” to the withdrawal of ben-
efits.	Instead	of	reducing	benefits	dollar	for	dollar	for	income	above	the	
“free area”—the income exempt from the Age Pension means test—the 
government lowered the reduction rate to 40 cents on the dollar. These 
initiatives	significantly	changed	the	character	of	the	Age	Pension.	Es-
sentially all workers would now get at least some income from the pro-
gram, and the income was reasonably substantial.
Focusing on male earnings understates the generosity of Age Pen-
sion	benefits.	A	large	number	of	women,	who	earned	less	on	average	
than men, entered the labor force after 1970 and brought median earn-
ings for the entire workforce to about 75 percent of men’s average earn-
ings. The Age Pension, pegged at 25 percent of men’s average earnings, 
thus replaces about 33 percent of the median worker’s earnings. This 
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makes	Australia’s	Age	Pension	benefit	one	of	the	highest	minimum old-
age incomes in the industrial world. Including the “tax offset” for se-
niors that fully shelters the Age Pension, the program replaces nearly 45 
percent of the median worker’s after-tax earnings. The expanded Aus-
tralian Age Pension, Whiteford and Stanton (2002) observe, “is actually 
closer to a demogrant, with a progressive income-test to exclude the 
relatively well-off.” What was once a welfare grant to the poor became 
a	benefit	claimed	by	the	great	majority,	as	a	matter	of	right,	in	return	
for a lifetime’s contribution to the nation (Bateman and Piggott 2001a; 
Commonwealth Treasury of Australia 2001, 2002; King et al. 1999; 
Rein and Turner 2001; Whiteford and Stanton 2002). 
The	 expansion	 of	Age	 Pension	 benefits	 also	 acted	 as	 a	 powerful	
incentive to retire. For earnings within the taper, a worker was effec-
tively	taxed	40	percent—via	the	loss	of	Age	Pension	benefits—before	
accounting for income taxes and the direct and indirect costs of work-
ing.1 Because of the falling demand for older workers and the expansion 
Figure 5.1  Australian Age Pension Relative to Average Male Earnings, 
1965–1999
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of the Age Pension program, earnings only accounted for 3 percent of 
old-age income in 1986, versus 16 percent 15 years earlier (Table 5.1) 
(King et al. 1999; OECD Labour Market Statistics 2003). 
While the expanded Age Pension provided a relatively generous 
minimum old-age income, it was designed as a means-tested safety 
net, not a program to replace preretirement earnings. Many Australians 
thus	faced	a	significant	decline	in	living	standards	over	the	increasingly	
lengthy period of retirement. The nation’s welfare approach to old-age 
incomes had clearly reached its limit (Commonwealth Treasury of Aus-
tralia 2001; King et al. 1999). 
To provide more adequate retirement incomes, a government com-
mission in 1976 proposed the creation of an earnings-related social in-
surance program, but the proposal gained little support. Many liberals 
opposed the plan because lower-income workers would be forced to 




creased private saving. It was therefore not the time to create a large 
public	pension	program,	financed	on	a	pay-as-you-go	basis,	that	could	
undermine private saving. 
The government indeed scaled back the Age Pension program. It 
tightened the means test to reduce or eliminate allowances for better-off 
retirees. It also froze the “free area” in nominal dollars, even though 
inflation	at	the	time	was	running	over	10	percent.	The	basic	structure	
of the Age Pension program has changed little since these reforms in 
the mid-1980s and is presented in Box 5.1 (Bateman and Piggot 1997, 
2001a; Commonwealth Treasury of Australia 2001; Whiteford and 
Stanton 2002). 
Table 5.1  Sources of Retirement Income, Australian Households Age 65 
or Older, 1969, 1986, and 1996 (%)
Source 1969 1986 1996
Government	cash	benefits 65 79 77
Earnings 16 3 3
Capital income 19 18 20
SOURCE: King et al. (1999), using Australian Bureau of Statistics Income Survey data. 
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Box 5.1  Australian Age Pension Benefits, 2005
Benefits to each person 
Single  A$12,711 per year
Married  A$10,613 per year
Benefits indexed to greater of the Consumer Price Index or male 
average earnings.
Income or asset test (whichever results in a lower benefit)
Income test
Pension withdrawn at the rate of 40 cents for each A$1 of private 
income in excess of a free area of: 
Single     A$62 per week (A$3,224 per year)
Married     A$110 per week (A$5,720 per year)
Asset test
Pension withdrawn by A$1.50 per week for every A$1,000 of 
financial assets above the following thresholds:
 
             Homeowner          Nonhomeowner
 Single       A$157,000       A$270,500
 Married     A$223,000            A$336,500
    
Income and asset thresholds and limits indexed to prices.
Australian incomes denominated in Australian dollars are com-
parable to U.S. incomes denominated in U.S. dollars. Between 
2001 and 2005, the exchange rate has fluctuated between A$2 
and A$1.2 to US$1. 
SourCe: Centrelink (2005).
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THE REFORM OF THE AUSTRALIAN RETIREMENT INCOME 
SySTEM: EvOLUTION OF INDIvIDUAL ACCOUNTS
While	the	debate	over	public	old-age	benefits	proceeded,	the	Aus-
tralian labor movement stepped up demands for expanded coverage un-
der employer-based plans. By the early 1980s, this campaign helped lift 
overall pension coverage to 42 percent of the workforce. The largest 
gains came in multi-employer “industry plans” in which the union had 
a strong if not dominant voice (Bateman and Piggot 1997; Common-
wealth Treasury of Australia 2001; Whiteford and Stanton 2002). 
When a Labor government returned to power in 1983, it adopted 
the tack of using employer plans to address the nation’s old-age income 
problem. Its key leverage point was the annual negotiation over the na-
tional standard labor contract between the representatives of labor and 
management. Australia, like many nations on the European continent, 
had such national bargaining. In the 1986 negotiations, the government 
collaborated with the unions to win a 3 percent “award superannuation” 
pension contribution in lieu of a comparable increase in wages.2 After 
the High Court ruled in 1989 that pensions could indeed be included 
in the wage-setting process, award superannuation contributions were 
widely adopted in renegotiated labor agreements. Participation in em-
ployer plans, as a result, reached 72 percent of wage and salary workers 
by the end of the 1980s. 
In Europe, such negotiations had resulted in mandatory pension 
institutions in which contributions were required as a matter of law. 
In Australia, however, the national labor agreement did not carry the 
same weight. Rather, it served as a model that was generally adopted in 
bargaining	conducted	at	the	firm	or	industry	level.	Because	the	pension	
contribution in the model contract was a direct substitute for wages and 
a	uniform	percent	of	earnings	across	industries	and	firms,	the	plans	to	
emerge	were	overwhelmingly	individual	account	defined-contribution	
arrangements. Because they grew out of labor negotiations, the funds 
tended to be invested collectively in employer or industrywide funds 
and employees participated in the management of those funds (Bate-
man and Piggot 2001b; Commonwealth Treasury of Australia 2001). 
While promoting employer plans, the government also reformed 
the general “framework for retirement income policy” (Commonwealth 
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Treasury of Australia 2001). It imposed ERISA-like rules, such as full 
and immediate vesting of award superannuation contributions, equal 
labor-management representation on the boards overseeing the new su-
perannuation award “industry” funds, and a “prudent man” investment 
management standard (Commonwealth Treasury of Australia 2001). 
The government also reformed Australia’s system of retirement 
plan taxation. As in many other countries, employer contributions to 
retirement plans were tax deductible, investment income was tax ex-
empt,	and	benefits	taxed	to	the	beneficiary	upon	receipt.	But,	if	workers	
in	Australia	 took	 their	benefit	as	a	 lump	sum	at	 retirement,	only	five	




funds	 in	 ways	 that	 maximized	 access	 to	Age	 Pension	 benefits.	 This	
practice, known as “double dipping,” had become more attractive with 
the	 expanded	 availability	 of	Age	Pension	benefits	 and	 the	 growth	of	
employer plan coverage. Given this favorable tax treatment and double 
dipping opportunities, the great majority of Australians covered by em-
ployer	plans	have	taken	their	benefit	as	a	lump	sum	(Commonwealth	
Treasury of Australia 2001). 
To reduce the size of rapidly expanding pension tax expenditures, 
the government imposed a 15 percent tax on contributions, investment 
income, and payouts from employer plans. Distributions received be-
fore age 55—the designated “preservation age”—were assessed an 
additional 15 percent tax, as were contributions made by individuals 
earning more than designated amounts and distributions exceeding des-
ignated amounts (approximately A$124,720 in 2004/2005) (Common-
wealth Treasury of Australia 2001). 
To combat double dipping, the government introduced “deeming” 
in the Age Pension means test. Deeming imputed income to assets that 
generated little or no cash income, such as checking accounts and non-
dividend paying stock. As the Age Pension income test had been more 
stringent than its asset test, deeming created a more consistent and 
meaningful evaluation of means (Commonwealth Treasury of Australia 
2001). 
The	final	step	in	the	development	of	the	new	Australian	system	was	
to ramp up the program. When the award superannuation program was 
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introduced in 1986, it was understood that the 3 percent contribution 
was	the	first	installment	of	a	program	to	set	aside	9	percent	or	more	in	
an individual retirement account. A 3 percent contribution could not 
generate very much retirement income. The overhead costs involved in 
handling such small sums were also quite onerous, so the government 
and the unions proposed a 6 percent contribution in the 1989 national 
wage-setting negotiations. The agency overseeing the negotiating pro-
cess balked, however, citing spotty compliance with the existing 3 per-
cent contribution program (Bateman and Piggot 2001a). 
The government, at this point, decided to abandon the collective 
bargaining approach. In 1991, it enacted the Superannuation Guarantee 
mandatory individual account program, to be put in place the follow-
ing year. The government now required employers to make a pension 
contribution, with the minimum contribution rising to 9 percent of cov-
ered earnings by 2002, on earnings between A$5,400 and A$80,000, in-
dexed to wage growth.3 The resulting funds would typically be invested 
collectively, in a company or industry fund overseen by employer and 
employee trustees. The Labor government in 1995 proposed an increase 
in the ultimate contribution to 15 percent of earnings, adding an ad-
ditional 3 percent from employees, matched by an additional 3 percent 
from the government. The return of the Conservatives in 1996 ended 
this initiative (Whiteford and Stanton 2002). 
This Superannuation Guarantee program—the direct extension of 
the negotiated award superannuation program of the 1980s—is now 
viewed as the core of Australia’s retirement income system. The means-
tested Age Pension and voluntary employer plans remain critically im-
portant to lower and higher paid workers, respectively. But the Super-
annuation Guarantee program, and the regulatory framework developed 
over the past 20 years, is widely viewed as the centerpiece of the Aus-
tralian retirement income system. 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORMED  
AUSTRALIAN SySTEM 
The reform of the Australian retirement income system, centered on 
the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee program, had three 
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main objectives: 1) to provide more adequate old-age incomes, 2) to re-
strain public expenditures on the elderly, and 3) to improve the system’s 
alignment with the labor market. 
The Superannuation Guarantee program will clearly create a sig-
nificant	 retirement	 asset	 and	more	 adequate	 old-age	 incomes.	As	 the	
program matures, capital market investments will become a key source 
of income for the entire elderly population. The program will diversify 
their retirement income portfolios and reduce their exposure to politi-
cal risk that a large social insurance program entails—that is, the pos-
sibility that an overburdened future government would cut promised 
benefits.	In	addition,	workers	will	have	access	to	the	Age	Pension	and	
continuing employer programs. 
The Australian Treasury has projected the retirement income pro-
vided by the Superannuation Guarantee program when the program ma-
tures, i.e., when workers have contributed over their entire careers. For 
the hypothetical median worker, contributing 9 percent over a 40-year 
career	will	produce	a	nominal	(non-inflation-proofed)	annuity	at	age	65	
equal	to	about	90	percent	of	the	full	Age	Pension	benefit.	(Workers	are	
not required to annuitize their Superannuation Guarantee balances in 
this	fashion,	but	the	assumption	greatly	simplifies	the	analysis.)	Such	
an annuity would produce an estimated 30 percent loss of Age Pension 
benefits	due	to	the	means	test	at	the	time	of	retirement.	The	worker’s	
combined retirement income would then replace 53 percent of pretax 
and	66	percent	of	final	after-tax	earnings	(Table	5.2).	
The Treasury also explored retirement income over a projected 18 
years of retirement. During this period, the Age Pension is indexed to 
wage	growth,	so	its	real	(after-inflation)	value	rises	over	time.	Mean-
while, the real value of the nominal superannuation guarantee annu-
ity steadily declines. The median worker would thus see a steady rise 
in	means-tested	Age	Pension	benefits.	Over	the	full	18	years	of	retire-
ment, this worker is projected to collect 92 percent of full Age Pension 
benefits,	with	the	two	programs	together	replacing	83	percent	of	final	
after-tax earnings. The effect of the Superannuation Guarantee program 
should thus be a substantial increase in retirement incomes, with the 
major contribution coming in the early years of retirement and declin-
ing over time.4 
These Treasury projections are point estimates and carry a great 
deal	of	uncertainty.	Workers	clearly	bear	significant	financial	 risks	 in	
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the individual account program. Even if the Treasury’s point estimates 
prove accurate on average, outcomes will vary both within and between 
generational cohorts. Collective investment and the control of invest-
ment policy by pension fund trustees subject to the “prudent man” in-
vestment standard reduce this risk for most Superannuation Guarantee 
participants. But a trend toward greater employee choice and smaller 
funds should increase the dispersion of individual results. Workers are 
also exposed to the risk that their cohort will experience unusually poor 
investment returns (Bateman and Piggot 1997). 
The means-tested Age Pension provides a measure of protection 
against these risks. Unlucky individuals or cohorts get higher means-









Superannuation Guarantee annuity income 90
Age	Pension	benefit	 70
Combined retirement income 160
Pretax replacement rate 53
After-tax replacement rate 66
Across remaining expected lifetime
Age	Pension	benefit	 92
Combined after-tax replacement rate 83
Assumptionsa
Full Age Pension is equal to 1/3 median earnings 
Real rate of return on assets 4.5
Real rate of wage growth 1.5
Rate	of	inflation 2.5
NOTE: This projection is for a worker with median earnings (75 percent of male total 
average weekly earnings) who contributes 9 percent of earnings to a Superannuation 
Guarantee account over a 40-year career and retires at age 65. 
a Superannuation Guarantee annuity income is calculated as an actuarially fair nominal 
annuity using 75 percent of the worker’s account balance at retirement, at age 65. 
SOURCE: Commonwealth Treasury of Australia (2002).
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tested	benefits,	with	the	cost	borne	by	all	active	workers	(in	the	form	
of higher taxes) and by elderly individuals and cohorts who had bet-
ter	luck	in	their	investments	(through	lower	Age	Pension	benefits).	As	
in any insurance program, the availability of this protection creates a 
moral hazard. Participants could be induced to take on more risk than 
they otherwise might, as they get to keep relatively more of any gain 
and less of any loss. For example, low earners, on the cusp between a 
full Age Pension and the 40 percent taper, keep 60 percent of any gain 
but bear none of any loss. Similarly, high earners, on the cusp between 
the 40 percent taper and an income too high to qualify for Age Pen-
sion	benefits,	get	the	entire	gain	but	absorb	only	60	percent	of	any	loss.	
The	most	serious	financial	risk	in	the	Australian	system	could	be	in	the	
decumulation process because the Superannuation Guarantee program 
does not require that balances be annuitized. Without annuitization, the 
elderly face the risk of consuming their assets too quickly or of con-
suming too little to the point of hardship. The government has tried to 
induce annuitization using tax incentives and the rules of the Age Pen-
sion means test, but the response thus far has been disappointing. Vari-
ous experts thus expect that Australia, at some point, will mandate the 
annuitization of at least a portion of Superannuation Guarantee account 
balances. Such a policy would make annuities more affordable, by re-
ducing adverse selection and marketing costs. It would also assure that 
the Superannuation Guarantee program, mandated by the government 
and	supported	by	tax	benefits,	fulfills	its	intended	purpose	of	converting	
income from earnings into a secure income in retirement.5 
A second objective of the Australian reform was to restrain the 
growth of public expenditures on the elderly. Australia currently allo-
cates a fairly low 3 percent of GDP to its public Age Pension program. 
The Treasury projects this expense to rise to 4.7 percent of GDP by 
2050 as the population ages. Without the Superannuation Guarantee 
program, however, projected Age Pension expenditures would reach 
6.8 percent of GDP. Because of the income generated by the Superan-
nuation Guarantee program, the Treasury projects that 1) the share of 
the	elderly	receiving	no	Age	Pension	benefit	will	rise	from	18	percent	
today	to	about	25	percent	in	2050,	2)	the	share	getting	a	partial	benefit	
will rise from a quarter to about 40 percent, and 3) the share collecting 
a	full	Age	Pension	benefit	will	fall	from	over	half	to	about	a	third	(Com-
monwealth Treasury of Australia 2002; Mitchell and O’Quinn 1997). 
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Offsetting these savings in government expenditures is the cost of 
subsidizing the Superannuation Guarantee program through generous tax 
favors.	While	the	tax	changes	of	the	1980s	significantly	reduced	the	gov-
ernment’s revenue loss, the Treasury’s projections show tax expenditures 
on the Superannuation Guarantee program exceeding reductions in Age 
Pension expenditures through 2020, after which the balance becomes 
increasingly favorable (Commonwealth Treasury of Australia 2002).
A third objective of the Australian reform was to improve the sys-
tem’s alignment with the labor market. A major drawback of the Age 
Pension is the powerful retirement incentive the program creates. A 
worker	cannot	increase	future	benefits	by	delaying	retirement	past	age	
65, and any earnings above a minimal amount will then result in a sig-
nificant	benefit	reduction.	
Potentially more troublesome is the incentive the Age Pension cre-
ates to retire early, as most Australians already retire well before age 65. 
The	program	gives	workers	a	higher	Age	Pension	benefit	if	they	retire	
early, live off their savings, and thus reduce the effect of the means test 
administered at age 65. If workers respond to this incentive, it would 
reduce the resources of the retirement income system while increasing 
its burdens. Workers who are out of the labor force do not pay taxes 
that fund the Age Pension, nor do they contribute to their Superannua-
tion Guarantee accounts, and lowering the balances in those accounts 
reduces the investment income they earn. Additional time spent out of 
the labor force also stretches the period of “retirement” those accounts 
must support. Because workers arrive at age 65 with smaller balanc-
es,	the	government	is	required	to	make	up	a	portion	of	the	deficiency	
through	increased	Age	Pension	benefits.	
Australian men currently withdraw from career employment at age 
58,	 significantly	earlier	 than	 the	age	assumed	 in	 the	Treasury	model.	
Most experts cite the declining demand for older men, as seen through-
out the industrial world, and the availability of special government un-
employment	and	disability	benefits	for	older	workers.	But	Australia’s	
powerful “double dipping” tradition, where workers take retirement 
benefits	as	a	 lump	sum	and	deploy	the	proceeds	 in	ways	designed	to	
increase	Age	Pension	benefits,	also	clearly	plays	a	role	(Australian	Bu-
reau of Statistics 2004; Edey and Simon 1996).
The government is trying to counter this early-retirement incen-
tive but with limited success. It is phasing in a rise in the Superan-
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nuation Guarantee “preservation age”—the earliest age a worker can 
draw down their balances without penalty—from 55 to 60. However, 
the higher preservation age will not be fully phased in until 2025. Its 
impact should also be small because the bulk of the time spent in early 
retirement comes between the ages of 60 and 65.6 Moreover, Austra-
lians have long viewed retirement plan balances in lump-sum terms and 
have fought to maintain access to these funds. They have also come to 
see	Age	Pension	benefits	as	a	broad-based	entitlement—as	compensa-
tion for contributing to the nation during their working careers—and 
are quite comfortable arranging their affairs to maximize Age Pension 
benefits.	Neutralizing	the	incentive	created	by	the	Age	Pension/Super-
annuation Guarantee interaction thus remains a serious challenge. 
CONCLUSION
The Australian example clearly illustrates the importance of size. 
The Australian and emerging British retirement income systems are both 
based	on	means-tested	public	benefits	and	mandated	contributions	 to	
individual accounts, but Australia’s system is bigger. It provides higher 
minimum public pensions, and it mandates larger contributions to pri-
vate retirement accounts. Not surprisingly, it is projected to produce 
significantly	more	retirement	income	than	the	smaller	British	system.	
This	difference	in	size	results	in	a	significant	difference	in	the	per-
ception of the public means-tested program. Australia’s ample Age 
Pension is widely seen as a universal demogrant—a standard payment 
made to all elderly residents—with a tax-like clawback for the better-off 
portion of the population. Britain’s means-tested pension credit, on the 
other hand, is a clear extension of the nation’s welfare program—with 
the base payment a welfare-level allowance and much more stigma at-
tached	to	benefit	receipt.	By	midcentury,	about	three-fourths	of	the	el-
derly	in	both	nations	is	projected	to	be	on	means-tested	benefits	at	any	
point in time, and a greater share at some point in their lives. Because 
benefits	in	Britain	will	remain	at	welfare	levels,	this	stigma	is	unlikely	
to dissipate. 
Despite the greater generosity of Australia’s public pension pro-
gram, government expenditures are projected to run about the same as 
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in Britain and the United States, at about 5 percent of GDP. In part this 
is because Australia’s public program is more thoroughly means tested. 
Only a bit more than half of the elderly in Australia currently get a full 
Age	 Pension	 benefit	 and	 nearly	 20	 percent	 get	 no	 public	 pension	 at	
all. In Britain, all workers get the Basic State Pension, no matter how 
affluent.	Public	pensions	in	the	United	Kingdom	will	become	more	tar-
geted going forward as the Basic State Pension declines and the pen-
sion credit expands, but public pensions in Australia will also become 
more targeted as the Superannuation Guarantee program matures. Only 
a third of the elderly is then projected to get a full Age Pension, and a 
quarter is projected to get no public pension at all.7 
A striking feature of the Australian reform has been the govern-
ment’s ability to extract a substantial portion of earnings for retirement 
saving—the 9 percent Superannuation Guarantee contribution—with 
relatively little resistance. A key contributing factor was the lack of a 
national social insurance program with a substantial payroll tax. The 
Superannuation Guarantee program also extended or replaced preexist-
ing	employer	programs	that	covered	a	significant	majority	of	Australian	
workers—far more than the share of workers covered by U.S. employer 
plans. The Superannuation Guarantee program was also comparatively 
cheap	to	administer.	It	had	significantly	lower	overhead	costs	than	Brit-
ish personal pensions because its larger contributions were mainly col-
lected and managed through employers, rather than through policies 
marketed to individual workers. Costs were also lower than U.S. 401(k) 
plans because the program is mandatory, which allowed for greater 
economies of scale and lowered marketing costs.8 Australia’s introduc-
tion of the new mandatory retirement savings program was also eased 
by the sense of ownership and equity created by individual accounts 
and by the run-up in the stock market in the boom years of the 1990s. 
Many Australians had hoped that the Superannuation Guarantee 
program would dominate the nation’s retirement income system—that 
workers would accumulate enough wealth in their retirement accounts 
to return the Age Pension to its original safety-net function. This might 
have been plausible had the program expanded beyond a 9 percent con-
tribution. But, under the current set-up, the Treasury projections have 
only	25	percent	of	the	elderly	collecting	no	Age	Pension	benefits	at	any	
point in time, and even fewer collecting no Age Pension at any point in 
their lives. The income from Superannuation Guarantee accounts also 
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carries a good deal of risk. So, even after the program matures, the Age 
Pension will remain critically important both as the primary source of 
old-age	income	and	as	insurance	against	adverse	financial	shocks.
The major weaknesses in the Australian system—the complications 
arising from the interaction between the Age Pension and Superannua-
tion Guarantee programs at the work/retirement divide—are also re-
lated to size. Australia combines means testing and individual accounts 
in a system large enough to maintain a reasonable approximation of 
preretirement	living	standards.	The	sums	are	of	such	significance	that	a	
large and rapidly growing industry has emerged to help workers invest 
their lump sum distributions in ways that reduce taxation and increase 
Age	Pension	benefits.	This	distorts	the	allocation	of	capital—typically	
toward	housing,	consumer	durables,	and	financial	products	that	are	de-
signed	 to	 reduce	 taxes	 and	 increase	Age	Pension	 benefits,	 and	 away	
from stocks and bonds issued by the business sector. The outlays for 
financial	planning	and	the	misallocation	of	capital	are	significant	addi-
tional costs in the operation of Australia’s retirement income system. 
The Australian system also creates a powerful incentive to retire 
early. The Age Pension, designed as a welfare program, uses a means 
test to identify the needy and provide a basic old-age allowance. Such 
means-tested programs generate a moral hazard. They discourage work 
and saving because the income that work and saving produces reduces 
the	means-tested	benefit.	So	long	as	the	benefit	and	withdrawal	thresh-
old is low, as in standard welfare programs, the bulk of the population 
might be expected to ignore the moral hazard. After Australia expanded 
the Age Pension and introduced the taper, however, the bulk of the pop-
ulation clearly altered its behavior to increase their means-tested ben-
efits.	As	the	Superannuation	Guarantee	program	matures	and	balances	
mount, so will the incentive to retire early, live off accumulated assets, 
and claim a larger government pension. This early retirement response 
will undermine the effectiveness of the Age Pension means test, and 
unnecessarily	 increase	 government	 expenditures,	 while	 significantly	
reducing retirement incomes. 
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Notes
	 1.	 The	“free	area”	in	the	1970s	was	roughly	equal	to	the	full	Age	Pension	benefit.	
As the free area threshold was indexed to prices and the Age Pension to wages, 
the	 free	 area	 has	 since	 fallen	 to	 about	 25	 percent	 of	 the	Age	Pension	 benefit	
(Whiteford and Bond 1999). 
 2. Substituting pension contributions for increased cash wages increased saving, 
which	 helped	 lower	 inflation,	 interest	 rates,	 and	 the	 nation’s	 widening	 trade	 
deficit.	
	 3.	 Accruals	 in	funded	defined-benefit	plans	are	a	permissible	substitute,	but	 they	
require	an	“actuarial	benefit	certificate”	indicating	that	participants	receive	equal	
or greater value than they would under the Superannuation Guarantee program. 
 4. For workers earning 100 percent of “male total average weekly earnings,” the 
two	programs	together	would	initially	replace	an	estimated	54	percent	of	final	
after-tax	earnings	and	an	estimated	73	percent	of	final	after-tax	earnings	over	the	
18 years of retirement (Commonwealth Treasury of Australia 2002). 
 5.  If Australia mandated annuitization, it would have to decide whether to man-
date gender-neutral annuity rates. Women tend to have lower lifetime earnings 
and therefore lower Superannuation Guarantee accumulations. They also have 
greater	 expected	 longevity.	Gender-specific	 annuity	 rates	would	 thus	 result	 in	
retirement incomes that were far lower for women than for men. One Australian 
observer noted that low-wage workers also have low expected longevity. Manda-
tory annuitization that fails to take this into account would, in effect, transfer in-
come from the poor to the rich (Bateman and Piggott 2001a; King et al. 1999).
 6. The primary sources of “early retirement” income have been generous disability 
and	unemployment	benefits.	The	disability	benefits	are	asset	tested,	so	the	build-
up	of	significant	Superannuation	Guarantee	assets,	available	at	age	60,	would	re-
duce moral hazard in the disability program and discourage its use as a pathway 
out	of	the	labor	force.	Means-testing	“mature	age”	unemployed	benefits	would	
have a similar effect. Raising the Superannuation Guarantee preservation age 
to 65, thus eliminating the gap with the Age Pension program, would exclude 
Superannuation	Guarantee	assets	from	the	disability	and	a	“mature	age”	benefits	
means tests. Requiring the annuitization of Superannuation Guarantee balances 
would reduce this early retirement incentive. By creating an income stream more 
readily subjected to the Age Pension means test, it reduces the opportunity to 
game the system by retiring early and running down Superannuation Guaran-
tee assets. Applying the means test to the annuity value of the assets, not their 
deemed investment income, would do the same (Bateman and Piggot 1997). 
 7. The current cost of Australia’s public pension program (3 percent of GDP) is 
also below expenditures in Britain because of its relatively young population. It 
is below expenditures in the United States primarily because of means testing. 





Investing the Trust Fund in Equities
Canada introduced equity investments into its Social Security pro-
gram	by	 using	 the	 “trust	 fund	 investment”	 approach;	 it	was	 the	first	
of the four Anglo-Saxon nations under review to expand its retirement 
income system. The legislation was enacted by the end of the 1960s. 
Canada’s response to demographic transition, however, came late, in 
1997. In that year, Canada restored solvency to its social insurance pro-
gram	by	accelerating	scheduled	tax	increases	to	prefund	future	benefits	




however, raises serious political issues, given the power it potentially 
puts in the hands of government. Canada adopted an elaborate gover-
nance	design,	taken	largely	from	the	governance	of	employer	defined-
benefit	 plans,	 to	 minimize	 political	 involvement	 in	 the	management	
of trust fund assets. Although the system has been in place for only a 
few years, the Canadian experience to date suggests that the problem is 
manageable. It also appears considerably less daunting than governing 
equity investments in a myriad of Social Security individual accounts. 
CANADIAN SySTEM AT THE END OF THE 1980s 
For	the	first	two	decades	of	the	postwar	period,	Canada	had	a	simple	
Anglo-Saxon	two-tier	retirement	income	system.	The	first	tier	was	the	
public Old Age Security program, which had evolved out of Canada’s 
1927 means-tested welfare program for the elderly. Old Age Security 
was not a social insurance program, funded by a payroll tax, but a de-
mogrant funded out of general revenues. The program gave all long-
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term residents, age 70 and over, a basic income equal to about 15 per-
cent of national average earnings. This amount was less than the 20 
percent of national average earnings typically guaranteed by the 1927 
means-tested program. But the Canadian provinces had contributed to 
the older means-tested program, while Old Age Security was entirely 
funded by the federal government, and most provinces supplemented 
the new federal demogrant. 
As in other Anglo-Saxon nations, tax-advantaged employer plans 
made up the second tier in the Canadian system. Coverage grew rapidly 
after the Second World War, rising from 10 to 15 percent of wage and 
salary workers in the 1930s to 40 percent by 1970. The primary drivers 
were much the same as in other Anglo-Saxon nations: 1) the low level 
of public old-age pensions; 2) the growth of employers that tradition-
ally offer pensions, such as governments and large corporations, and 
of unions, which made pensions a high priority in postwar collective 
bargaining; and 3) the expansion of income taxation, which made the 
favorable treatment accorded pension saving increasingly attractive.1 
Like other Anglo-Saxon nations, Canada also found its retirement 
income	system	increasingly	deficient	toward	the	end	of	the	long	post-
war boom. While the incomes of working-age adults rose steadily, the 
elderly were left behind. They had little or no income from work or 
savings,	and	few	qualified	for	a	reasonable	employer	pension.	By	the	
early	1960s,	nearly	45	percent	of	 the	elderly	were	classified	as	poor,	
and the income gap between workers and their parents was widening 
(Osberg 2001).
The expansion of the Canadian retirement income system in the late 
1960s focused primarily on the problem of old-age poverty. Between 
1965 and 1969, Canada
• Reduced the age of eligibility for Old Age Security from 70 to 65. 
• Introduced a new earnings-related social insurance program, the 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP). The program was funded 
by a payroll tax and, at age 65, provided a pension that replaced 
25 percent of earnings up to the national average.2 
• Introduced an income-tested Guaranteed Income Supplement, 
which was expected to become irrelevant with the maturation of 
the C/QPP.3 
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• Broadened access and improved the security of employer pen-
sion	 benefits	 by	 imposing	 vesting,	 funding,	 and	 fiduciary	 re-
quirements. 
Further details are provided in Box 6.1.
The expanded Canadian system was quite similar to that developed 
in the United States. The Old Age Security and C/QPP programs com-
bined provided the hypothetical “average earner” 40 percent of prere-
tirement earnings, close to the 42 percent policy model replacement rate 
for the “average earner” in the expanded Social Security program. 
The Canadian system differed from that in the United States in the 
unusually strong role of the provinces in pension policy and in the Ca-
nadian focus on poverty reduction. The role of the provinces is clear-
ly seen in the regulation of employer plans and in the design of the 
public	 earnings-related	 pension	 program.	The	Pension	Benefits	Acts,	
which regulated employer plans, required the enactment of legislation 
at the provincial as well as national level. As a result, the new vesting, 
funding,	 and	 fiduciary	 requirements	 varied	 somewhat	 from	 province	
to province.4 In the new public earnings-related pension program, the 
provinces were the designated “stewards” of the program, along with 
the national government. Any major reform required the approval of 
two-thirds of the provinces with two-thirds of the population. Because 
of the strength of French-Canadian nationalism in Quebec, the province 
was allowed to set up a separate Quebec Pension Plan (QPP), distinct 
from the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), so long as it had comparable ben-
efits	and	contribution	rates.	
The expansion of the Canadian system was also highly targeted to 
poverty reduction. Thus C/QPP does not replace earnings above the 
national average. The Guaranteed Income Supplement also set a retire-
ment	income	floor	significantly	higher	than	that	in	the	United	States	or	
the United Kingdom and similar to that provided by the Australian Age 
Pension. Individuals who did not qualify for a full earnings-related ben-
efit—primarily	older	 cohorts,	 low-wage	workers,	 and	widows—were	
assured an income equal to about a third of the national average wage; 
couples were assured about half the national average wage. As this 
guaranteed	income	was	not	much	below	the	combined	benefit	from	the	
Old Age Security program and the C/QPP (Figure 6.1), the Canadian 
public system, as John Myles put it, “functioned approximately like a 
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Box 6.1  The Canadian Retirement Income System at the End of 
the 1970s
1) Public programs 
  Old Age Security:
	 	 	 •	A	flat	payment	of	about	15	percent	of	average	earnings	
    provided to all long-term residents. 
   •	Funded out of general revenues. 
 Canada/Quebec Pension Plan:
  •	A pension of 25 percent of indexed earnings, on earnings  
 up to national average earnings. 
  •	Funded by payroll tax of 3.6 percent on earnings between  
 10 and 100 percent of average earnings. 
 Guaranteed Income Supplement: 
  •	An	income-tested	benefit	that	guarantees	individuals	age	 
 65 and older an income equal to about a third of national  
 average earnings, reduced by $C0.50 for each $C1 of  
 other income. 
		 •	Funded out of general revenues. 
2)  Employer plans 
  Covered about 45 percent of wage and salary workers: 
   • About 31 percent of private sector wage and salary workers. 
   • 100 percent of public sector wage and salary workers. 
	 	 	 •	 90	percent	covered	by	a	defined-benefit	plan.	
	 	 Key	features	of	Canadian	employer	defined-benefit	plans:
	 	 	 •	 The	common	benefit	was	2	percent	of	final	salary	per	year		
    of service, reduced by a portion of the worker’s public 
    pension. 
   • Mandatory vesting, typically at age 45 with 15 years of  
    service. 
   • More than half required employee contributions. 
   • Employers topped up the funding to meet the cost of 
	 	 	 	 currently	accrued	benefits	and	to	pay	down	funding	deficits.	
SOURCE: Coward (1995). 
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universal	 flat	 benefit	 system”	 (Battle	 2003;	Béland	 and	Myles	 2005;	
Myles 2000, p. 14; Osberg 2001). 
The Canadian public system succeeded in its objective of reduc-
ing old-age poverty. As the C/QPP program matured and delivered full 
benefits	 to	 an	 increasing	 share	 of	 the	 elderly	 population,	 the	 elderly	
poverty rate fell from 44 percent in 1961 to 18 percent in 1999 (Figure 
6.2). However, the maturation of the C/QPP did not eliminate the need 
for the Guaranteed Income Supplement, as originally envisaged. About 
a	third	of	the	elderly	in	2001	still	received	these	benefits,	down	from	
about	half	 in	1985.	These	benefits	are	particularly	 important	 to	older	
widows, who continue to have incomes somewhat below, though not 
far	below,	the	official	Canadian	poverty	line.5 
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THE REFORMED CANADIAN RETIREMENT SySTEM
Canada, like other industrial nations, reformed its retirement in-
come system at the end of the twentieth century in response to the 
greater instability in employer plans and the impending transition to 
a much older society. Like the United States and the United Kingdom, 
Canada imposed new funding regulations on employer plans to protect 
accrued	pension	benefits	in	the	event	the	sponsor	went	bankrupt.	It	re-
sponded	to	the	demographic	transition	by	reducing	benefits	and	raising	
taxes. Canada’s primary response to the challenge of population aging, 
however, was to prefund the C/QPP and invest the accumulated assets 
in equities. 
Figure 6.2  Percent of the Elderly Population below the Canadian 
Poverty Line, 1961–1999












1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Lessons from Canada   113
The Reform of Employer-Sponsored Plans
Similar to other Anglo-Saxon nations, Canada imposed new regula-
tions	on	employer	plans	to	protect	worker	benefits	should	the	sponsor	
go bankrupt. If an existing plan did not have enough assets to satisfy 
its termination liability—the value of pensions based on current wages, 
discounted to the present using the interest rate on low-risk bonds—the 
sponsor	had	to	eliminate	the	deficit	within	five	years.	
From the enactment of the new regulations in 1987 through the end 
of the 1990s, the reform appeared quite successful. Financial markets 
were unusually robust, and most plans showed comfortable surpluses 
when valued on either a continuing or termination basis.6 Employer 
plans were so well funded that many sponsors in Canada, as in the 




only a few years for the downturn at the beginning of the new century to 
pull	employer	defined-benefit	plans	deeply	into	the	red.	Watson	Wyatt,	
the	 pension	 consulting	 firm,	 estimates	 that	 plans	 sponsored	 by	 com-
panies listed on the Toronto Stock exchange had a “funding ratio” of 
about 115 percent at year-end 2000—that is, pension fund assets were 
about 15 percent greater than the present value of plan liabilities. By 
May	2003,	plan	assets	covered	barely	80	percent	of	benefit	obligations,	
similar to the experience elsewhere. The new funding rules thus became 
binding,	requiring	sponsors	to	extinguish	termination-valuation	deficits	
within	five	years	(Watson	Wyatt	2004).	
The new rules were largely responsible for lifting the overall fund-
ing ratio above 85 percent by year-end 2003. A recovery in stock prices 
increased the value of pension fund assets, but this was largely offset 
by continuing declines in the interest rate on the low-risk bonds used 
to value termination liabilities. It was the stepped-up contributions, re-
quired	in	response	to	the	termination	valuation	deficits,	 that	strength-
ened	the	finances	of	employer	plans	and	protected	the	pension	benefits	
accrued by the sponsor’s workers (Watson Wyatt 2004, 2005b). 
A major shortcoming in this approach to maintaining solvency, 
however, was the perverse pension funding pattern it created over the 
business cycle. During upswings, employer plans were generally given 
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a	clean	bill	of	financial	health	by	both	the	ongoing	and	termination	sol-
vency measures, so funding requirements were low. The government 
had also enacted the “excess surplus” rule, similar to rules enacted else-
where, that prevented sponsors of apparently well-funded plans from 




The new funding rules were especially onerous now that most em-
ployer plans were mature. They had substantial asset accumulations 
and	their	financial	program	called	for	investment	income	to	fund	about	
two-thirds	of	benefit	payments.8	The	financial	downturn	at	the	turn	of	
the century thus produced losses that dwarfed the employer’s annual 
contribution. The demand for increased contributions during economic 
downturns actually contributed to the bankruptcy of weakened spon-
sors, with Air Canada the best known example (Le Pan 2003).9 
As in other Anglo-Saxon nations, the demand for greater contribu-
tions in the downturn of the early 2000s accelerated the shift of em-
ployers	out	of	defined-benefit	plans.	The	coverage	of	employer	defined-
benefit	plans	had	not	declined	as	dramatically	in	Canada,	or	the	United	
Kingdom, as it had in the United States. In 2003, about 35 percent of 
Canadian wage and salary workers were covered by such plans. But 
a	2004	survey	of	68	large	firms,	conducted	by	Watson	Wyatt	and	the	
Conference Board, found that nearly 40 percent of these employers had 
either	 eliminated	 a	 defined-benefit	 plan,	 converted	 one	 to	 a	 defined-
contribution format, or were planning to do so (Watson Wyatt 2005b). 
Of the companies in the 2004 Watson Wyatt survey with under-
funded plans, nearly 60 percent had taken a contribution holiday within 
the past four years. Many had been prevented from contributing by the 
excess surplus rule, but the great majority had been happy not to con-
tribute—implicitly accepting the solvency measurements taken at the 
height of the boom as the best indication of the long-term health of their 
plans (Watson Wyatt 2004, 2005b). 
The problem with both statutory measures of solvency—both the 
ongoing and termination measures—is that they consider only the cur-
rent value of plan assets and liabilities. They ignore the substantial risks 
involved	in	funding	long-term	fixed	obligations	with	equities.	As	expe-
rience makes clear, the value of assets and liabilities in such plans can 
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rapidly change in ways that dramatically reduce their ability to satisfy 
benefit	obligations.	
The Reform of the Public Pension System
Canada, like other industrial nations, responded to the impending 
demographic	transition	by	reducing	public	old-age	pension	benefits	and	
raising contributions. But because the Canadian program focused on 
poverty reduction, the cuts were small.10 Canada’s primary response 
to the challenge of population aging was the 1997 decision to prefund 
the C/QPP and invest the accumulated assets in equities. The reform 
was sparked by the government actuary’s 1995 report on the program, 
which	projected	a	sharp	rise	in	benefit	payments	in	the	coming	century.	
To	fund	these	benefits	on	a	pay-as-you-go	basis,	contributions	would	
need to rise from the current 5.6 percent of covered earnings to 14.2 




lower	 Canada’s	 retirement	 income	 floor	 and	 expand	 the	 size	 of	 the	
income-tested Guaranteed Income Supplement program.11 As major 
reforms to the C/QPP program required the approval of two-thirds of 
Canada’s	provinces	with	two-thirds	of	the	population,	significant	cuts	
were pushed off the table. 
There was also stiff resistance to the nearly threefold increase in 
contributions	required	to	fund	benefits	in	2030	on	a	pay-as-you-go	ba-
sis. No politician wants to enact such a substantial tax increase, espe-
cially	to	maintain	rather	than	increase	government	benefits.	But	the	pri-
mary objection to such a tax increase, and to continued pay-as-you-go 
funding, was intergenerational fairness. As expressed in an overview of 
the problem prepared by the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Gov-
ernments of Canada, the fair approach to pension funding would have 
each generation contributing much the same share of earnings and in 
retirement getting much the same replacement rate (Federal, Provincial, 
and Territorial Governments of Canada 1996a,b; Pesando 2001). 
The key reform of the C/QPP program enacted in 1997 thus in-
volved a rapid rise in contributions to its projected uniform long-term 
rate. The rapid rise was designed to build-up the C/QPP trust fund in the 
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near term, with income on trust fund assets augmenting contributions to 
pay	benefits	in	the	out-years.	To	increase	trust	fund	income	and	reduce	
the long-term contribution rate, the C/QPP would invest trust fund as-
sets in equities.12 
The CPP funding model developed by the government actuary 
projects contributions, set at 9.9 percent of covered earnings, to exceed 
benefit	payments	through	2020.	The	aging	population	would	then	push	
outlays above payroll tax receipts. Contributions will cover barely 85 
percent	of	benefit	payments	by	the	end	of	the	2030s,	then	stabilize	at	
that level. By 2020, however, assets in the CPP trust fund should ex-
ceed	 five	 times	 annual	 outlays.	With	 an	 estimated	 real	 return	 of	 4.1	
percent, CPP investment income should exceed 20 percent of annual 
outlays.	Total	 inflows—tax	 receipts	 plus	 investment	 income—in	 fact	
continuously	exceed	outflows	by	a	 significant	margin.	Trust	 fund	as-
sets continue to rise and at the end of the planning horizon, in 2075, 
are	projected	at	seven	times	annual	benefit	outlays	(Office	of	the	Chief	
Actuary 2004). 
The decision to invest C/QPP assets in equities, with their greater 
expected	 return	 but	 also	 greater	 risk,	was	 strongly	 influenced	by	 the	
contrasting experience of the QPP and CPP trust funds. Both plans had 
accumulated	assets,	equal	to	about	two	years	of	benefit	payments,	as	a	
buffer	against	cash	flow	shortfalls.	Each	plan	also	pursued	a	policy	of	
“social investment”—investing trust fund assets to achieve “socially 
desirable”	objectives	in	addition	to	traditional	financial	goals.	And	both	
notions	of	“socially	desirable”	reflected	the	influence	of	the	Canadian	
provinces in national pension policy. The CPP invested its assets in non-
marketable provincial bonds with a yield equal to that on federal debt. 
As the federal government paid a lower interest rate than the provinces, 
and as the bonds were not marketable, the CPP was subsidizing the pro-
vincial governments. Quebec adopted a more active social investment 
policy, with the QPP directed to buy equities and fund projects thought 
to advance the economic development of the province. Such active “so-
cial investment” strategies also tend to produce sub-par risk-adjusted 
returns, but the three decades in which the C/QPP programs had been 
in existence had been a boom period for equities. Furthermore, the QPP 
over time had moved away from social investing toward a policy that 
emphasized standard risk-adjusted return optimization. The QPP thus 
clearly outperformed the CPP. With this experience in the advantages 
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of equity investments in social insurance programs, the 1997 reformers 
decided to invest CPP assets in equities (Béland forthcoming [2006]; 
Béland and Myles 2005; CPP 1997; Mendelson 2005).13 
The 1997 CPP reform, however, rejected social investment. It de-
fined	the	sole	objective	of	the	CPP	Investment	Board	(CPPIB)	as	acting	
in the best interests of plan participants—both active and retired—un-
der the governing notion that each generation should contribute much 
the	same	share	of	earnings	and	get	much	the	same	benefits.	That	invest-
ment decisions are made solely in the best interests of plan participants 
is	the	fiduciary	standard	that	ERISA	and	the	Canadian	Pension	Benefit	
Acts	require	of	employer	defined-benefit	plans.	To	pursue	such	a	policy	
at the CPP, the 1997 legislation created the CPPIB Board, a quasi-inde-




CPPIB to “exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably pru-
dent person would exercise in comparable circumstances” when han-
dling plan assets and to provide periodic performance reports to assure 
accountability (CPPIB 1997; Slater 1997b). 
The	1997	legislation	defined	an	elaborate	set	of	procedures	designed	
to make the CPPIB as independent from the government as possible. 
To name the members of the investment board, the participating pro-
vincial governments, as “stewards” of the program, would each select 
one member of the nominating committee. That committee would draw 
up	a	list	of	candidates	that	excluded	government	officials	and	included	
investment professionals. The federal Minister of Finance, in consulta-
tion with the provincial Ministers of Finance, would then select the in-
vestment	board	members.	To	assure	efficiency,	transparency,	and	public	
accountability, the board was required to conduct periodic internal per-
formance	reviews,	issue	quarterly	and	annual	financial	reports,	organize	
biennial town meetings in each province, and undergo a thorough trien-
nial review (CPP 1997; Slater 1997b). 
The CPPIB has embraced the institutional investor model. “As a 
long-term	 investor,	with	 substantial	 annual	 cash	 inflows	 for	 the	 next	
twenty years,” it intends to “build a broad-based portfolio” that includes 
not just investments in stocks and bonds, but also in merchant bank-
ing, real estate, infrastructure projects, venture capital, private equity, 
118   Munnell and Sass
and buyout funds (CPPIB 2003). The investment board also intends 
to become active in corporate governance under the notion that “the 
thoughtful	voting	of	our	proxies	can	constructively	influence	corporate	
performance and have a positive impact on the value of our portfolio” 
(CPPIB 2005). 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORMED CANADIAN SySTEM 
It is too early to evaluate the success of the 1997 reform to the CPP 
program and its new funding model. The primary concerns, however, 
are	in	managing	the	financial	and	political	risks	inherent	in	a	social	in-
surance program funded with equities. 
In	terms	of	managing	the	financial	risks,	one	thing	is	clear.	The	CPP	
and other social insurance programs should be managed quite differ-
ently	than	employer	defined-benefit	plans.	This	is	clearly	indicated	in	
the	way	financial	health	is	evaluated.	In	employer	plans,	the	standard	
measure of solvency is the funded ratio. Whether evaluated on an ongo-
ing or termination basis, the basic question is whether the assets in the 
pension	fund	are	sufficient	to	pay	promised	benefits.	In	social	insurance	
programs, by contrast, the basic solvency measure is whether the cur-
rent	level	of	contributions	is	sufficient,	given	the	financial	structure	of	
the	program,	to	pay	promised	benefits.	Thus,	the	U.S.	Social	Security	
program in 2006 faces a shortfall over the 75-year planning horizon 
equal to 2 percent of covered earnings. The reason why social insurance 
programs are evaluated this way is because the government is presumed 
to	continue	indefinitely.	Thus,	the	retirement	income	benefits	earned	by	
workers do not need to be secured against the bankruptcy of the sponsor 
with assets held in a segregated pension fund. 
As we have seen, equity investments make the funded ratio a weak 
measure	of	solvency	and	expose	employer	defined-benefit	plans	to	pow-
erful risks. The introduction of equity investments exposes the CPP, like 
other retirement income programs, to three types of risk: 1) the standard 
risk	that	year-to-year	returns	will	fluctuate	around	the	expected	long-
run rate and could even be negative for a considerable stretch of time, 
2) the risk that the long-run rate of return could be less than expected, 
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and	3)	the	risk	that	the	plan’s	financial	managers	are	infected	by	eupho-




century, the 1997 legislation included an automatic adjustment mecha-
nism	that	restores	solvency	by	freezing	benefits	and	raising	the	contri-
bution rate. The political system could enact a different response, but 
the	stabilizer	is	a	guarantee	that	the	CPP’s	finances	will	not	go	off	the	
rails.14 





also far less reliant on investment income than a mature employer plan, 
and thus less vulnerable to the risk in investment returns. The funding 
model projects investment income ultimately providing over 20 per-
cent	of	CPP	 inflows,	with	 total	 inflows	10	 to	15	percent	greater	 than	
projected outlays. In mature employer plans, by contrast, investment 
income is generally more than twice as large as employer contributions. 
Financial	fluctuations	should	thus	have	a	much	more	moderate	effect	
on CPP solvency.15 
The	second	financial	 risk—that	 the	 long-run	rate	of	 return	on	as-
sets is less than projected—presents a more serious problem. To protect 
against this risk, the CPP funding model assumes a conservative 50–50 
allocation of equities and bonds and a conservative 4.1 percent real 
return on trust fund assets. Using these conservative assumptions, the 
model	also	projects	 substantial	cash-flow	surpluses	and	a	 rising	 ratio	
of assets to outlays. If investment returns do decline to the point where 
the	actuarial	review	finds	the	9.9	percent	contribution	rate	inadequate,	
the automatic adjustment mechanism would restore balance by freezing 
benefits	and	raising	the	contribution	rate	(Ambachtsheer	1996;	Sarney	
and Preneta 2001–2002; Slater 1997a). The government could also en-
act a different set of adjustments, for example, raising taxes or cutting 
benefits	in	a	different	way.	
The CPP funding model also requires disciplined long-term invest-
ment management at the CPPIB, and thus far it has had such a policy. 
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Even though investment returns were extremely volatile over the early 
years of the reform (see Figure 6.3), the CPPIB has functioned as a 
solid long-term investor. Remarking in the 2004 Annual Report, the 
CPPIB stated that “A large part of the reversal in the CPP’s investment 
fortunes . . . was the result of our decision to continue to build the eq-
uity portfolio throughout the market collapse that began in the fall of 
2000 and continued to the spring of 2003, one of the worst declines in 
a century. Many Canadians were concerned that we were on the wrong 
track and should invest in bonds, or hold cash and try to time the market 
bottom. Our decision to stay the course and buy shares in hundreds of 
Canadian and foreign companies resulted in equity gains of $7.2 billion 
versus a $4.1 billion loss a year earlier. For us, the stock market collapse 
was a buying opportunity in a long investment journey.” 
From	a	purely	financial	perspective,	the	government	is	thus	in	a	far	
better position than employers to manage the risk of equity investment 
Figure 6.3  Canadian Pension Plan Investment Returns, 2000–2005 
NOTE: If $C100 were invested at the beginning of 2000 and experienced these returns, 
its value would be $C169 at the end of 2005. This would be an internal rate of return 
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in	a	defined-benefit	pension	program.	And,	 in	 terms	of	managing	 in-
vestment risk, the government is light years better than individuals with 
individual retirement accounts. 
In	addition	 to	financial	 risks,	another	concern	 is	 the	political	 risk	
inherent in using the trust fund as the vehicle for introducing equities 
into the social security program. The CPPIB was designed as an “insti-
tutional investor,” no different from the investment boards of employer 
defined-benefit	plans.	Researchers	have	identified	four	ways	in	which	
government	influence	could	turn	public	pension	reserve	managers,	like	
the CPPIB, into something other than a standard institutional investor. 
The four risks are that the CPP would (Palacios 2002):
 1) Become a captive source of credit that would fund the govern-
ment rather than invest in assets better suited to a long-term 
retirement income program and would do so at below-market 
rates. This was clearly the case in the initial CPP funding pro-
gram, which only bought Provincial government bonds and 
subsidized provincial borrowing. Such a policy clearly sacri-
ficed	the	financial	health	of	the	pension	program.	To	the	extent	
that it increased government spending, it also reversed the con-
tribution to national saving created by the funding program. 
 2) Invest in “socially desirable” projects and/or avoid “socially 
undesirable” projects. This was clearly the case in the Que-
bec pension, which explicitly targeted investments designed 
to advance the provincial and French-Canadian economy. This 
policy also resulted in subpar risk-adjusted returns. By intro-
ducing a diffuse new set of objectives, other than the standard 
financial	goals,	 it	 also	made	 it	more	difficult	 to	oversee	and	
manage the QPP. 
 3) Use its power as a major shareholder to promote “socially 
desirable” and/or avoid “socially undesirable” corporate deci-
sions. Such decisions could involve plant closings, purchasing 
decisions, union recognition, lobbying practices, charitable 
contributions,	and	the	like.	In	addition	to	sacrificing	financial	
performance and diminishing the nation’s ability to oversee 
the CPPIB, this policy could give government a tremendous 
lever of control over Canada’s economy and society. 
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	 4)	 Prop	up	financial	markets	 in	 a	 “crisis.”	 In	 addition	 to	 sacri-
ficing	 returns	 and	weakening	 the	 governance	 of	 the	CPPIB,	
such interventions require enormous amounts of capital and 
are rarely effective. 
Most Canadian observers see the adoption of such policies at the 
CPPIB as highly unlikely. Because of the explicit “institutional inves-
tor” mandates included in the 1997 legislation, and the elaborate gover-
nance and reporting structures, the CPPIB is widely regarded as profes-
sional, independent, and accountable. 
Some	critics	contend	that	the	government	has	too	little	influence	on	
the CPPIB. They worry that the “institutional investor” model unduly 
strengthens the hand of “capital” against competing, and weaker, “so-
cially desirable” interests. Such critics have objected, for example, to 
CPP investments in Talisman Energy, a large Canadian oil and gas pro-
ducer with operations in Sudan. Because Talisman funded the Sudanese 
government’s widely criticized military campaigns, the U.S. govern-
ment	threatened	to	bar	it	from	U.S.	financial	markets.	Critics	also	object	
to	CPP	investments	in	buyout	funds	that	finance	corporate	restructur-
ings that result in layoffs and plant closings. Members of Parliament 
have also called for “ethical” screens, which would restrict investments 
in tobacco companies and providers of other “socially undesirable” 
products (Cooke 2003; Social Investment Organization 2002).
Calls for a more “socially responsible” investment policy will no 
doubt continue. In time, this could result in a change in the CPPIB’s 
mandate. The acceptance of “social investment” as a policy objective 
might advance Canada’s larger public policy objectives. Such a change, 
however, would clearly jeopardize the CPP funding model and its con-
tribution to retirement income security. 
CONCLUSION
The Canadian retirement income system is distinguished by 1) the 
relatively narrow focus of government programs on assuring a basic 
old-age income with minimal income-testing, 2) the long reliance on 
both general revenues and a payroll tax to fund these programs, and 
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3) its recent policy of investing social insurance trust fund assets in 
equities. 
Canadian public pensions, even after the expansion in the late 
1960s, were modest and largely targeted to low and middle earners. 
Even more than public pensions in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, Canada had little “fat” to cut when programs for the elderly 
came under pressure after 1980. 
The Canadian system is also distinguished by its long reliance on 
both	general	 revenues	 and	 a	payroll	 tax	 to	finance	old-age	pensions.	
This	mixed	revenue	base	gave	Canada	the	flexibility	to	develop	a	mixed	
fiscal	 response	 to	 the	demographic	 transition.	 It	 increased	 the	C/QPP	
payroll tax and built up the program trust funds with the goal of stabi-
lizing the long-term contribution rate. The Old Age Security and Guar-
anteed Income Supplement programs remain pay-as-you-go programs 
funded out of general revenues, so their claim on government budgets 
will rise as the population ages. But general revenues are drawn from a 
far broader base than the payroll tax. As the population ages, the gov-
ernment can spread the burden and raise taxes that produce the least 
adverse effects. 
Canada’s third distinguishing characteristic is its use of the social 
insurance trust fund to introduce equity investments into its social secu-
rity program. Britain prefunded social insurance obligations with equi-
ties by encouraging employers and workers to “contract out” of SERPS 
(the British analog to the C/QPP), using employer plans or individual 
account private pensions. Australia never created an earnings-based 
social insurance program but mandated an individual account system 
to prefund, with equities, a similar earnings-related retirement income 
stream. 
From	 a	 purely	 financial	 perspective,	 the	Canadian	 trust	 fund	 ap-
proach seems best. It captures the substantial economies of scale in 
investment	 management	 better	 than	 employer	 defined-benefit	 plans,	
let alone individual worker accounts. The trust fund is in an especially 
good position to pool and manage the risks in equities, as it can smooth 
volatility	over	an	infinite	horizon.	Unlike	employer	plans,	the	trust	fund	
approach involves no additional administrative expense to maintain in-
dividual	accounts	or	employee	defined-benefit	accruals.	 It	 avoids	 the	
significant	marketing	 costs	 seen	 in	 employer	 individual	 account	pro-
grams. Finally, it avoids the costly process of enforcing and comply-
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ing with government regulations needed to distribute and secure tax-
favored	employee	plan	benefits	while	minimizing	the	revenue	loss	to	
the Treasury. 
The primary objection to the trust fund approach is political. Critics 
in the United States generally contend that it is impossible to build up a 
social insurance trust fund, let alone have it invest in equities, without 
succumbing to one of the pitfalls cited by Palacios (2002). They claim 
that the U.S. Social Security trust fund has functioned as a “captive 
source of credit”—that the fund’s build up of government bonds merely 
funded increased government expenditures, without raising national 
saving. Critics view the prospect of trust fund investment in equities 
with an even more jaundiced eye. The great fear is that the government 
would use the trust fund as an instrument for advancing public policy or 
the policy of the politicians who happen to be in power. 
The Canadian experience provides an example of a governance 
structure that responds to many of these objections. The 1997 reform 
gave	the	investment	board	substantial	independence	and	a	clear	finan-
cial objective—to minimize the long-term level contribution rate. It also 
provided reporting mechanisms to help maintain accountability. Most 
observers agree that the investment board has thus far managed trust 
fund assets in an independent, professional, and accountable fashion. 
Overseeing the management of the CPPIB has not only been far less 
costly than overseeing the operation of employer plans or employee 
individual accounts, it has also been far more effective. 
Canada’s ability to invest trust fund assets in equities allowed it to 
maintain	C/QPP	benefits	with	a	level	contribution	rate	lower	than	it	oth-
erwise could. This is extremely important given the rapid rise in the cost 
of other public programs for the elderly over the next quarter century. 
The trust fund approach has also allowed Canada to prefund retire-
ment	 income	benefits	within	 the	 traditional	 defined-benefit	 structure.	
Equity-funded	defined	benefits	are	far	more	predictable	than	the	indi-
vidual account systems used in the United Kingdom or Australia. As 
employers	shift	to	defined-contribution	arrangements,	the	predictability	
of	public	benefits	provides	 a	 secure	 retirement	 income	floor,	 helping	
workers plan their retirement and allowing them to take more risk in 
their supplemental plans. For all these reasons, the Canadian system 
deserves careful attention. 
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Notes
  1.  In addition to the exemption of pension contributions and investment earnings, 
Canada	also	exempted	 the	first	$1,000	 in	annual	pension	benefits.	 Individuals	
age 65 and older were also entitled to an additional “age exemption” that further 
sheltered pension income (Béland and Myles 2005; Coward 1995). 
  2. Like the U.S. Social Security program, the C/QPP program was “rushed to matu-
rity.” While introduced in 1966, workers who had consistently contributed to the 
program could retire on a full C/QPP pension, at age 65, from 1976 onward.  
  3. Unlike the UK Pension Credit, the Australian Age Pension, and Canada’s 1927 
Old Age Pension program, the new Guaranteed Income Supplement was income-
tested rather than means-tested—only income, rather than income and assets, 
was	considered	in	calculating	eligibility	and	benefit	levels.	
  4. The most common requirements were full vesting at age 45 with 15 years of 
service (subsequently tightened to full vesting after 2 years of plan participation 
or 5 years of service); contributions that covered the cost of currently earned 
benefits	and	the	amortization	of	any	unfunded	liability;	and	the	management	of	
pension	fund	assets	solely	in	the	interest	of	the	plan	beneficiaries,	without	regard	
to the interests of the sponsor. To protect surviving spouses (essentially widows), 
most provinces made the joint-and-survivor annuity the default payout, with the 
survivor	getting	60	percent	of	the	worker’s	initial	benefit	(Coward	1995).	
	 5.	 The	Canadian	poverty	line	is	now	significantly	higher	than	the	benchmark	used	
in the United States. In 1994, the Canadian poverty line for a family of four in 
a medium-sized city was $C26,650—40 percent higher than the U.S. poverty 
line of $C19,024 (converted to Canadian dollars on a purchasing parity basis). 
Thus,	the	Canadian	poverty	rate	would	now	be	significantly	lower	if	measured	
using the U.S. benchmark (Battle 2003; Fisher 1995; Myles 2000; Osberg 2001; 
Phipps and Curtis 2000; Sarney and Prenata 2001–2002). 
  6. As discussed above, both the continuing and termination valuations compare 
plan	assets	to	plan	liabilities,	with	the	liabilities	defined	as	the	present	value	of	
future pension obligations. The future pension obligations in a continuing valu-
ation are based on projected earnings when workers retire or separate from the 
firm	and	are	discounted	to	the	present	using	the	expected	return	on	plan	assets.	
The future pension obligations in a termination valuation are based on current 
earnings and are discounted to the present using the interest rate on low-risk 
bonds. 
   These funding rules were more critical in Canada than in the United States. 
In	the	United	States,	accrued	pension	benefits	are	not	just	backed	by	the	assets	in	
the pension fund, but by a legal claim on the net worth of the sponsor and, up to 
specified	limits,	by	the	federal	PBGC.	In	Canada,	accrued	pension	benefits	are	
not	backed	by	a	claim	against	the	sponsor.	Only	Ontario	has	a	pension	benefit	
insurance program, and the level of protection is modest (Coward 1995). 
 7. The Canadian excess surplus rule prevented sponsors from making contributions 
once the value of pension fund assets exceeded 110 percent of plan liabilities. As 
126   Munnell and Sass
elsewhere, this was designed to maintain government revenues during a period 
of	large	budget	deficits,	
 8. In 1999, the last year for which data on 5,500 U.S. employer plans are available, 
single-employer	defined-benefit	plans	paid	out	$91	billion	in	benefits	and	held	
$1.65 trillion in assets. If U.S. plans were 30 percent overfunded in 1999, as was 
the	case	in	the	analysis	of	plans	sponsored	by	100	very	large	firms	conducted	by	
the pension consultant Milliman, $1.27 trillion was the “fully funded” level of 
assets. If 60 percent of those assets were invested in stocks with a real rate of 
return of 6.5 percent (the long-term U.S. rate), and 40 percent in bonds yielding 
a real 2.25 percent, the long-term U.S. rate, investment income would be $61 
billion,	or	67	percent	of	benefit	payments	(Milliman	2005;	U.S.	Department	of	
Labor 2004, Tables C5, C10). 
	 9.	 Recognizing	the	burden	placed	on	the	firm	by	the	1987	funding	rules,	Parliament	
enacted	the	Air	Canada	Pension	Plan	Solvency	Deficiency	Funding	Regulations	
in August 2004, a statute that allowed Air Canada—and Air Canada alone—to 
pay	down	its	termination	deficit	over	a	10-year	period	(Canadian	Department	of	
Justice 2004; Watson Wyatt 2003). 
	10.	 The	benefit	cuts	primarily	targeted	the	well-to-do,	primarily	through	reductions	
in tax reliefs for the elderly and a limited clawback, or income-tested reduction, 
of	Old	Age	Security	benefits.	For	details	see	Myles	(2000)	and	Battle	(2003).	
	11.		 A	cut	 in	CPP	benefits	would	also	 increase	 the	obligations	on	employer	plans,	
as most were integrated with the CPP—they essentially targeted a combined 
public-private	benefit	and	reduced	employer	pensions	by	a	portion	of	the	govern-
ment allowance (Coward 1995). 
	12.	 CPP	benefits	were	also	reduced	by	a	change	in	the	indexing	formula.	The	benefit	
calculation	now	indexed	past	wages	to	 the	present,	with	 the	“present”	defined	
as	average	wages	over	 the	five	years	prior	 to	retirement,	 rather	 than	 three.	As	
a	result,	benefits	are	now	sometimes	estimated	at	24	rather	than	25	percent	of	
indexed earnings. The reform also reduced future outlays by tightening access 
to	CPP	disability	benefits.	In	addition	to	raising	the	contribution	rate,	the	1997	
reform increased revenues by freezing the “exempt amount” of earnings not sub-
ject to tax. This exempt amount, which had been pegged at earnings up to 10 
percent of average earnings, was now frozen at $C3,500. 
 13. A proper analysis of the choice between equities and bonds in a social insurance 
program would not focus narrowly on the experience of the CPP and QPP from 
the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s, but the political process rarely makes 
decisions based on proper analysis. Within the investment community, which is 
sophisticated about such issues and tends to be suspicious about government, the 
recognition that the QPP had essentially abandoned social investment and was 
professionally managed did reduce anxiety over the use of equities in the CPP 
(communication from John Myles). 
 14. The automatic stabilizer is actually seen more as a lever forcing future govern-
ments to take some sort of action that restores solvency rather than the “proper” 
set of trade-offs to restore CPP solvency in all situations.
 15. The government could respond to a prolonged market downturn by shifting 
funds from general revenues. The CPP could repay this advance, and rebuild the 




The U.S. retirement income system faces an enormous challenge, 
with the transition to a much older society about to begin. The now 
dominant 401(k) plans have not produced the accumulations that peo-
ple will need for a secure retirement, and the backbone of the retirement 
system—Social Security—faces a long-term shortfall. The introduction 
of provisions, such as automatic enrollment, to make 401(k) plans more 
automatic and easier may improve their performance. Efforts to restore 
balance to the Social Security program, however, appear stymied. Many 
observers, for different reasons, nevertheless suggest that investment in 
equities should be part of the solution.
The	Social	Security	funding	deficit	is	equal	to	2.02	percent	of	tax-
able payrolls when measured over the traditional 75-year planning hori-
zon	and	3.70	percent	when	calculated	from	now	to	infinity.	These	mag-
nitudes are very close to those that existed in the mid-1990s when the 
1994–1996	Social	Security	Advisory	Council	attempted	to	fix	the	prob-
lem. The council was caught in a dilemma. While charged with closing 
the	financing	gap,	its	members	resisted,	for	different	reasons,	restoring	
balance	solely	by	raising	taxes	or	cutting	benefits.	They	all	resorted	to	
a new source of revenue—namely, the higher expected return on equity 
investment—to	help	solve	the	financing	problem.	
The council produced three separate proposals: 1) invest a portion 
of trust fund assets in equities; 2) “add on” individual accounts, in-
vested	 in	 equities,	 that	would	 top	 up	 the	 reduced	benefits	 that	 could	
be	financed	by	 the	current	payroll	 tax;	 and	3)	 “carve-out”	 individual	
accounts	invested	in	equities,	funded	by	redirecting	a	significant	por-
tion of current payroll taxes and sharply reducing the guaranteed social 
insurance	 benefit.	The	 council,	 however,	 failed	 to	 reach	 a	 consensus	
around one of these plans. No action has since been taken, and these 
three options remain on the table. President Bush’s 2005 Social Secu-
rity reform proposals are a direct descendent of the carve-out individual 
account proposal. Many Democrats have advocated add-on individual 
accounts. The nation’s largest membership organization for older peo-
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ple, the AARP, included investing 15 percent of trust fund assets in eq-
uities	as	part	of	a	package	to	eliminate	Social	Security’s	75-year	deficit	
(AARP 2005). 
Much has been written about each of these approaches, and the pur-
pose of this book is not to duplicate those analyses. Rather, it is to ex-
plore the experiences of countries that have systems much like that of 
the United States and have introduced equities into their public pension 
system in each of these three ways. This chapter summarizes the les-
sons learned both in terms of system design and the ability to manage 
the risk associated with equity investment.
THE CHALLENgE FACINg THE UNITED STATES
By the end of the twentieth century, the United States had largely 
succeeded	in	providing	its	elderly,	for	the	first	time	in	history,	a	reason-
ably secure and comfortable standard of living. 
This achievement has since been threatened by two developments. 
Rapid population aging most directly challenges the solvency of pub-
lic pay-as-you-go programs. Employers have also withdrawn from the 
sponsorship	of	defined-benefit	pension	plans.	Shifts	in	the	nature	of	in-
dustry and increased regulation explain some of this withdrawal. But the 
financial	storm	at	the	end	of	the	century,	the	combination	of	low	interest	




this shift eliminated severance incentives that used system resources to 
induce the “retirement” of workers who were clearly employable and 
not truly old, but critical shortcomings remain. Employer-sponsored 
defined-contribution	plans	were	not	designed	to	be	the	primary	private-
sector component of the nation’s retirement income system. They are 
voluntary and transfer all the responsibility for retirement planning to 
the	 individual	worker.	They	also	expose	participants	 to	significant	fi-
nancial and longevity risks. They are costly to administer, and they tend 
to	leak	assets	so	that	workers	often	arrive	at	retirement	with	insufficient	
balances. 
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In addition to the withdrawal of employers from the provision of re-
tirement income, the nation’s most pressing retirement income problem, 
as	already	noted,	 is	 the	financial	 shortfall	 the	Social	Security	 system	
faces. While this shortfall is not enormous when viewed as a percent-
age of GDP, it will not be easily closed. The payroll tax, which funds 
both Social Security and Medicare, now takes more than 15 percent of 
earnings,	split	evenly	between	workers	and	employers.	The	benefit	cuts	
enacted	in	1983,	which	will	be	phased	in	over	the	first	quarter	of	the	
twenty-first	 century,	will	 reduce	Social	Security	 replacement	 rates	 to	
their lowest point in history. Given the substantial risks in 401(k) plans, 
further reductions in Social Security pensions could result in clearly 
inadequate	old-age	incomes.	To	restore	solvency	without	a	significant	
tax increase or cut in old-age incomes, many policymakers would add 
investments in equities to the program design. 
To help evaluate the nation’s options going forward, this book re-
viewed the experience of three nations with Anglo-Saxon retirement in-
come systems similar to our own—the United Kingdom, Australia, and 





the United States, unlike the other three nations, the two tiers are con-
tained within a single program—Social Security (see Table 7.1). 
Since 1980, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have each 
reformed their public old-age income programs along the lines of one of 
the approaches proposed by the Advisory Council: carve-out individual 
accounts, add-on individual accounts, and the investment of a portion 
of trust fund assets in equities. Each system is solvent in the sense that 
they	are	expected	to	pay	benefits	promised	under	current	law,	and	the	
reforms have been in place long enough to illustrate the opportunities 
and challenges implicit in each. 
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LESSONS FROM THE UK ExPERIENCE 
By the end of the 1970s, the United Kingdom had created a retire-
ment income system quite similar to that in the United States. Its two 
social	insurance	programs,	the	flat	Basic	State	Pension	and	SERPS,	to-
gether	would	have	produced	benefits	very	close	to	those	provided	by	
the U.S. Social Security program. Britain also had a robust employer 
pension institution, similar to that in the United States. A major dif-
ference was that the British government allowed, indeed encouraged, 
employers to “contract out” of SERPS and provide the public earnings-
related	benefit	through	their	equity-funded	pension	plan.	
In response to a change of government in 1979 and to the growing 
awareness of the impending demographic transition, the United King-
dom reformed its system along the lines of the Advisory Council carve-
out approach. It sharply cut public pensions, both the Basic State Pen-
sion and SERPS, and shifted an increasing portion of the government’s 
diminished old-age income responsibilities to the private sector. Con-
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tracting out had already established the principal of private retirement 
plans assuming social security obligations, with those plans funded with 
contributions carved out of the payroll tax and invested in equities. The 
government now encouraged workers to contract out of SERPS using 
individual retirement savings accounts. At the same time, the govern-
ment guaranteed Basic State Pension was falling to just 15 percent of 
the national average earnings by the end of the twentieth century and is 
projected	to	be	just	7	percent	by	the	middle	of	the	twenty-first	century.	
British employers, like those in the United States, are also withdraw-
ing	from	traditional	defined-benefit	plans.	The	departure	came	later	in	
Britain and for somewhat different reasons. But, by the beginning of the 
twenty-first	century,	private	sector	employers	are	closing	their	defined-
benefit	plans	to	new	workers	and	offering,	at	best,	individual	account	
programs where workers bear most of the funding responsibilities and 
all of the risks. Thus, the great majority of those who contract out of 
SERPS (roughly half the workforce) will soon be in individual account 
type programs. So, like American workers under a carve-out reform, 
British workers are increasingly dependent on sharply reduced govern-
ment pensions and accumulations in individual retirement accounts. 
The British experience illustrates the high cost of administering and 
regulating accounts carved out of the payroll tax. Most U.S. carve-out 
proposals would improve on the British design by using the govern-
ment to collect and administer accounts with small balances. The cost 
Table 7.2  Estimated Administrative Costs of Pension Systems and Their 




Percent reduction in 
assets at retirement
Social Security $11 per participant 2
Federal Thrift Savings Plan $25 per participant 5
Mutual funds (average) 1.09% of assets 23
Private	defined-contribution	funds
Large plans $24 per participant
0.8% of assets
21
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of selling and administering individual accounts, even well above the 
“small balance” threshold, is nevertheless high (Table 7.2). The British 
mis-selling scandal also illustrates costs created by the vulnerability of 
carve-out designs to abuse and error. The British experience also illus-
trates	the	difficulties	carve-out	designs	encounter	in	defining	regulatory	
rules	on	matters	such	as	annuitization	and	inflation-proofing—difficul-
ties that are costly to overcome. 
Another lesson from the U.K experience is that the “adequacy” of 
old-age pensions is more of a “relative” than an “absolute” concept—
that is, notions of adequacy are tied to a moving social norm, not a static 
basket of necessities. Britain price-indexed the Basic State Pension in 
1980,	 in	effect	defining	the	basic	pension	as	 the	basket	of	goods	and	
services that could be purchased by the Basic State Pension in 1980, 
which was then 25 percent of average earnings. Britain’s welfare sys-
tem, however, had long pegged poverty as income less than about 20 
percent of average earnings, a moving social norm. Both Conservative 
and Labor governments had used means-tested programs to assure the 
elderly an income above that threshold amount, pegged to incomes in 
the economy at large. 
As British social insurance pensions declined, the only way to as-
sure the elderly an adequate income was through a means-tested wel-
fare program, but such programs reduce incentives to work and save. To 
counter the moral hazard created by means-testing, Britain introduced 
the Pension Credit with a tapered withdrawal rate. Because of the taper, 
half	 the	elderly	population	became	eligible	for	means-tested	benefits.	
The proportion will rise as the Basic State Pension continues to decline 
relative to earnings, since the welfare benchmark keeps pace with earn-
ings growth. By midcentury, three-quarters of the elderly should thus 
be	eligible	for	means-tested	benefits	at	any	point	in	time	and	a	greater	
proportion at some point in their lives. The British experience thus il-
lustrates how means-tested programs can rapidly expand through the 
introduction of a taper designed to counteract moral hazard. 
Guaranteed	 Social	 Security	 benefits	 are	 especially	 vulnerable	 to	
falling below socially acceptable norms and triggering an expansion of 
means-testing	under	a	carve-out	reform.	In	the	first	instance,	carve-out	
proposals	 reduce	 Social	 Security	 benefits	 to	 fit	within	 the	 program’s	
current resources. Many carve-out proposals do this through price-in-
dexing or some other mechanism that does not assure the elderly an 
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income that will likely be seen as adequate. All carve-out proposals 
then allow workers to divert a portion of their social insurance con-
tributions into an individual retirement savings account but require in 
exchange	a	reduction	in	their	Social	Security	benefits.	Even	if	a	carve-
out	reform	retains	an	adequate	initial	benefit,	workers	who	elect	the	in-
dividual account option will generally bring their remaining guaranteed 
benefit	well	below	the	adequacy	threshold.	The	only	way	to	assure	such	
workers an adequate income is through a means-tested program. The 
British experience suggests that a broad take-up of the individual ac-
count	option,	with	a	reduction	in	guaranteed	benefits	below	the	socially	
acceptable level of adequacy, could quickly lead to a major expansion 
of means-testing that could make the elderly, on the whole, a welfare-
dependent population. To avoid this outcome, the British government 
is now considering major reform of its retirement income system that 
would abandon the carve-out design. 
The carve-out approach as implemented in the United Kingdom pro-
duced	sharply	lower	guaranteed	social	insurance	benefits,	the	privatiza-
tion of much of the nation’s diminished retirement income system, in-
creased reliance on individual retirement income planning, and a major 
expansion of means testing. The goal was to reduce dependence on the 
state	and	increase	reliance	on	individual	initiative	and	private	financial	
markets. However, retirement income systems emerged throughout the 
industrial world because people generally proved themselves incapable 
of preparing for their own old age. Many people have a myopic view 
when trading consumption today for consumption in the future. In addi-
tion, many people simply lack the information and investment channels 
they need to accumulate and protect their savings for retirement. The 
British experience suggests that this original incapacity has not been 
overcome. If given the latitude, workers will save too little, mishandle 
the risks and complexities of retirement income planning, and require 
an extensive safety net. Thus, the outcome of sharp social insurance 
cutbacks and expanded privatization—in the United States as in Brit-
ain—is likely to be just the opposite of what its proponents desire.  
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LESSONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN ExPERIENCE 
Australia reformed its retirement income system somewhat along 
the lines of add-on individual accounts. Like the add-on proposal, the 
Australian Superannuation Guarantee program brought additional re-
sources to the retirement income system. Superannuation Guarantee 
contributions, at 9 percent of earnings, are far larger than add-on pro-
posals in the United States, but the preexisting Australian public system 
was limited to the means-tested Age Pension and had no earnings-re-
lated component. The addition of a substantial earnings-related Super-
annuation	Guarantee	was	therefore	needed	to	approximate	the	benefit	
structure in typical Anglo-Saxon retirement systems—that of contribu-
tions	and	benefits	rising,	and	replacement	rates	falling,	with	earnings.	
The administrative costs of the individual accounts under Austra-
lia’s Superannuation Guarantee program are lower than those in the 
U.K individual account system because the contributions are largely 
collected and invested collectively, by employers or employer-union 
plans, and thus capture important economies of scale in marketing, ad-
ministration, and investment management. The mandatory character of 
the contribution also reduces marketing, education, and operating costs 
below those in voluntary U.S. 401(k) programs, which are otherwise of 
comparable size and similarly managed. 
Many Australians had hoped that workers would accumulate 
enough assets in their Superannuation Guarantee accounts to return the 
Age Pension to its original safety net function. But the Australian Trea-
sury projections have 75 percent of the elderly collecting Age Pension 
benefits	 even	 after	 the	 Superannuation	 Guarantee	 program	 matures,	
with	 even	more	 collecting	 benefits	 at	 some	 point	 in	 their	 lives.	The	
retirement income generated by Superannuation Guarantee contribu-
tions also carries a good deal of risk. For this reason as well, the Age 
Pension will remain the central component of the Australian retirement 
income system. The continuing centrality of the Age Pension in the 
Australian system, even with the Superannuation Guarantee taking 9 
percent of earnings, illustrates the high cost of retirement. By analogy, 
the standard contribution to U.S. 401(k) plans, which is also 9 percent, 
(ProfitSharing/401(k)	Council	of	America	2005)	will	never	accumulate	
enough assets to serve as the sole source of support in retirement, high-
lighting	the	need	for	a	meaningful	Social	Security	benefit.	
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A key lesson for the United States arises from the interaction be-
tween Australia’s Superannuation Guarantee individual account and its 
means-tested Age Pension programs. The means-tested Age Pension 
plays	an	important	role	in	that	it	offsets	a	significant	portion	of	the	risk	
associated with equity investments in the Superannuation Guarantee 
program.	Age	Pension	benefits	rise	for	those	who	outlive	their	assets,	
invest poorly, or are in unlucky cohorts when it comes to investment 
returns.	It	also	funds	those	higher	benefits	by	reducing	benefits	to	those	
who do well. The means-tested Age Pension therefore functions as a 
valuable risk-pooling mechanism. 
The interaction between Australia’s individual account and means-
tested	programs	also	has	two	dysfunctional	effects.	The	first	is	the	over-
investment in assets such as housing, consumer durables, and exotic 
annuity products that yield lower returns than alternative investments 
(such as stocks and bonds issued by the business sector) on a before-tax 
and before-Age Pension basis, but higher returns after netting out tax 
and Age-Pension reductions. Potentially far more serious is the incen-
tive for workers to retire early, cut back on savings, and spend down 
their assets prior to reaching old age, so that they can collect a higher 
Age	Pension	benefit.	In	other	words,	the	Age	Pension	means	test	creates	
a powerful incentive for workers to retire early and dissipate assets well 
before they reach “old age.” By contrast, the incentives in the 401(k) 
program	and	the	actuarial	adjustment	of	U.S.	Social	Security	benefits	
both reward continued work. These incentives increase the resources of 
the retirement income system and encourage workers to delay drawing 
down their Social Security and private retirement wealth and shift it 
to older ages. Should the United States move to a means-tested public 
program, whether to manage risk or better target public support for the 
elderly, it could undo key work incentives and weaken the nation’s re-
tirement income system. 
LESSONS FROM THE CANADIAN ExPERIENCE 
Canada reformed its pension system, in response to the pressures 
created by demographic transition, by raising taxes to prefund the pub-
lic program and investing a portion of social insurance trust fund assets 
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in equities. The cost of administering and managing equity investments 
through	a	centrally	managed	trust	fund	is	significantly	lower	than	in	a	
myriad of individual accounts. Investment and mortality risks are also 
pooled far more effectively. The main disadvantage of this approach is 
the potential interference of the federal government in private corporate 
activity. 
While equity investments bring a higher expected rate of return 
than bonds, they are also risky. The question is the extent to which in-
dividuals face this market risk under an individual account arrangement 
as opposed to investing through the trust fund. Given the enormous 
variation in stock market returns, a constant contribution rate in an indi-
vidual account program will inevitably produce substantial overfunding 
relative to the target replacement rate for some cohorts and substantial 
underfunding for others. Attempts to stabilize replacement rates would 
require constant tinkering with contribution rates and can at best be 
only partially successful. Thus, it is virtually impossible to ensure sta-
ble replacement rates when individuals must rely on their independent 
investment results. 
In the case of the trust fund investing in equities, individuals avoid 




to restore solvency over a period of 100 years. In other words, the trust 
fund functions as a shock absorber, dampening the volatility inherent in 
equity investment. 
Future stock returns, of course, could turn out to be considerably 
lower than those experienced in the past. Such a decline, however, 
would be far more disruptive if the equities were held in individual 
accounts.	In	both	cases,	resources	would	be	inadequate	to	finance	pro-
jected	retirement	income	benefits.	The	question	is	who	would	bear	the	
loss. With individual accounts, retirees would simply have to live with 
lower	benefits.	With	trust	fund	investments,	younger	taxpayers	could	be	
required to pay higher taxes to offset some or all of the shortfall. The 
automatic	stabilizer	in	the	CPP	would	trigger	a	combination	of	benefit	
cuts and tax increases that would return the program to balance over 
a 100-year period. Incorporating equity investments within a public 
defined-benefit	pension	framework	 thus	dramatically	reduces	 the	risk	
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faced by future retirees compared to what they would face with indi-
vidual accounts.
The major concern about investing social insurance trust fund as-
sets in equities is the power it potentially puts in the hands of govern-
ment. Using trust fund assets for “socially desirable” purposes could 
undermine retirement income security. It would also open the door to 
government interference in the economy—often without public over-
sight—and this, in turn, undermines the democratic process.1 To guard 
against such threats, Canada has adopted a well-thought-out design, 
taken	from	the	governance	of	employer-defined	pension	plans,	intend-
ed to minimize political interference in the management of trust fund 
investments. The Canadian structure calls for an independent CPPIB, 
which is selected through a laborious political process that involves a 
wide	array	of	provincial	and	federal	officials.	The	board	must	periodi-
cally review its own performance and make frequent and extensive re-
ports to the pubic. Within this governance framework, the board is free 
to invest trust fund assets in the full gamut of opportunities available to 
employer	defined-benefit	pension	fund	managers.	
In the United States, most proposals for investing Social Security 
trust fund assets in equities reject such an active investment policy. They 
instead call for a passive strategy that invests trust fund assets in a broad 
market index, such as the Russell 3000 or the Wilshire 5000. (Note that 
in most individual account proposals, the government would also be 
required to select a series of funds that could be used in the program.) 
An expert investment board would select the index, choose portfolio 
managers for the accounts, and monitor the performance of the manag-
ers. To ensure that government ownership does not disrupt corporate 
governance, most proposals require that voting rights be given to the as-
set managers, not voted at all, or voted in the same fashion as the other 
shareholders, which is equivalent to not voting at all. 
Two types of government pensions in the United States already in-
vest in equities with no apparent ill effects. The federal Thrift Savings 
Plan	for	government	employees	has	established	highly	efficient	stock	
index funds. That is, the government is responsible for selecting the 
investment options provided to government employees. To date, these 
decisions	 have	 not	 been	 influenced	 by	 politics.	The	 plan’s	 designers	
insulated investment decisions by setting up an independent investment 
board,	narrowing	investment	choices,	and	requiring	strict	fiduciary	du-
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ties. The plan also operates in a political culture of noninterference. Its 
creators made clear from the beginning that economic, not social or 
political, goals were to be the sole purpose of the investment board. 
State and local pension funds also invest in equities. Some oppo-
nents of trust fund investment in equities contend that state and local 
pensions interfere in private sector activities. The contention is that 
these funds often undertake investments that achieve political or social 
goals, divest stocks to demonstrate that they do not support some per-
ceived immoral or unethical behavior, and interfere with corporate ac-
tivity by voting proxies and other activities. Recent research, however, 
documents that political considerations have had almost no effect on 
investment decisions at the state and local level (Munnell and Sundén 
2001). Indeed, public pension plans appear to be performing as well as 
private plans. 
The political stakes in placing such a large amount of wealth and 
corporate shares in government hands would still be high. But the task 
of overseeing equity investments in Social Security would be simpli-
fied,	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 success	 significantly	 enhanced,	 if	 it	 were	
done through the trust fund. The task of governing the investment of 
the trust fund in a passive equity index is clearly less than the daunting 
challenge of overseeing and regulating equity investments in a myriad 
of individual accounts. 
SUMMARy
The previous survey reveals three important conclusions relating 
to	the	size	of	benefits,	the	cost	of	retirement	income	programs,	and	the	
ability to manage investment risk.
The Size of Benefits
Workers	presumably	want	an	old-age	income	sufficient	to	maintain	
their standard of living. Social security, like public retirement income 
programs in other Anglo-Saxon nations, has never explicitly targeted 
this objective. The primary goal has been to provide reasonably ad-
equate earnings replacement for low-wage workers and a base upon 
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which publicly subsidized and regulated employer plans, plus other 
private saving efforts, could deliver reasonably adequate earnings re-
placement for middle- and upper-income earners. This combination of 
Social Security, employer plans, and private saving (primarily the ac-
cumulation of home equity) succeeded in delivering reasonably com-
fortable retirements to much of the elderly population by the end of the 
twentieth century. 
This	achievement	will	be	difficult	for	Social	Security	to	maintain	
going forward. As noted, Social Security replacement rates will decline 
under current law as the Normal Retirement Age increases, as ever larg-
er Medicare premiums are deducted from Social Security checks, and 
as	more	benefits	are	subject	to	the	personal	income	tax.	
If	wages	 grow	 as	 projected,	 benefits	will	 decline	 relative	 to	 pre-




three nations reviewed suggests that adequacy is, in large measure, rela-
tive. Australia’s Age Pension guarantees the elderly an income equal 
to 25 percent of male average earnings, or about a third of the national 
average wage. The Canadian Guaranteed Security Income program sets 
a	similar	minimum	income	floor.	Britain,	in	1980,	fixed	the	Basic	State	
Pension	in	absolute	terms	by	price-indexing	the	benefit.	When	the	Basic	
State Pension fell below the nation’s welfare stipend, traditionally set at 
about 20 percent of national average earnings, Britain transformed its 
retirement income system to assure the elderly that minimal welfare-
level income. To do so, it effectively replaced the Basic State Pension 
with the Pension Credit as the government’s “basic” retirement income 
program, replacing social insurance with means-tested welfare. Given 
that many U.S. proposals for reforming Social Security include further 
benefit	cuts,	 the	British	experience,	 in	particular,	 suggests	 that	defin-
ing the minimum public pension—and whether it should be absolute or 
relative and guaranteed or means tested—are critical agenda items. 
It also seems appropriate to identify some intermediate income tar-
get—between just above poverty and the maintenance of preretirement 
living standards—as a viable objective for Social Security or for the 
system as a whole. The most common such intermediate benchmark is 
a	“modest	but	adequate”	standard	of	living,	defined	as	an	income	that	
140   Munnell and Sass
“affords full opportunity to participate in contemporary society and the 
basic options it offers” (Parker 2002). For individuals, 40 percent of 
the average wage, the traditional Social Security replacement rate, is a 
reasonable income target needed to achieve that “modest but adequate” 
benchmark. The nation should seriously consider what it would take to 
assure this level of old-age income.
The Cost of Benefits
Retirement income programs are expensive. At the most basic level, 
the cost is measured by the required contributions. Social Security old-
age	and	survivor	benefits	take	10.6	percent	of	covered	earnings,	split	
evenly between employer and employee. They require another 2.02 per-
cent	to	fund	promised	benefits	over	the	next	75	years	and	3.70	percent	
to	fund	benefits	over	the	infinite	horizon.	Standard	401(k)	contributions	
run about 9 percent of earnings—6 percent from the worker and a 3 per-
cent employer match. Total contributions for someone who makes the 
standard 401(k) contribution are nearly 20 percent of earnings.2 A full 
accounting of the costs of retirement income programs would also in-
clude government tax expenditures—the foregone government revenue 
resulting from the special tax treatment given to pensions. 
The current payroll tax, 10.6 percent for old age and survivor ben-
efits	 and	 15.3	 percent	 including	 disability	 insurance	 and	 Medicare,	
though low by continental European standards, is high relative to pay-
roll taxes in Australia and Canada. Most Americans already pay more in 
payroll	tax	than	they	do	in	income	tax,	and	there	is	significant	political	
resistance to raising the rate.3 
Canada did increase its payroll tax in its 1997 reform. But the levy 
had been low, and the rate was pushed to only 9.9 percent. Australia 
also imposed mandatory contributions to individual “Superannuation 
Guarantee” accounts, akin to a tax on earnings, but the required con-
tribution was only 9 percent. This experience suggests there may be 
limited resistance to extracting contributions up to about 10 percent of 
earnings,	but	it	becomes	significantly	more	difficult	to	raise	rates	past	
the U.S. level of 15 percent. If the United States wants to add revenues 
to its programs for the elderly, it may well have to turn to sources other 
than the payroll tax.4 
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Managing Risk of Equity Investment
Because	the	taxes	for	financing	public	retirement	systems	are	so	high	
and	benefits	are	scheduled	to	increase	rapidly	as	the	population	ages,	
nearly all countries have attempted to mitigate some of the projected 
burden by introducing equities into their public pension systems.
The extent to which an entity can “count on” the higher returns of 
equity investments depends on its ability to manage the risk. Work-
ers who need to annuitize accumulations in an individual account at 
a particular date are not well-positioned to manage the risk in equi-
ties.	Defined-benefit	plans	which	can	pool	the	risks	for	large	numbers	
of people and spread risks over time are positioned far better. But, as 
the experiences in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada 
illustrate,	 employer-sponsored	 defined-benefit	 plans	were	 not	 able	 to	
emerge unscathed from the “perfect storm” of the simultaneous col-
lapse of interest rates and equity prices at the turn of the century. 
The best way to manage risk, as the Canadian example illustrates, is 
to hold equities in the social security trust fund. This approach is better 
for two reasons. First, the trust fund, unlike individual workers, can be 
expected to use professional investment management that can reduce 
risk	without	sacrificing	returns.	Second,	the	infinite-horizon	Social	Se-
curity	fund	can	smooth	fluctuations	in	returns	across	time,	so	the	adjust-
ments in work or consumption potentially required of any one cohort 
would be dramatically lower. 
On balance, it seems like investing a portion of the social security 
trust fund in equities is a feasible and desirable strategy. The higher 
expected	 returns	would	moderate	 the	 tax	 increases	 and	 benefits	 cuts	
required	 to	close	 the	financing	gap.	The	approach	has	 its	 limitations.	
Many observers agree that it would be undesirable for the trust fund 
to hold more than 5 to 10 percent of total U.S. equities. If in 2005 40 
percent of the Social Security trust funds ($1.9 trillion) were invested in 
equities, trust fund holdings (0.4 × $1.9 trillion = $760 billion) would 
amount to only 4 percent of total equities outstanding ($19 trillion). A 
policy of investing 40 percent of the trust fund in equities, phased in 
between 2006 and 2018, assuming a 6.5 percent real rate of return on 
equities, would eliminate more than half of Social Security’s 75-year 
deficit.	The	question	is	how	much	political	turmoil	would	such	a	strat-
egy create and whether the gains are worth it. 
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CONCLUSION
At some point, the debate over retirement income policy stops deal-
ing	in	the	pragmatics	of	costs,	benefits,	and	efficiency.	Proponents	of	
benefit	reductions	and	carve-out	individual	accounts	often	present	their	
proposals as part of a larger transition to an “ownership society,” with 
individual households shaking free of Social Security and becoming far 
more self-reliant. This vision expresses a notion of the “good society,” 
an end in itself, and a belief that the vitality of the nation derives from 
the activity of independent, freestanding households. 
The notions of “social security” and even a “national retirement in-
come system” derive from a different conception of the “good society” 
and the source of national vitality. This vision, which your authors hold, 
has a far less sanguine view of the state of nature. It sees individual 
households as immersed in the demands of everyday life and too myo-
pic to closely negotiate the powerful cross currents of modern industrial 
economies.	It	sees	saving	for	retirement	as	a	complex	matter,	difficult	to	
understand and fraught with uncertainties. Those who hold this vision 
claim that paring down Social Security and substituting individual ac-
counts is simply too perilous, while preserving social security, broadly 
construed, enhances independence and allows full participation in the 
life of society. 
This is not the place to evaluate these larger claims regarding the 
effects of Social Security and national retirement income systems. Both 
perspectives have elements of truth, and both can be extended too far. 
The point is that such beliefs underlie much of the retirement income 
debate. As such, they need to be acknowledged and discussed. But they 
must also be held somewhat in check, as we have a serious pragmatic 
problem that must be solved. Indeed, the process of developing a practi-
cal response might help the nation resolve this broader political debate. 
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Notes
  1. Note, however, that investing trust fund assets in equities forecloses the oppor-
tunity to use these assets as a captive source of credit for the government, which 
typically results in the government spending more than it otherwise would.  
 2. Including the employer’s Social Security contribution and 401(k) match in the 
worker’s earnings, the contribution is about 18 percent of earnings. 
  3. There is less resistance to raising the cap on the wage base or on forcing all new 
state and local workers into the system, and the 1994–1996 Advisory Council 
generally agreed on including these measures in any reform package. 
  4. General government revenues are drawn from a far broader base than the payroll 
tax, giving government the ability to spread the burden of population aging and 
raise	taxes	that	produce	the	least	adverse	effects.		General	revenue	financing	also	
allows the government to redirect resources freed up by population aging and 
low labor-force growth, such as expenditures on education and additional public 
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ployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of pub-
lications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a re-
search program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal 
research	program	by	providing	financial	support	to	researchers	outside	the	In-
stitute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for dis-
seminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in 
the	field;	and	4)	an	Employment	Management	Services	division,	which	man-
ages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the 
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solu-
tions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic de-
velopment and local labor markets.
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